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Abstract 
 
Thomas S. Kuhn claimed that the meanings of scientific terms change in theory 
changes or in scientific revolutions. In philosophy, meaning change has been taken 
as the source of a group of problems, such as untranslatability, incommensurability, 
and referential variance. For this reason, the majority of analytic philosophers have 
sought to deny that there can be meaning change by focusing on developing a theory 
of reference that would guarantee referential stability. A number of philosophers 
have also claimed that Kuhn’s view can be explained by the fact that he accepted and 
further developed many central tenets of logical empiricism. I maintain that the 
genesis of Kuhn’s meaning theorising lies in his historical approach and that his view 
of meaning change is justified. Later in his career he attempted to advance a theory 
of meaning and can be said to have had limited success in it. What is more, recent 
cognitive science has unexpectedly managed to shed light on Kuhn’s insights on the 
organisation of information in the mind, concept learning, and concept definition. 
Furthermore, although Kuhn’s critique of Putnam’s causal theory of reference has 
often been dismissed as irrelevant, he has a serious point to address. Kuhn thought 
that the causal theory that works so well with proper names cannot work with 
scientific terms. He held that conceptual categories are formed by similarity and 
dissimilarity relations; therefore, several features and not only one single property 
are needed for determination of extension. In addition, the causal theory requires 
universal substances as points of reference of scientific terms. Kuhn was a 
conceptualist, who held that universals do not exist as mind-independent entities and 
that mind-dependent family resemblance concepts serve the role of universals. 
Further, at the beginning of his career, Kuhn was interested in the question of what 
concepts or ideas are and how they change in their historical context. Although he 
did not develop his theorising on this issue, I demonstrate that this is a genuine 
problem in the philosophy of history. Finally, Kuhn argued that scientists cannot 
have access to truth in history because we cannot transcend our historical niche, and 
as a consequence, the truth of a belief cannot be a reason for theory choice. Instead 
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of truth, we can rely on justification. I also discuss Kuhn’s idea that problem-solving 
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1. Multiple aspects of meaning change 
 
This thesis is a result of two interests and objects of study. It can be placed between 
an analytical account of meaning change and an interpretative study of Thomas S. 
Kuhn’s philosophy. The impetus for this was inspired several years ago by two rather 
different pieces of philosophical writing. The first is Donald Davidson’s essay “On 
the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, and the other is Kuhn’s treatise The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. After reading these I had a pre-analytic intuition 
that meaning change is something that naturally occurs in history rather than a 
philosophical problem, and that, by changing our basic ontology, it alters the way we 
understand reality.  
From a historical point of view, Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s claim, for example, 
that the meaning of ‘mass’, ‘time’, and ‘space’ changed in the transition from 
Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian sounds uncontroversial. If it is true that Newton 
understood mass, time and space as absolute, how could there not have been a 
change in meaning? My feeling was, to take another example, that if ‘earth’ in 
Ptolemy’s system meant something unique and stable in the centre of the Universe, 
Copernicus must have changed its meaning, just as Kuhn asserts. However, I could 
see what Davidson was saying in the article, and that it was, in part, directed against 
Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s ideas of meaning change, untranslatability, and 
incommensurability. His message is that the idea of untranslatable conceptual 
schemes or the idea that there is something that organises our experience making 
reality, or better, what counts as real, relative to a scheme implies a contradictory 
position philosophically: different (incommensurable) points of view make sense 
only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them, and this is an 
assumption that undermines the claim of dramatic incomparability. Nevertheless, I 
took his article as an illustration of how exciting a phenomenon meaning change can 
be, not only because the claim of meaning change appeared to accord so well with 
historical or cultural studies, but also because I presumed that we do not need to 
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accept all the premises and commitments implicit in Davidson’s argument. The 
thesis of meaning change seemed to show that our basic ontology changes from time 
to time altering the view of what and what kind of entities our world is inhabited by. 
It was this that primarily interested me. Once there was mass, time and place but later 
something else - mass*, time* and place*. Or, once there were such things as 
phlogiston, cadaveric particles, and inertia, but in another time oxygen, bacteria, and 
momentum. This conclusion prompted an adjacent question that seemed to lead to an 
interesting investigation of the origins of our world view: What is the causal factor 
that brings about such changes? I took it for granted that there is such a ‘meaning’, 
upon which this kind of investigation can rely.   
 The doctoral thesis, therefore, was meant to be a study on meaning change 
carried out in the analytic framework. The primary questions of that putative study 
were intended to be as follows: What is that ‘meaning’ that changes? How do we 
recognise such changes? And what philosophical consequences would such a 
position entail? Once I realised that there is a large amount of writing on meaning 
change and incommensurability in philosophy, the seemingly natural conclusion was 
that studying the debate on meaning change would clarify the outlined position. That 
is what has been achieved, but with an unexpected outcome. After taking a closer 
look at the notions of meaning and meaning change, any illusion that such a view 
could be vindicated philosophically by the existing body of literature soon 
disappeared. Meaning change and its implications have come to signify a specific set 
of problems that ought to be overcome by an appropriate philosophical analysis, 
rather than a historically illuminating account of the emergence and transformation 
of our basic scientific ontologies.   
 The debate on meaning change in philosophy has been vivid and diverse over 
a period of several decades, but it has recently centred on a certain view that has 
achieved a high degree of acceptance among contemporary analytic philosophers. 
That discussion is studied in Chapter 2. The first element of this view is a historical 
interpretation of meaning change. It is suggested that the historical philosophers’ 
thesis of meaning change, as advanced by Kuhn and Feyerabend, is a further 
development from some of the basic tenets of logical empiricism. This alleged link 
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becomes understandable if we remember that the dream of logical positivism, that 
meaning could be fixed permanently by observation, evaporated gradually. Logical 
empiricism, a successor of logical positivism, had firstly come to accept through 
Carnap that not all terms can be given an explicit definition by reducing them to the 
observational language. Carnap suggested that the job could be done by so called 
reduction sentences. However, soon after he came to a more radical conclusion, i.e. 
that theoretical language needs to be taken in addition to observational language as a 
fully legitimate scientific language. This admission brought the idea that the meaning 
of at least some expressions is determined by their place in theory. In other words, 
meaning is in some cases theory-laden. According to this interpretation, Kuhn, 
Feyerabend and others continued from this point sweeping away the foundation of 
the logical empiricists’ double language model by questioning whether observation 
can ever be neutral, and also by arguing that it is, in fact, theory-laden. This makes 
the meaning of all expressions, whether tied directly to observation or not, dependent 
on theory.  
 The proposition that the meanings of terms change in the history of science 
has become a premise for many philosophically problematic conclusions. The best-
known consequence is incommensurability, customarily interpreted as 
incomparability. The point is that if theories and their terms are about different things 
altogether, or if we cannot translate between hypotheses of rival theories, then 
theories cannot be compared in a commensurable way. The question that has been 
asked is: If there is not such a precise and a rational comparison, how can we 
maintain the view that science has progressed? What is more, it seems evident that if 
theories in the past did not deal with the same subject matter as contemporary ones, 
then progress as convergence to truth is merely a pipe dream. This type of worry has 
given an incentive for many to argue that meaning does not alter. Consequently, 
meaning change has been (re)interpreted by the tools of philosophy of language in 
order to allow that interpretation. First of all, let us separate sense from reference. A 
typical assumption in philosophy after Frege is that sense determines reference. If 
we, then, take sense as theory-laden, and therefore change-sensitive, we can see the 
route to change in reference as well. It seems that Kuhn and Feyerabend implicitly 
accepted a wide descriptive theory of reference, according to which a description 
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comprising a large number of propositions determines reference. It is only natural 
that a theory, or some part of it, which functions as a descriptive determinant of 
reference, changes, making a shift in reference also possible. Yet, it seems that there 
is a problem only if reference changes, because it alone can offer us a point of 
comparison. If we can find a theory that makes reference invariant, then that is all 
that is important philosophically because it allows a comparison of the truth-values 
of propositions. The 1970s child, the causal theory of reference, first developed by 
Putnam and Kripke, appeared to postulate just that. It is a theory that does not 
employ descriptions and that can, therefore, guarantee invariance of reference in 
theory changes.  
 The above view undeniably makes a plausible story, and it offered me a 
potential way to proceed further. After understanding that the causal theory is not 
free of problems either, but is in fact in need of modification, the doctoral thesis 
could have focused on searching for a suitable theory of reference. However, I soon 
also realised that the story is inadequate for several reasons. Let me start with the 
historical explanation offered.  
 The presumption implied in the above interpretation, namely that the 
meaning-change thesis is an account with a uniform historical genesis, forces us to 
look into the background of the philosophers that formulated the thesis. This is one 
of the major tasks of Chapter 3. The idea that Kuhn had adopted the philosophical 
framework of logical empiricism so that he was able to extend the tenets of it, struck 
me as being especially surprising once Kuhn’s education, which involved no formal 
studies of philosophy, is taken into account. By comparing two of those who 
advanced the thesis of meaning change, namely Kuhn and Feyerabend, we can see 
that the meaning-change account has more than one origin. Feyerabend is actually 
closer to being a late empiricist than Kuhn. The former worked under and with 
philosophers who were very closely affiliated with logical positivism or empiricism. 
At the beginning of his career, he associated himself with that tradition while also 
attacking it. Kuhn’s interest in such philosophical notions as meaning and meaning 
change emerges from his studies of the history of science. He knew logical 
empiricism only in its outline and criticised the implied view of history on the basis 
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of his historical research. Studies on the history of science seemed to suggest to 
Kuhn that meaning is some kind of holistic notion that changes in theory transitions. 
This origin could not be further from Carnap’s detailed philosophical investigations 
of meaning. In other words, Kuhn’s meaning-change thesis is a positive construction 
out of historical studies, while Carnap’s view of meaning, which allows changes of 
meaning in some cases, is a concession in the face of insurmountable difficulties in 
regard to the Received View of logical positivism.   
 However, it is not only that the intellectual backgrounds of Kuhn and 
Feyerabend are different, but also that their attitudes to meaning and meaning change 
are divergent. After the initial formulation of the meaning-change idea, Kuhn saw 
these notions as central and also as worthy of further later development, while 
Feyerabend wished to discuss meaning only, as he said, “in the gossip columns” 
(Feyerabend 1981b, 113) and moved on to other issues. This makes it reasonable to 
exclude Feyerabend from consideration and to focus instead on what Kuhn had to 
say on meaning and meaning change. I show in Chapter 3 that Kuhn did attempt to 
specify his ideas on meaning and meaning change, and he can, moreover, be said to 
have had some success in this, although not in having managed to develop a 
sophisticated account. Kuhn’s early intuition that meaning is holistic and 
psychological, or sociopsychological, is better expressed later in his applications of 
Wittgenstein’s family resemblance notion. He rejects the classical theory of concepts 
that defines concepts by sufficient and necessary conditions. Kuhn tries to develop a 
theory of concept learning according to which concepts are learned by observing the 
similarities and dissimilarities of objects. This ostensive learning results in the family 
resemblance concepts that are defined by the net of overlapping and crisscrossing 
similarity relations. He further speculates on how information is stored in the mind, 
suggesting that there is a kind of holistic structure that not only stores information in 
the mind but also conceptualises the world and experience for us. This holistic 
structure is variously called at different times ‘conceptual scheme’, ‘mental module’, 
and ‘lexicon’.  
 Kuhn’s interest in the theory of concepts, the learning of concepts, and in the 
organisation of information in the mind is something that has long been largely 
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ignored in philosophical discussions. It is now the case that virtually all these issues 
have received a new momentum in applications from cognitive science. There are a 
number of scholars who have approached Kuhn’s philosophy from a specific 
cognitive-historical orientation. Chapter 4 thoroughly explores the cognitive link and 
also takes into account the research of those few that have earlier discussed some of 
the above insights of Kuhn.  
A question of special interest is whether cognitive science can explicate 
Kuhn’s meaning change by framing it as a certain type of conceptual change. I show 
that Kuhn’s insight that information is organised and stored in some kind of holistic 
structure is now seen to be receiving support from recent research in cognitive 
science. There is a large amount of empirical evidence that can be interpreted as 
corroboration of that idea; furthermore, there are a number of suggestions as to the 
specific shape of that structure. The earliest proposal was that of something called a 
semantic network; later, the notion of a frame that stores information in clusters of 
feature associations has become more popular. Despite the fact that Kuhn’s theory of 
concept learning does not appear to receive similar empirical support, it is of interest 
on its own, even with its limited applicability to concepts that deal with observable 
objects. Finally, it is true that even though Kuhn advocated the family resemblance 
view of concept and sought to apply it in the philosophy and history of science, he 
never advanced an explicit theory of concept. Nevertheless, scholars with a 
historical-cognitive orientation believe that research in cognitive psychology has 
given an empirical vindication to Wittgenstein’s family resemblance concept. 
However, I think this is far too strong a claim. The past failure of the classic account 
of concept does not make it impossible to find a definition by sufficient and 
necessary conditions in the future. I maintain that what is fundamentally at stake is 
how extension is determined, i.e. whether instances that fall under a concept are 
determined by their mutual similarity to each other and dissimilarity to instances that 
fall under another concept, or whether they are determined by a set of necessarily 
shared features. For this reason, I treat Kuhn’s suggestion of the family resemblance 
account, which is also closely linked to his idea of concept learning, as a proposal on 
how extension is determined. On the whole, I argue in this chapter that Kuhn’s 
insights can be given a more precise, although extended and applied, interpretation 
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by recent studies in cognitive science. Perhaps surprisingly, this makes Kuhn look as 
if he was ahead of his time.  
 Kuhn’s theorising on meaning and meaning change may thus be said to be 
more nuanced and multi-facetted than has been perceived over the last few decades 
in philosophy. It is not necessarily only a source of problems, but it is also something 
that is potentially constructive. Nonetheless, it is true that the causal theory of 
reference has brought an interesting new theory to philosophy. One of the 
suggestions in regard to the causal account is that it solves the problems that are 
associated with meaning change. What is crucial is that it is seen to enable 
commensurability in science. This prompts us to ask the question whether such a 
suggested solution to Kuhn’s meaning change is viable. The question is posed and 
studied in Chapter 5.  
The setting for this is generally fruitful because Kuhn explicitly drafted his 
response to Putnam’s causal theory. Except in respect of proper names, Kuhn flatly 
rejects the causal theory in the context of the history of science. This rejection is 
grounded on two arguments. Firstly, Kuhn argues that normally it is impossible to fix 
the reference of a term by one single property alone. Rather, we need several features 
to make a difference to the contrasting categories of a term. Furthermore, it is not 
possible to make an undisputable distinction between essential and accidental 
properties. Kuhn suggests that reference is fixed by crisscrossing and overlapping 
similarities and dissimilarities between objects without a distinction between 
essential and superficial properties. Secondly, I show that the Putnam-Kuhn 
argument hides a genuine metaphysical difference. The causal theory of reference 
requires a single abstract entity or a universal, usually understood as an essence, 
where a term refers to, and which stays invariant in theory transitions. While a single 
reference point may be established with proper names, it is a lot more problematic 
with common nouns that are, however, most important in science. I argue that Kuhn 
is an anti-conceptual realist who does not have an account of universals. More 
precisely, he is the kind of conceptualist according to which individuals are real 
entities in the external world, but universals are real only as concepts in mind. Their 
function is to categorise objects. Moreover, my view is that when dealing with theory 
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changes Kuhn is talking about extension, i.e. a set of individual things or particulars, 
and not of reference, i.e. abstract entities or universal substances.  
The causal theory cannot work if there are no universals that would give us a 
single common point of comparison. For this reason we are left in Kuhn’s 
philosophy with changing sets of individuals that are determined by similarity and 
dissimilarity relations. That theory has been accused of blurring the line between 
what falls and what does not fall into a conceptual category, extending conceptual 
categories without limits. The problem is the so-called problem of wide-open texture. 
However, this criticism can be countered by understanding that the function of 
dissimilarity is that it excludes one instance of a category from qualifying as an 
instance of another.  
 All the chapters above deal with meaning change in the context of philosophy 
or cognitive science philosophically interpreted. It is possible to allege that 
historically, meaning change is yet something else, which might explain the initial 
persuasiveness of the meaning-change view in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. From a historical perspective, the primary question is not where and 
how our terms refer, but the main interest is in the thinking and the products of 
thinking of past scientists. The crucial question is naturally how this intensional 
meaning, concept, or “thought product” should be understood in the historical 
context.  
I show firstly in Chapter 6 that Kuhn, in his earliest historical writings, was 
indeed preoccupied by questions that are typical in the history of ideas and 
intellectual history: What are ideas or concepts? How do they come about? And how 
do they change or transform? Further, I examine two theoretical traditions that have 
given an answer to the above questions. Here mere terminological differences should 
not confuse us. It does not matter whether we are talking of concepts or ideas as long 
as the concern for the basic intellectual units in the history of thought is the same. 
Moreover, a concept or an idea can be taken as a meaning that a term denotes and as 
the notion that Kuhn is talking about in his historical texts.  
The first tradition studied is Arthur Lovejoy’s project on the history of ideas, 
with the unit idea as a central notion. This has generally been seen as a failure among 
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historians, but I argue that the traditional method of writing the histories of concepts 
and ideas actually presupposes something like a unit idea. That is, if one writes a 
history of a concept, such as the ‘atom’, all instantiations need to have something in 
common. And yet, it is true that reliance on a totally unchangeable unit idea 
overemphasizes continuity and conceals interesting points of discontinuities in the 
thinking of past scientists. The second tradition studied here, the cognitive history 
and philosophy of science, makes the family resemblance concept the basic 
theoretical tool. By that notion it is able to take discontinuities into account. The 
suggestion of the cognitive history and philosophy of science is more precisely that 
concepts are stereotypes or prototypes: Concept is taken as a summary of features of 
instances that fall under a concept and features are understood as having weights or 
emphases reflecting how likely it is that a particular object has this or that property. 
Unfortunately, due to the commitment to family resemblance, this proposal allows a 
situation where two instantiations of the same concept do not share any common 
feature. Consequently, any history written that relies on the family resemblance 
notion produces a narrative that postulates continuity merely via terms or via the 
minds of individual scientists.  For this reason, it is questionable whether it results in 
the history of concepts or intensional meanings. Furthermore, the notion of 
stereotype is interesting, but the problem with this specific account is that it assumes 
that concept is formed by observing real existing objects. And yet it is clear that I can 
possess a concept without having constructed it in such a way. Neither is it a 
requirement of having concepts that a concept should correspond to any real entity or 
property in the world.  
My solution is to accept the insight of Lovejoy that the logic of history 
writing requires that all exemplifications of the same historical concept share 
something. Yet I also accept Nersessian’s idea that discontinuities and their 
representation matter. Furthermore, with regard to the cognitive history and 
philosophy of science, I take historical concepts as psychological or 
sociopsychological entities that are subject to natural explanation, this being unlike 
Lovejoy’s history of ideas. For these reasons, I suggest that a concept or a meaning 
historically can be understood as something that has a minimal, “necessary”, shared 
component, but it does not have an unambiguous or full definition beyond that. In 
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other words, a history of a concept implies that sub-concepts of the covering 
historical concept have a common core, which guarantees their conceptual 
membership, but it also allows that all other, out-of-core, elements can change. The 
full explicit definition is unreachable, because no illuminating definition of the 
concept can offer an exhaustive account of features that vary in the course of its (or 
its exemplifications’) history. This conclusion stems from the belief that, historically, 
it makes the best sense. In light of this, I give an example of meaning change as an 
‘element’ in 18
th
 century chemistry. Further, I (re)interpret the notion of 
incommensurability. Incommensurability may be taken as the practical difficulty of 
achieving translation and reaching comprehension in a situation where the same 
expressions imply radically different assumptions.   
 If, then, the causal theory of reference cannot be applied in the history of 
science, it naturally raises the question whether we are forced to accept 
incomparability as an inconvenient fact of history.  The question is an important one, 
as it has been a key concern in philosophy for four decades. In the penultimate 
chapter, I argue that incomparability is not a necessary consequence of Kuhn’s 
position. First of all, it is an exaggeration to say that Kuhn would have definitely 
propagated such a view. On several occasions, he writes that there are some values 
that are used in intertheoretic comparisons. What is really at stake is the comparison 
of truth-values. Kuhn contends that that cannot be done if being true means 
correspondence to absolute mind-independent reality, and therefore, the 
correspondence theory of truth does not have a use in historical explanations focused 
on theory choice. Scientists simply do not have access to truth, which means that 
they cannot tell truth from falsity in the situation of theory choice. Kuhn appeals to 
the pessimistic metainduction to prove the point: all that has been claimed to be true 
previously has turned out to be false; for this reason, there is good reason to suppose 
that all that we believe now to be true is not true. Kuhn puts forward his historical or 
developmental perspective according to which we are tied to our historical situation 
without an Archimedean neutral platform. All that we can do is to accept the existing 
body of beliefs and to revise it from that point. While there is no access to truth, as 
God would have, we can ask for the justification of our beliefs. However, Kuhn 
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argues that we ought not to require justification of single beliefs per se but we can 
ask for justification of changes of beliefs in the whole web of beliefs.  
Kuhn is epistemologically conservative, which is a position that can be 
supported not only by historical studies but also by evidence from cognitive science. 
This evidence suggests that drastic changes in our web of beliefs are impossible 
without there being an alternative available and that they are difficult to achieve in 
any case. I further argue that Kuhn’s philosophy of science and his epistemology can 
be incorporated into the coherentist epistemology. Firstly, conservatism is a natural 
consequence of the coherentist theory of justification; hence, epistemological 
conservatism receives an explanation if we assume that Kuhn is a coherentist. More 
importantly, Kuhn characterised science as problem-solving, and problem-solving is 
something that can be linked unproblematically to the concept of coherence. 
Admittedly, however, not all Kuhn’s intertheoretical values of comparison contribute 
directly to coherence, but also they can be linked to it via their role in problem-
solving. In this view, science is an attempt to increase the coherence of theories. In 
addition, coherence offers us a common standard to be used in a theory comparison: 
one should accept a more coherent theory if there is one available for the same task. 
While it may be argued that convergence to truth underlies and explains increasing 
coherence, I point out that the concept of verisimilitude is still in need of conceptual 
clarification, and in addition to that, convergence should be corroborated historically. 
Kuhn insists that there is no ontological convergence, although the case remains 
empirically undecided. At the very end, I draft briefly a pragmatic-historical view on 
the basis of Kuhn’s philosophy. This sees us as natural beings in touch with nature, 
but also situates us historically into a certain niche, with the consequence that theory 
construction inherently involves a perspective. 
 This thesis has turned out to be a study of multiple aspects of meaning change 
in or in relation to Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Meaning change has multiple 
aspects because it has been and/or can be seen in a philosophical, cognitive or purely 
historical framework. My overall view is that the customary philosophical 
interpretation is exaggerated and one-sided. The claimed consequences are not quite 
those that have been assumed. Further, Kuhn’s philosophy offers an answer to many 
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worries from his specific epistemological anti-realist perspective. Kuhn’s anti-
realism is, of course, rejected by scientific realists, but that does not make his 
philosophy unreasonable in any obvious way. The cognitive perspective, in turn, is a 
refreshing point of view in that it takes into account Kuhn’s later views and is able to 
occasionally show real points of contact with recent cognitive science. Finally, 
historical meaning change is only implied in Kuhn’s work. Although it is something 
that is historically intuitive and may be implied in many studies on history, it is also 
something that was left undeveloped in Kuhn’s philosophy and has remained such 
until this day.  
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2. Meaning change and philosophy of science 
 
The idea that the meanings of scientific terms change in theory changes, or at least in 
scientific revolutions, was introduced to the philosophy of science essentially by two 
historically-oriented philosophers of science: Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. 
Feyerabend. They were united in their belief, as were the other historical 
philosophers of their time, that the philosophy of science should base its 
argumentation on the realistic understanding of past scientific practice. Accordingly, 
Kuhn and Feyerabend mostly argued for meaning change by simply introducing case 
studies or examples that were meant to demonstrate the phenomenon. The initial 
plausibility of Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s claim derives also from the historical 
grounding of their argumentation. However, the assertion that the meanings of 
scientific terms change was not received favourably in the philosophy of science. In 
this chapter I will examine how discussion on meaning change has evolved since the 
1960s when the meaning-change thesis was first introduced.   
Firstly, I will look at some of the claims on meaning change made by Kuhn 
and Feyerabend. In this chapter these claims function as an introduction to the debate 
that they initiated in philosophy. The next chapter is devoted to a study of their 
message and underlying assumptions. Secondly, I outline how the problem of 
meaning change was typically interpreted. As this already implies, Kuhn’s and 
Feyerabend’s idea of meaning change was predominantly seen as a problem. Thirdly, 
I show into what kind of theoretical background the problem of meaning change was 
placed. In the last decade several philosophers have quite unexpectedly found an 
immediate intellectual predecessor of the historical philosophers in logical positivism 
and empiricism. Finally, I focus on the view that finds a solution on the basis of the 
analysis of the alleged theoretical background of meaning change. According to this 
view, a solution to the problem of meaning change can be found from the 
contemporary applications of the philosophy of language. More precisely, theories of 
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 14 
reference are thought to pave the way for overcoming the set of problems brought by 
Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s meaning change.  
 
Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s meaning change  
 
A famous example of Kuhn’s meaning change is the meaning change of central 
terms in the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics. Kuhn considers 
whether we could derive Newtonian dynamics from relativistic dynamics. Some have 
suggested that this is possible if we restrict the range of the parameters and the 
variables of the Einsteinian statements. By limiting the conditions of the application 
of the derived laws we would be able to deduce a set of N-laws from Einstein’s 
mechanics that are identical to the Newtonian laws. However, what is carried out in 
such a derivation appears to be a trick. The derivation does not give Newton’s laws, 
unless we can admit an interpretation impossible before Einstein. Kuhn writes:  
 
The variables and parameters that in the Einsteinian Ei’s represented 
spatial position, time, mass, etc. still occur in the Ni’s and they still 
represent Einsteinian space, time and, mass. … Unless we change the 
definition of the variables of the Ni’s, the statements we have derived 
are not Newtonian. If we do change them, we cannot properly be said 
to have derived Newton’s laws. (SSR, 101-2)  
  
Kuhn adds also that “(T)his need to change the meaning of established and familiar 
concepts is central to the revolutionary impact of Einstein’s theory.” (SSR, 102) We 
find passages that imply a similar view throughout The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. Kuhn tells us in a straightforward way what ‘space’ meant in Newtonian 
mechanics, and how it changed from that:  
 
The laymen who scoffed at Einstein’s general theory of relativity 
because space could not be “curved” – it was not that sort of thing – 
were not simply wrong or mistaken. Nor were the mathematicians, 
physicists, and philosophers who tried to develop a Euclidean version 
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of Einstein’s theory. What had previously been meant by space was 
necessarily flat, homogenous, isotropic, and unaffected by the 
presence of matter. (SSR, 149)  
 
Furthermore, Kuhn’s thesis is not limited to the Einsteinian revolution. His 
favourite historical example deals with another famous revolution - the Copernican 
revolution in astronomy.  
 
Consider, for another example, the men who called Copernicus mad 
because he proclaimed that the earth moved. They were not either just 
wrong or quite wrong. Part of what they meant by ‘earth’ was fixed 
position. Their earth, at least, could not be moved. (SSR, 149)  
  
And the meaning change in the Copernican revolution does not only concern 
‘planet’, but also ‘sun’:   
 
The Copernicans who denied its traditional title ‘planet’ to the sun 
were not only learning what ‘planet’ meant or what the sun was. 
Instead, they were changing the meaning of ‘planet’ so that it could 
continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all celestial 
bodies, not just the sun, were seen differently from the way they had 
been seen before. The same point could be made about any of our 
earlier examples. (SSR, 129-30) 
 
It is important to note the last sentence in the above quotation. Kuhn clearly extends 
meaning change to cover a large number of cases. The point that meaning change is 
not confined to a couple of the most famous revolutions in the history of science is 
also made clear in the following passage:  
 
Though subtler than the changes from geocentrism to heliocentrism, 
from phlogiston to oxygen, or from corpuscles to waves, the resulting 
conceptual transformation [in the Einsteinian revolution] is no less 
decisively destructive of a previously established paradigm. (SSR, 
102) 
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Feyerabend writes of meaning change in synchrony with Kuhn. The 
difference is, though, that he explicitly calls into question “the principle of meaning 
invariance” in his 1960s articles. The principle says that the meaning of scientific 
terms stays invariant in theory changes. He says that this idea played a decisive role 
in Platonism and in the Cartesian physics and mechanics. (Feyerabend 1981a, 46) In 
these traditions, key terms of physics, such as ‘matter’, ‘space’ and ‘motion’, and in 
metaphysics, those of ‘god’ and ‘mind’, are supposed to stay invariant in any 
explanations involving them. According to Feyerabend, this is inconsistent with 
empiricism and historically inaccurate.    
Feyerabend claims that in the classical, pre-relativistic physics, the concept of 
mass (of length and of duration) was absolute. The mass of a system was not 
influenced by its motion in the chosen co-ordinate system. By contrast, Feyerabend 
writes that in the relativistic physics mass is a relational property, and one has to take 
into account the co-ordinate system in which spatiotemporal descriptions are 
conducted. In brief, Feyerabend tells us that in the pre-relativistic physics we are 
measuring an intrinsic property of the system under consideration, whereas in the 
relativistic physics we are measuring a relation between the system and certain 
characteristics of a domain. Like Kuhn, he argues that for this reason no reduction or 
derivation relation between these two systems of physics is possible. (Feyerabend 
1981a, 81-2) 
Another example by Feyerabend deals with the relation between the medieval 
impetus theory and Newton’s physics. The question is whether the momentum of a 
moving object in the Newtonian theory is an analogue of the impetus in the medieval 
theory of motion. If this were so, it would be possible to reduce the impetus theory to 
Newtonian mechanics. He implies that logical empiricists have assumed something 
like this, most notably Ernst Nagel in his Structure of Science (1961). However, 
Feyerabend flatly rejects this possibility. ‘Impetus’ and ‘momentum’ mean 
something different. ‘Impetus’ is a kind of force that pushes a body along, like a cart 
drawn by a horse, while ‘momentum’ is the result rather than the cause of the 
motion. Secondly, the inertial motion of classical mechanics occurs by itself without 
any causes, unlike its Aristotelian and medieval counterparts. (Feyerabend 1981a, 
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65) His conclusion is that the meaning of ‘force’ has not stayed invariant in the 
Newtonian scientific transformation. 
Feyerabend takes preliminary steps towards a more formal explication of his 
conception of meaning change. He writes:  
  
What happens here when a transition is made from a theory T’ to a 
wider theory T (which, we shall assume, is capable of covering all the 
phenomena that have been covered by T’) is something much more 
radical than incorporation of the unchanged theory T’ (unchanged, 
that is, with respect to the meanings of its main descriptive terms as 
well as to the meanings of the terms of its observation language) into 
the context of T. What does happen is, rather, a replacement of the 
ontology (and perhaps even of the formalism) of T’ by the ontology 
(and the formalism) of T, and a corresponding change of the meaning 
of the descriptive elements of the formalism of T’ (provided these 
elements and this formalism are still used). This replacement affects 
not only the theoretical terms of T’ but also at least some of the 
observational terms which occurred in its test statements. That is, not 
only will description of things and processes in the domain in which 
T’ had been applied be infiltrated, either with the formalism and the 
terms of T, or if the terms of T’ are still in use, with the meanings of 
the terms of T, but the sentences expressing what is accessible to 
direct observation inside this domain will now mean something 
different. In short, introducing a new theory involves changes of 
outlook both with respect to the observable and with respect to the 
unobservable feature of the world, and corresponding changes in the 
meanings of even the most ‘fundamental’ terms of the language 
employed. (Feyerabend 1981a, 44-5)  
 
Feyerabend’s view appears to be that in theory transitions basically all terms are 
affected by changes of their meanings. There is no difference in this respect between 
theoretical and observational terms. Moreover, meaning change counts as a 
replacement of ontology.  
I have outlined above what Kuhn and Feyerabend initially claimed on 
changes of meaning. It is clear that they rely crucially on the historical argumentation 
and on some specific examples from the history of science. The assumptions that 
underlie their view or the implicit theory of meaning are not explicit at this point. 
Next, I will discuss how the idea of meaning change was received in the philosophy 
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of science. Since the first argument for meaning change in the early 1960s there have 
appeared a large number of papers written directly or indirectly on it. Although 
meaning change can be seen as a problem as such, commonly the idea of the 
meaning change of scientific terms is thought to be part of the argument for 
incommensurability between scientific theories. I do not intend to cover all the 
articles on meaning change or incommensurability as this would require separate 
research
1
, but instead I will give a representative description of the discussion on 




Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s views came under intense criticism soon after their first 
formulation
2
. Frederick Suppe’s introductory chapter “The Search for Philosophic 
Understanding of Scientific Theories” in The Structure of Scientific Theories serves 
well as a description of the early responses to meaning change
3
. The meaning-change 
thesis was really born only a few years before by Kuhn, Feyerabend, and a few other 
historical philosophers of science or scientists, such as David Bohm, Stephen 
                                                 
1
The Centre for Philosophy and Ethics of Science at the University of Hanover has a comprehensive 
bibliography on incommensurability that is also continuously updated. The bibliography can be found 
on-line at http://www.unics.uni-hannover.de/zeww/inc.conf.litlist.eng.html. For references of the 
discussion on incommensurability in relation to Kuhn, see Hoyningen-Huene (1993, 207).  
2
 Probably the first profound evaluation of Kuhn’s views is in the 1965 symposium, and later in a 
corresponding publication, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). 
Shapere’s early papers (1964, 1966) are also worth mentioning because, in addition to more typical 
criticism, Shapere brings forward more untypical polemic. That is, Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s views do 
not, according to Shapere, arise from the actual history of science after all, and the implied conception 
of meaning is neither clear nor (any reference to the notion of meaning) helpful for understanding the 
history of science.   
3
 The chapter is included in the volume that was born out of a symposium on the structure of scientific 
theories held in Urbana 1969. The symposium was supposed to gather together philosophers, 
historians of science and scientists to evaluate new alternative analyses to logical empiricism in regard 
to the structure of scientific theories. It drew audiences as large as 1200, and its participants’ views 
were, according to Suppe, “fairly representative of the current spectrum of philosophical thinking 
about the nature of scientific theories” and shows, therefore, “a revealing picture of what philosophers 
currently think about the nature of theories and their roles in the scientific enterprise”. Because the 
symposium collected audiences from different backgrounds, it was decided to include an introductory 
chapter to the philosophical literature on scientific theories of the century. Suppe says that the result, 
his chapter, is “as comprehensive a critical survey of the philosophical literature on theories as has 
been published” (Suppe 1977, vii). 
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Toulmin and Norwood Russell Hanson. Suppe’s analysis lays the framework for the 
future discussion on meaning change since in his criticism we find many of the seeds 
of later critique on meaning change.  
 Suppe formulates first weak and strong theses of meaning change and 
attributes one or the other to such philosophers as Feyerabend, Kuhn, Bohm, 
Toulmin, and Hanson. After that, he introduces five objections to these theses. The 
objections apply to both versions, and therefore, for our purpose, it is enough to take 
into account only one formulation of the meaning-change thesis. The strong 
meaning-change thesis says:   
 
All of the principles of the theory contribute to the meanings of the 
terms occurring in them; hence any change in theory alters the 
meanings of all the terms in the theory. (Suppe 1977, 199) 
 
Suppe argues that the first problem with the thesis is that the advocates of 
meaning change do not specify what it is to be a change in theory and what it is to be 
a change in meaning. Suppe asks whether a redetermination of the value of a 
physical constant counts as a change, both in theory and in the meanings of the terms 
in that theory. He points out that it is not clear whether there is any difference in 
change in belief, in theory, and in meaning. According to Suppe, Feyerabend thinks 
that any sufficiently general point of view concerning matter of fact is a theory. 
Suppe wonders if any change of belief is, therefore, a change in theory or in 
meaning, or both. (Suppe 1977, 200) 
 The second problem is that two theories could never contradict each other if 
the meaning-change thesis is correct. This follows from the idea, implied in the 
thesis, that the meaning of a term is determined by the theory it occurs in. An 
example of this kind of theory-dependence of meaning, given by Suppe, is how in 
Bohr’s theory of the atom, angular momentum and radiant energy cannot have 
continuous values, which they, in contrast, do have under classical thermodynamics. 
Any supposed contradiction is deceiving because the meanings of the terms are 
different. Even an expression of disagreement with the terms of the theories is 
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impossible because the terms have their meaning in virtue of the theories, and the 
theories assign different meanings to the same terms or words. The third problem is 
merely an addition to what has just been said. There can be neither agreement 
between theories for the same reason that disagreement is impossible. Again, this is a 
consequence of the premise that the meaning of all terms is theory-laden. There is no 
neutral observation language in which to express either agreement or disagreement, 
and as a result, theories talk beside each other. Suppe asks whether there is any sense 
in which theories can be seen as alternatives. (Suppe 1977, 201) 
 The fourth problem that follows from the meaning-change thesis is that it 
threatens to make science a non-empirical discipline. This is the case if every 
principle of the theory contributes to the meaning of the terms. The rejection of any 
principle results in a change in meaning. These principles seem to be, therefore, 
analytic because, according to Putnam’s idea of analyticity in the same volume, 
which Suppe cites, the mark of a statement being analytic is that its denial requires 
alteration in the meaning of terms. The fifth and final problem is that the testing of 
theories becomes circular, and no observation report can disconfirm or falsify a 
theory. Suppe asks us to consider a case where a prediction P of a theory disagrees 
with the result of an observation, and the observation report therefore entails not-P. 
But if the prediction P is part of the original theory, its denial alters the theory and 
changes the meaning of the descriptive terms in P. The descriptive terms in the 
statements P and not-P cannot have, therefore, the same meaning and the seeming 
contradiction of not-P with P is just that, only an apparent contradiction, and thereby, 
does not count as a disconfirmation of the theory. Only those observation reports are 
relevant to testing that are consistent with the theory. This is what makes testing 
circular. (Suppe 1977, 201-2)  
To recapitulate, the above objections can be expressed as a set of four 
problems: 1) A specification problem (first), 2) no agreement/disagreement problem 
(second and third), 3) an analyticity of theories problem (fourth), and 4) a circular 
testing problem (fifth). Since meaning change has often been taken merely as a 
problem that needs to be overcome, there have not been too many attempts to find a 
specification. This thesis is in part an attempt to correct that situation and try to find 
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some formulations of meaning change. Furthermore, to say that scientific theories are 
immune to empirical refutation or corroboration strikes me as an absurd statement, 
because empirical evidence certainly matters in science in practice. However, more 
interestingly, three latter problems can be subsumed under another more general 
problem, thereby allowing discussion on a more general level. If theories cannot 
agree or disagree, are analytic, and subject to only circular testing, then they do not 
appear to be comparable in order to allow a rational theory choice between them. 
What is more, it is also questionable whether they are commensurable. The problem 
is, in other words, the same infamous problem of incommensurability that has caught 
the attention of numerous philosophers over a period of several decades. This notion 
is next discussed under the heading of the incommensurability thesis.  
 
The incommensurability thesis  
 
After intense early discussion on their proposals, it appears that there was a collapse 
of interest among philosophers in the mid 1970s in taking Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
philosophy seriously. One can even sense the feeling of irritation and frustration 
towards their responses to the early criticism.
4
 Yet it would be wrong to say that 
there has been a lack of interest at any point in what Kuhn and Feyerabend claimed. 
One can justifiably declare, to use John Preston’s expression, that there “has been 
spilt a tremendous amount of ink” over incommensurability since 1962 when it was 
first introduced (Preston 1997, 102). And yet, despite this, it is difficult to spell out 
what incommensurability means because the specification of it varies among 
philosophers. Normally all discussants have separated at least two distinct types of 
                                                 
4
 Suppe’s “Afterword” in The Structure of Scientific Theories conveys vividly the Zeitgeist in 
philosophy. According to Suppe, Feyerabend “generally has ignored and refused to take seriously 
criticism, preferring instead to develop increasingly extreme versions of his general view”. Kuhn has, 
Suppe writes, taken critique seriously and tried to modify his view, but this has meant a loss in 
originality. Furthermore, he says, “their reactions to the critical attacks levelled against their earlier 
work have played a significant part in the declining influence of their work during the 1970s”. As a 
result, an increasing numbers of philosophers of science have rejected Kuhn’s approach “as 
irredeemably flawed, although not as hopeless as Feyerabend’s”. (Suppe 1977, 636-49) 




 Any definition of incommensurability that I know recognises 
meaning or semantic incommensurability. Incommensurability in this sense is 
important to the current study because meaning change has become closely 
associated with semantic incommensurability.  
 Semantic incommensurability stems from the idea that is currently under 
investigation in this thesis, i.e. from meaning change. The common feature of all 
formulations of semantic incommensurability is the conception that meaning varies 
or is different between theories. The consequence, as Suppe has already noted, is that 
the terms in the statements deduced from theories that are assumed to be in 
competition do, in fact, mean something different. Because theories discuss different 
issues, they are not rivals. What is more, it is hard to see how they could be 
compared in that situation.  
One of the clearest formulations of semantic incommensurability is described 
by Howard Sankey. Sankey calls semantic incommensurability the 
incommensurability thesis, which he characterises with three semantic relations 
between alternative theories: meaning variance, translation failure, and content 
incomparability. According to Sankey, two alternative scientific theories are 
incommensurable if, and only if: 
 
(i) the meaning of the vocabulary by theories varies between theories 
(ii) translation is impossible from the vocabulary of one theory into the 
vocabulary of the other 
                                                 
5
 Here are some examples of how incommensurability has been categorised. Ian Hacking in 
Representing and Intervening (1983) finds three kinds of incommensurability: topic-
incommensurability, dissociation and meaning-incommensurability. W.H. Newton-Smith in The 
Rationality of Science (1981) similarly separates three different kinds of incommensurability that are 
due to value variance, radical standard variance and radical meaning variance. Alexander Bird says 
that there are two distinct but related sources of incommensurability. One stems from the nature of 
paradigms as benchmarks for the evaluation of theories, and the other from the role played by 
paradigms in establishing meaning (Bird 2000, 150-1). Preston notes that Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
notions of incommensurability are different, which Feyerabend also noticed (Preston 1997, 103). Even 
if this is so, one type of Kuhn’s incommensurability, semantic, appears to be Feyerabend’s 
incommensurability.   
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(iii) as a result of (i) and (ii), the content of such theories may not be 
compared. (1997
6
, 4-5; 2000, 127)   
 
One difference to what Suppe had said earlier is that Sankey makes the 
premise (ii) explicit, and there are further novelties to be found in Sankey’s analysis 
of incommensurability. The most important contribution is analysing also the notion 
of meaning itself more explicitly.  It has become increasingly popular to interpret 
meaning change via the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. With the 
exception of Israel Scheffler (1967) and Michael Martin (1971, 1972), the early 
responses did not attempt to solve the meaning-change problems with the help of 
Frege’s distinction. Now, this new focus does not only seem to give a more nuanced 
analysis of meaning change, but it also appears to indicate a fresh historical 
interpretation of meaning change, and best of all, a solution to the problems that it 
brought. 
The question is, first of all, what is that meaning that changes in meaning 
change: sense or reference, or both? Sense is often called intension, or just 
“meaning”, in contrast to reference. In Frege’s theory the sense of a term is “the 
mode of presentation”, or how the reference is presented. Sense determines reference 
and can change without reference changing, but not the other way round. Frege’s 
famous example is of how the two expressions ‘Morning star’ and ‘Evening star’ 
differ in their sense but not in their reference, i.e. they both refer to the planet Venus. 
In other words, the question now is: How extensive is Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
meaning change?  
To begin with, meaning change can be interpreted as a change in sense. It 
sounds natural to say that, if there is meaning change in the first place, it is primarily 
a change in sense. For instance, ‘Newtonian mass’ and ‘Einsteinian mass’ differ in 
                                                 
6
 Page numbers refer to Sankey’s article “Incommensurability: the Current State of Play”, that can  be 
found on his home page at http://www.hps.unimelb.edu.au/bio_hsankey.html. The paper is also 
published in Theoria (1997), which is listed in the bibliography of this thesis. But note that there are 
several journals called Theoria that appear to address more or less related themes. This is not the 
Swedish Journal of Philosophy, but apparently the one published by the Spanish Society of Logic, 
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sense as they connote different things. Perhaps one is absolute and the other relative, 
and so on. But is there also a referential change? It seems that the answer is in the 
affirmative, if we are to believe Kuhn and Feyerabend. Kuhn writes:  
 
But the physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no 
means identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the 
same name. (Newtonian mass is conserved: Einsteinian is convertible 
with energy. Only at low relative velocities may the two be measured 
in the same way, and even then they must not be conceived to be the 
same). (SSR, 102) 
 
Compare this to Feyerabend’s characterisation of change in meaning in his article 
“On the ‘Meaning’ of Scientific Terms”, which is an answer to criticism of his 
meaning theory: 
 
We shall diagnose a change of meaning either if a new theory entails 
that all concepts of the preceding theory have zero extension or if it 
introduces rules which cannot be interpreted as attributing specific 
properties to objects within already existing classes, but which change 
the system of classes itself. (Feyerabend 1981b, 98) 
 
Kuhn writes about the difference in “physical referents” between Einsteinian and 
Newtonian concepts, and Feyerabend about “zero extension” of the old theory in 
comparison to the new. It seems evident, therefore, that Kuhn and Feyerabend also 
allow referential change.  
Sankey and others point out that Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s view on meaning 
change as both change in sense and reference, becomes understandable if we suppose 
that it implies a descriptive theory of reference.
7
 The first step in this explanation is 
that there is a holistic theory of meaning, or the principle of the theory-ladenness of 
                                                                                                                                          
Methodology and Philosophy of Science (SLMFCE) and the Spanish Society of Analytical 
Philosophy (SEFA).   
7
 Interpretation of the Kuhn-Feyerabend meaning change in this fashion can be found in the following 
publications: Sankey (1994, 1997, 2000), Hacking (1983, ch. 6), Newton-Smith (1981, ch. 7), Bird 
(2000 ch. 5; 2002, 2004a), and Nersessian (1984, ch. 2).  
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meaning, presupposed in Kuhn’s and Feyrabend’s meaning change. That is, the 
meaning of a term is determined by its place in some kind of system or structure, 
such as a theory, a conceptual scheme, or just a “context”. Feyerabend does 
explicitly recognise this, and calls his theory of meaning a “contextual theory of 
meaning”, which he attributes to Wittgenstein (1981a, 74; see also 1965, 180). Kuhn 
does not bring forward his own theory although he writes often about meaning. Yet, 
it is apparent that his meaning implies holism in some form. The suggested 
explanation as to why there is a change in sense is that meaning is theory-dependent, 
and as a consequence of this, an alteration in theory changes sense automatically. In 
the most radical form of holism, any change, no matter how small, is enough to alter 
meaning. Remember here also Suppe’s idea that even the denial of a statement 
counts both as theory change and meaning change. All in all, theory change is 
virtually equivalent to meaning change if the meaning-change view implies holism.  
 The second step in the explanation is to combine this very “unFregean idea” 
(see Hacking 1983, 76), i.e. meaning or sense is theory-laden, with two properly 
Fregean principles: sense determines reference and different sense may pick out 
different reference. If sense undergoes a change in theory transition, then reference 
may shift as well. Whether there is a shift in reference depends on whether sense1 
and sense2 can refer to the same object. If there is a contradiction between the 
theories or their principles that define senses, then co-referentiality is not a 
possibility. For example, let us assume that the ‘mass’ term is defined by the theory 
in which it is incorporated. When a scientific community abandons Newton’s theory 
and accepts Einstein’s theory, the sense of ‘mass’ changes. If mass cannot be taken 
as being both absolute and relativistic, then the ‘Newtonian mass’ and the 
‘Einsteinian mass’ cannot refer to the same entity. This would constitute a rational 
explanation as to why there is a referential shift in the theory transition.  
 We can now say that the first premise in Sankey’s incommensurability thesis 
implies both alteration in sense and reference. More generally, an appeal to the 
principle of the theory-ladenness of meaning and the descriptive theory of reference 
offers us a theoretical explanation of the position adopted by Kuhn and Feyerabend. 
But what, then, is the historical context? Why did Kuhn and Feyerabend end up with 
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such a view? In comparison to the early responses, recent interpretations yield 
something of a surprise. First assessments of the historical philosophers of science, 
and especially Kuhn and Feyerabend, saw their philosophy as the embodiment of 
discontinuity in relation to the previous dominant philosophical tradition, that of 
logical positivism/empiricism. This early view does indeed sound plausible if one 
thinks about some central elements in Kuhn’s and Feyrabend’s philosophy. They 
both championed the view that observation is theory-laden; the meaning of scientific 
terms vary; science does not develop steadily by reductions or incorporations, but 
rather by the abandonment of earlier theories; the history of science is not an 
accumulation of facts; and theories are incommensurable, making the idea of 
progress problematic. These theses undoubtedly contradict the philosophy of logical 
positivism. Moreover, the historical philosophers used extensively detailed studies of 
history, in contrast to the more logic-methodological approach employed by logical 
positivism and empiricism. The surprise here is that the recent assessments find 
inherent connections between logical empiricism - a successor of logical positivism - 
and the historical philosophy of science. In some analyses, Kuhn and Feyerabend 
actually continue the preceding tradition and bring the re-evaluation of some of the 
original tenets of logical positivism by logical empiricists to their natural end.
8
 I will 
present below the main line of this type of argument.  
 Let us remind ourselves of the main doctrines of logical positivism. Theories 
were formulated in first order logic. In addition to logical machinery, there were 
thought to be two classes of non-logical terms: observational and theoretical. 
Observational terms refer directly to observable physical objects or observable 
attributes of physical objects.
9
 Theoretical terms are given an explicit definition by 
observational terms and by correspondence rules, which connect theoretical 
                                                 
8
 The following publications suggest either parallel views or a continuity of views between logical 
positivism/empiricism and the historical philosophy of science, especially Kuhn’s philosophy: Sankey 
(1997, 2000), Bird (2000, 2002, 2004c), Earman (1993), English (1978), Irzik and Grünberg (1995), 
Newton-Smith (1981, ch 7), Papineau (1979, ch 1), Reisch (1991), and to a lesser extent also 
Nersessian (1984).  
9
 In the days of the Vienna circle, some took the view that terms in the basic or protocol sentences 
referred to phenomenal experience. The most elaborate expression of this position is arguably 
Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1961). This idea was soon given up, presumably because it 
threatens the intersubjectivity of science.  
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expressions directly to observational expressions. The fundamental premise of 
logical positivism is that observation is neutral, which guarantees a determined and 
stable meaning of observational expressions. Theoretical expressions alone are void 




Advocates of the above view, notably Rudolph Carnap (1953)
11
, soon noticed 
that there are serious problems with the reduction of theoretical terms. Definition of 
dispositional terms, such as ‘soluble’ or ‘fragile’, by observational terms posed a 
particular problem. After earlier attempts with observational language had failed, 
Carnap suggested that they could be defined by reduction sentences, i.e. by reducing 
them to experimental conditions. This step is significant because it rates as an 
admission that observational language is not enough to fix the meaning of all terms 
in scientific language. This is, in other words, the first step in the process of the 
liberalisation of the criteria for scientific language. The second crucial step comes 
when Carnap (1956)
12
 realises that not even his earlier effort to define with reduction 
sentences is enough. He noticed that this attempt ultimately fails because it makes a 
term meaningful only if certain test conditions are fulfilled. Unfortunately we are not 
able to determine all test cases, and so, the meaning remains indeterminate. For this 
reason, Carnap postulates a separate theoretical language (LT) that cannot be 
determined by observational language. Let Carnap himself express this:  
 
In [“Testability and Meaning”] I recognised this “open” character of 
scientific terms, that is, the incompleteness of their interpretation. At 
that time I tried to do justice to this openness by admitting the 
addition of further dispositional rules (in the form of reductions 
sentences …). I think now that the openness is more adequately 
represented in LT.  (Carnap 1956, 67)  
 
                                                 
10
 Suppe (1977, 17-118) offers a good summary of the “Received View” of logical positivism and of 
amendments made to it by logical empiricists.   
11
 “Testability and Meaning”, first published in two parts in 1936 and 1937.  
12
 “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”, first published in 1956.  
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The acceptance of theoretical language is a long way from the first idea of logical 
positivism. The upshot is that theoretical terms are defined by meaning postulates, 
i.e. the relations to both observational and theoretical terms determines meaning. 
This could be expressed in brief by saying that the meaning of theoretical terms is 
established by their role in theory.  
 The historical philosophers of science, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hanson, in 
particular, famously questioned whether observation is neutral. They argued that 
one’s theory or background shapes one’s observation. If this is so, then the 
foundation of the double language model of logical empiricism is hollow. 
Observation was supposed to guarantee, by giving direct cognitive significance to 
observational expressions, that at least observational expressions receive meaning 
unambiguously. Now, the theory-ladenness of observation breaks this bedrock of 
scientific language. If observation is theory-dependent, then observational language 
is theory-dependent as well. For this reason, we might say that logical empiricists 
conceded that the meaning of theoretical terms is theory-dependent, but that the 
historical philosophers extended this principle to cover all the terms in science, both 
theoretical and observational alike. In other words, they can be seen as widening the 
application of “the contextual theory of meaning”, which is already found in late 
logical empiricism. In this view, the historical philosophers took the third and final 
step in the process of liberalisation of the criteria for scientific language.  
 From these considerations we arrive smoothly at Sankey’s first premise of the 
incommensurability thesis. The conclusion so far is that all meaning is theory-laden. 
Therefore, a change in the theoretical context in which terms are incorporated alters 
the meaning of terms. The result is the full-scale meaning change. We may say that 
for the logical positivists only those terms referred whose reference were determined 
by observation. Their sense might be thought to be the sensation that picks out the 
object one refers to. For Kuhn and Feyerabend, in turn, there is not a principled 
distinction between observational and theoretical vocabulary. Sense is determined by 
a theory that a term is part of, and reference is whatever fulfils the theoretical claims 




 To repeat, it follows that a change in theory results in a change in 
sense, and hence, possibly also in reference.  
 Sankey reminds us that that incomparability cannot be inferred just from 
meaning variance.  We need a further assumption. That is the second premise of the 
incommensurability thesis: there is no translation between vocabularies from 
different theories. Translation failure is a consequence of the contextual theory of 
meaning. It is easy to see this if we consider a holistic theory of meaning in its 
radical form. That is, let us suppose that the meaning of all terms in theory is 
dependent on the whole theory or on the meaning of all other terms. As a 
consequence, any change in theory is a change of meaning of all terms. There is no 
way to express meanings in any other theoretical context, and translation is thereby 
an impossibility. It is, in principle, possible to also advocate more limited forms of 
holism, which has the consequence of partial untranslatability. Yet, the argument for 
untranslatability appears, crucially, to be the same for the part to which it applies.  
 Why then does untranslatability lead to incomparability? Even though there is 
no translation between the vocabularies of different theories, one might suppose that 
a comparison is possible by some other means. There is indeed a reasonable 
discussion on the relation between incommensurability and incomparability. The 
majority of philosophers interested in the incommensurability problematic have 
taken a short route from incommensurability to incomparability by thinking that the 
former simply means the latter, or at least immediately implies it.
14
 Paul Hoyningen-
Huene and Bird correctly remark that there is no such necessary link (Hoyningen-
Huene 1993, 218-21; Bird 2000, 149-50). Incommensurability is a metaphor 
borrowed from mathematics and means that there is no common measure, i.e. 
theories are not co-measurable. An example of a common measure could be a ruler 
                                                 
13
 Alexander Bird has an elaborate analysis along these lines. According to Bird, Kuhn implies that 
key scientific terms have an intension that depends on certain theoretical claims. The dependence is 
thick, i.e. the intension depends on a wide range of theoretical claims. The dependence is also strict, 
i.e. all descriptions of theoretical claims have to be true of an entity in order for a term to refer. (Bird 
2000, 167-8) 
14
 That this is so can be seen from Hoyningen-Huene’s extensive list of works that adopt this 
interpretation (1993, 218; note 118). 
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that is divided into centimetres and is used to measure different lengths.
15
 Yet, 
incommensurability allows that, even if there is no such “point-by-point” 
comparison, comparison in some form is possible.   
The point is that philosophers want an objective criterion to enable the 
systematic comparison of the truth and falsity of theories’ consequences. Kuhn 
denies the possibility of any such (theory) neutral standard against which theories 
could be compared. The rejection of an autonomous observation language, the 
neutral language for the logical positivists, means the denial of what was thought to 
provide such a common unit and measure. Whatever consequences one can deduce 
from two theories, they are expressed in different languages, and their meanings are 
not translatable due to meaning holism. No observation report, or any other report for 
that matter, constructed with the vocabulary of one theory is relevant to another. 
(Bird 2000, 149-56)  Theories “speak only to themselves, not each other”. Whatever 
other criteria of comparison there might be, they do not seem very interesting 
because they cannot be intertheoretic truthfunctional measures. This is why the 
argument of the incommensurability thesis ends with the exaggerated conclusion that 




Enemies of science? 
 
As already stated, the majority of philosophers who have studied incommensurability 
have taken the view that incommensurability eventually leads in one way or another 
to incomparability. I think that, on the whole, Sankey’s incommensurability thesis 
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 According to Sharrock and Read, incommensurability was first noticed by Pythagoreans, and it can 
be seen by a thorough understanding of Pythagoras’ law. Consider a right isosceles triangle. 
Pythagoras’ law says that if each of the shorter sides is one unit in length, then the hypotenuse is the 
square root of two units in length. The problem is that the square root of two is not a rational number. 
As a consequence, there is no absolute commensurable measure between hypotenuse and sides 
because 2 cannot be expressed accurately as a fraction. (Sharrock and Read 2002, 141-2) It is 
naturally possible to compare them approximately, but it is not the same as the exact “point-by-point” 
commensuration.  
16
 Moreover, it is also an exaggeration with  regard to Kuhn because he allowed there to be values that 
can be used in comparison. On this, see note 18 below and Chapter 7.  
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captures the main line of argumentation brought forward in philosophy over the 
recent decades very well. Meaning change and untranslatability form an unholy 
alliance in the minds of many philosophers with the result that scientific theories are 
incomparable. Moreover, this argument is thought to challenge the view of science as 
a rational and progressive endeavour. Consequently, responses have been angry, 
dismissive, or have sought to overcome the problems that the incommensurability 
thesis brings. Let us see next why the Kuhn-Feyerabend case for meaning change 
seems to have such far-fetching outcomes.  
The first thing to mention is a consequence that derives from the holistic 
theory of meaning. It may be argued that it is absurd to claim that any difference of 
beliefs, or of theory, makes a difference in meaning. That is because it would suggest 
that no two persons could ever understand each other. Presumably every person’s set 
of beliefs is at least a little bit different, which has a consequence according to 
meaning holism, that the terms and sentences of one person never mean the same as 
those of another. People cannot then agree or disagree with each other because they 
talk beside each other. Yet, the situation can look even more startling. Not even one 
individual person can mean exactly the same with his or her expressions at two 
different times if there is only one tiny change in his or her set of beliefs. A holistic 
theory of meaning and meaning change, thus, tend to make communication and 
understanding impossible. This type of criticism is common in the debates on holism. 
If communication and understanding require existence of meaning and possession of 
synonymous meanings between participants, then this criticism hits its target. The 
question of holism will be dealt with on further occasions in the thesis below.  
The second worrying consequence stems from the idea of 
incommensurability as incomparability. Namely, if there is no way to compare 
theories, then theory choice cannot be rational. It is a rather common view that 
Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s philosophy implies the irrationality of theory choice. That 
is, theories are chosen only by irrational means, such as propaganda, taste, or by 
some other subjective criteria.
17
 However, it is not clear whether this is a fair charge. 
                                                 
17
 For an extensive selection of references that advance this point, see again Hoyningen-Huene (1993, 
221; note 132).  
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If incommensurability does not necessarily imply incomparability, as was argued in 
the last section, there can be means to compare and choose between theories. In 
relation to this, we saw an argument for a kind of incomparability due to translation 
failure between theories. This does not yet mean that one could not find some other 
forms of common measure. Perhaps Kuhn’s suggestion of problem-solving in The 
Structure could work as such.
18
 Nevertheless, the charge of irrationality is commonly 
directed at Kuhn and Feyerabend.  
One should bear in mind that we have been dealing above with semantic 
incommensurability and arguments from semantic incommensurability to 
incomparability. A third alarming consequence of Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s 
philosophy comes directly from this argument. If there is no way to compare truths 
and falsities of derived statements from different theories, then it is not possible to 
say that theory A is more truth-like, or has greater verisimilitude, than theory B. In 
other words, it is not possible to assess the progress of science in terms of 
verisimilitude. Whatever other ways there might be for comparison of theories, it is 
not possible to compare the truth content of theories. As to which theory represents 
the world better, there is no answer. Theories are not rivals but merely alternatives. 
This does indeed challenge the view of science as progressing, if progress is taken as 
progress towards truth.  
A further troubling fall-out has to do with meaning change as referential shift. 
How should we understand the claim that before and after theory change the same 
terms do refer but not to the same entities? Remember Kuhn’s claim of this kind of 
change in the Einsteinian revolution. A descriptive theory of reference makes this 
view understandable, but what does it mean ontologically? Is it that before and after 
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 Already in SSR Kuhn indicates that persuasion in theory choice can be rational. It is possible to 
compare problem-solving success, quantitative precision, novelty prediction capability and aesthetic 
value between new and old theories (152-155). In the “Postscript” of SSR Kuhn writes that the reasons 
by which one can be persuaded are accuracy, simplicity, and fruitfulness (199). Furthermore, Kuhn 
says later that there are five standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory: accuracy, 
consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness (1977b, 322). Although these values appear to be 
indeterminate, and therefore incompletely determine the concrete evaluations, this is a clear indication 
that comparison is possible. (See also Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 147-154) Hoyningen-Huene argues 
that Kuhn allows comparison of incommensurable theories (1993, 218-223). Feyerabend also sees 
that, even if theories are semantically incommensurable, and thus, semantically incomparable, there 
are several other ways to compare theories (See Preston 1997, 115-123). 
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such a change scientists are referring to different things altogether? Are there two 
different masses, for example? A scientist in the Newtonian paradigm would refer to 
the Newtonian mass, and a scientist in the Einsteinian paradigm would refer to the 
Einsteinian mass. If scientists are, hence, literally talking about different things 
before and after a theory change or a revolution, there is a further strong reason to 
regard the progress of science to be impossible. Science does not attempt in this view 
to learn more about the same things but instead studies entirely different entities at 
different times.  
The above description of referential shift sounds much like idealism – almost 
as if the world somehow changes when scientists’ theories change. Kuhn especially 
seems to give grounds for this interpretation. Consider the following passages:  
 
I have so far argued only that paradigms are constitutive of science. 
Now I wish to display a sense in which they are constitutive of nature 
as well. (SSR, 110) 
 
The historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when 
paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. … In so far as 
their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we 
may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a 
different world. (SSR, 111) 
 
In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of 





Remember also that Feyerabend claimed that theory change is an ontological change. 
It is not clear what exactly he means by this, but it sounds rather similar to Kuhn’s 
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 But note that Chapter X, which contains the second quotation above, is named “Revolutions as 
Changes of World View” (my italics). Notice also that he writes confusingly “though the world does 
not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world” (SSR. 121); 
and  “Whatever he may then see, the scientist after a revolution is still looking at the same world” 
(SSR, 129). I will discuss Hacking’s interpretation and my attempt to reconcile these passages in 
Chapter 5.  
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world change. It is obviously possible to offer other kinds of interpretations than the 
idealistic one.
20
 Yet, the idealistic interpretation has definitely some plausibility. 
Kuhn seems to be saying that the world itself changes in paradigm change, and 
Feyerabend talks about a change in ontology in theory changes. If the world with its 
ontology thus changes, then so naturally do references. In any case, the use of 
‘reference’ needs some kind of explanation. I will discuss this whole problematic 
extensively in Chapters 5 and 7.  
Meaning change seems to be, thus, a root cause for a group of problems in 
science and beyond: the impossibility of communication and understanding, the 
irrationality of science, the non-truth-convergence of science and referential 
variance. These problems, and especially the three latter ones that endanger the 
rational and truth-progressive image of science, have preoccupied the minds of 
philosophers during recent decades. I think it is fair to say that apart from few 
exceptions, most philosophers have taken a negative view on meaning change. Let 
Sankey serve again as a spokesperson and express this concern of so many 
philosophers: 
 
The claim by Kuhn and Feyerabend that reference varies in the course 
of scientific theory change is of particular concern to philosophers of 
a scientific realist persuasion. Scientific realists defend the view that 
the aim of science is to discover the truth about an objective reality, 
and that scientific progress consists in an increasing convergence on 
the truth about such a reality. But, if the history of science consists in 
repeated transitions between theories which refer to none of the same 
things, then it is impossible for progress to occur in the sense required 
by the scientific realist. For if later theories refer to none of the same 
things to which earlier theories referred, then it is impossible for the 
transition between such theories to involve an increase of truths 
known about common items of a shared, objective reality. (Sankey 
2000, 129-30)  
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 Bird interprets Kuhn’s use of ‘reference’ as meaning ‘internal reference’, i.e. reference is not 
reference to an entity independently of theory but the hypothetical entity posited by the theory. 
According to Bird, the meaning of ‘reference’ in Kuhn is not far from the customary meaning of 
‘sense’ or ‘intension’. (2002, 13) Hoyningen-Huene, in contrast, sees Kuhn as a Kantian with the 
distinction between the world-in-itself and the phenomenal world (1993, 31-42). Reference would not 
be to things-in-itself, but to “things” in the phenomenal world. Hacking understands Kuhn as a 
nominalist: the world that does not change is the world of individuals, while “the world of kinds of 
things” in which scientists work, changes (Hacking 1993). Again, I return to this debate in Chapter 5.   
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Naturally, if one is not a realist, then the phenomenon of meaning change 
may not feel so challenging. However, anti-realistic philosophers are in a clear 
minority at the moment in the present era of post-logical empiricism (at least in the 
Anglo-American world), which is perhaps also the era of the post-historical 
philosophy of science; therefore, philosophers have typically treated meaning change 
as a cause for problems, and most discussants have sought to suggest something that 
would overcome these problems. Increasingly, these suggestions have concentrated 
on the notion of reference. In the last section of this chapter I will introduce a popular 
way in which the above problems are thought be solved or avoided.  
 
Reference invariance as a solution  
 
The first person to suggest a referential solution to the Kuhn-Feyerabend meaning 
change was Israel Scheffler. His fundamental idea is that “for the purposes of 
mathematics and science, it is sameness of reference that is of interest rather than 
synonymy” (Scheffler 1967, 57). Scheffler explains this idea by citing Frege’s 
famous example. The expression ‘Evening Star’ refers to the same object as the 
expression ‘Morning star’, but they are not synonymous. According to Scheffler, the 
identity of these expressions is scientifically interesting because interchanging them 
preserves the truth of the sentences. The difference in meaning, i.e. sense, does not 
prevent this exchange and is thus primarily a concern for the linguist. (Scheffler 
1967, 56-7)  
 Scheffler says that references may stay the same even if the meanings of 
terms change. The common reference may survive cases of meaning change as the 
sense changes. What is more, opposing theorists who have different beliefs and 
whose terms’ sense differ may yet refer to the same objects. (Scheffler 1967, 60) 
Applied to the meaning-change debate in general, Scheffler’s suggestion takes the 
following form: a change in sense does not imply a change in reference, and science 
is interested in sameness of reference because sameness of reference is enough for 
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the comparison of truth-values. In order to see how comparison is possible in the 
case where terms’ senses differ, but where references are the same, let us take the 
above example of Frege, as used by Sankey. The components of the two expressions 
‘The Evening Star is a star’ and ‘The Morning Star is a planet’ differ in their sense. 
But because ‘The Evening Star’ and ‘The Morning Star’ are co-referential, i.e. both 
refer to the planet Venus, and stars cannot be planets, the two expressions contradict 
each other. Both cannot be true
21
. (Sankey 2000, 128).  
 Scheffler can thus be credited with being the first to express a referential 
solution to meaning change and incommensurability. The crux is that the sameness 
of reference is a solution to all the problems mentioned above. It allows a 
comparison of theories via their truth-values, and also gives us then a rational 
criterion for theory choice. Moreover, if we know that science is dealing with the 
same subject matter at different times, and we can determine the truth and falsity of 
claims, we might be able to retain the idea that the verisimilitude of theories has 
increased and increases in the history of science. And, if reference is what scientists 
are interested in, then perhaps the problems caused by differences in sense, such as 
untranslatability, do not matter that much in the philosophy of science anyway. 
However, Sankey is right in saying that Scheffler was working in the tradition of a 
classic description theory of reference that determines a term’s reference by the 
satisfaction of its associated description (Sankey 1994, 36). Scheffler does indeed 
imply that even though a different description or a different sense may refer to the 
same object, it is in any case the beliefs or senses that determine the reference. If we 
want to guarantee the sameness of reference in all circumstances then this is a 
disadvantage because it allows referential discontinuity. The descriptive contents of 
the two terms that determine the reference may be so different that they pick out 
different things; a case in point is the ‘atom’ of modern physics and the ‘atom’ of the 
ancient Greeks. Or perhaps, as Kuhn and Feyerabend are sometimes seen to be 
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 Alternatively, we may think of a pair of sentences that are referentially related so that they 
contradict each other even though the senses of component expressions differ. Let us assume that one 
sentence is a negation, and the other is a positive statement, and furthermore that the reference of the 
component expression of one is identical with that of the other. In this case, one has to be false and the 
other true. We may express this formally as follows: Pa & ~Qb is contradictory, if P=Q and a=b. (See 
Sankey 1994, 39; note 3)  
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arguing, the two descriptions are contradictory and cannot be true of the same 
reference, and therefore, they fail to co-refer. In an earlier example of two apparently 
different references of ‘mass’ terms in the Newtonian and Einsteinian theories, the 
former is an intrinsic absolute property and the latter relative.   
 Confronted with the problems of the descriptive theory of reference, 
numerous philosophers have concluded that the Frege-Russell type of descriptivism 
cannot be an answer to incommensurability. That is because, even though reference 
is enough for a comparison of theories, the descriptive theory allows referential 
discontinuity, and hence, full-scale meaning change and incommensurability. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to demand that the satisfaction of our occasionally 
totally incorrect beliefs should not decide our references. The improved answer 
appears to stem from theories that were originally not designed to neutralise the 
incommensurability thesis, but which seem to provide a solution anyway. I will now 
briefly examine Hilary Putnam’s and Saul Kripke’s ideas in order to show how the 
popular causal theory of reference was born.
22
  
 Putnam’s and Kripke’s suggestions are fundamentally anti-Fregean. It is 
worth studying Putnam’s Twin Earth example (Putnam 1975b). The imaginary Twin 
Earth is like our Earth, except for a difference in the composition of the stuff people 
call ‘water’. While ‘water’ on the Earth is composed of H2O, on the Twin Earth it is 
made of an unknown substance XYZ. H2O and XYZ are similar in their observable 
properties, and therefore, people on the Earth and the Twin Earth have the same 
beliefs about them: it is liquid, it is transparent, it quenches thirst and can be found in 
lakes etc. One should also note that people are identical on these earths, including 
with regard to their use of language. As a result, in the time before chemistry had 
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 Two early papers that extended Scheffler’s point about references are Michael Martin’s (1971) 
“Referential Variance and Scientific Objectivity” (see also Martin 1972) and Hartry Field’s (1973) 
“Theory Change and Indeterminacy of Reference”. Martin applies set theory to the problem of 
comparison. His main point is that an overlap in the sense of either extensional containment or 
intersection makes comparison possible. Field’s idea is that terms may “partially denote” entities and 
subsequently undergo “denotational refinement”. For example, Newton’s mass, according to Field, 
partially denoted relativistic mass and proper mass, and in the Einsteinian revolution went under 
refinement to denote only the latter. Both of these suggestions are, however, overshadowed by the 
causal theory of reference. One further point to notice is that the success of the descriptive theory 
depends on how much theory, not necessarily all, determines reference, as Papineau (1996) has 
remarked. See below.  
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developed enough to reveal the difference in composition, let’s say 1750, Oscar and 
twin-Oscar believe exactly the same beliefs about what they both call ‘water’. Now, 
let us suppose that the difference is revealed and reported to the people and the twin-
people. The question is: What do they say on the Earth in this kind of situation? Is 
meaning of ‘water’ on the Twin Earth different from ours, or is the meaning the 
same, but the reference is different? According to Putnam, we would say that the 
Twin Earthian’s “water” is not really water, which is to say that its meaning is 
different from ours. Putnam wants to argue here on two separate points. The first 
point is that it is not enough to be in a certain psychological state in order to know 
meaning. Knowing meaning requires also knowing about the term’s reference. Oscar 
and Twin-Oscar were in the same psychological state, but the meaning of their 
‘water’ was still different. Therefore, knowing meaning cannot be defined as being in 
a certain psychological state. Putnam’s second point has to do with the determination 
of reference. Oscar and twin-Oscar had the same intension of water until the 
discovery, but they still referred to different substances by their terms ‘water’. 
Therefore, sense or intension cannot determine reference, as Frege thought.  
 The moral of Putnam’s story is that intension or sense is not sufficient to 
determine meaning and pick out reference. He goes further than this by arguing that 
sense is neither necessary to determine reference and that reference may be fixed 
pragmatically. Putnam (1975a) formulates a causal theory of reference, which says 
that a user of language is connected by a certain kind of causal chain to a situation in 
which a name is given to an entity (200). According to this theory, ‘water’ refers 
directly to H2O, no matter what descriptions are given of it. The determination of 
reference takes place in a situation in which a term is first introduced. In such a 
circumstance a sample of stuff is named by a term, and so the reference of ‘water’ is 
fixed, perhaps ostensively, to a sample of H2O. Kripke (1980), who was the first to 
advance a causal theory of reference, suggests that the initial determination of the 
term’s reference can be likened to the baptising of a child. In a baptism, a child is 
named and retains that name throughout the life. Similarly, a name can be given to a 
natural kind, such as water, in a direct causal relationship. Later users inherit the use 
of the name and its relation to reference. The main point is that the initial baptising 
via direct relation to a natural kind is responsible for reference determination. It does 
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not matter if the original baptisers or later users have many false beliefs about the 
natural kind because the description of a natural kind does not play any role in fixing 
reference. We need to add a further specification to point out a difference between 
the child’s baptism and the natural kind baptism in science. Human beings are 
separate particular objects, and therefore, a naming ceremony does not pose any 
problems. Natural kinds, in turn, are not such middle-sized particulars. It is not 
possible, for example, to baptise all the water in the world at once. The trick 
suggested by the causal theorists is, as mentioned earlier, to name a sample of the 
baptised stuff and extend the usage to cover all possible samples of that natural kind. 
 
After simple causalism  
 
The causal theory of reference is, unsurprisingly, not the last word in this saga. Since 
the introduction of causalism, philosophers have pointed out several problems with 
it. Because the purpose of this thesis is not to try to find a viable theory of reference, 
I will not engage in an extensive detailed discussion of the problems of causal 
theories of reference. Instead, I will simply list some problems using some of the 
bibliographical references associated with them. Before concluding this chapter, I 
will also comment on the direction the debate on reference is heading at the moment.  
 The Putnam-Kripke type of simple causalism is subject to at least the 
following problems. Simple causalism: 
 
(1) is unable to grant changes in reference because reference is fixed once and for 
all in the baptism. Sometimes reference, however, appears to be changed. 
According to Fine, that happened with the shift of ‘electron’ from referring to 
the unit charge of electricity to a specific kind of particle. (Fine 1975, 25; also 
Sankey 1994, 55-6; Sankey 1997, 7) 
(2) does not give an adequate explanation of how reference of theoretical or 
hypothetical terms, such as ‘positron’, ‘neutrino’, and ‘quark’ can be 
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determined. In other words, it is not clear how baptising can be done in the 
absence of any observable entities.  
(3) postulates reference to intuitively non-referring terms, such as ‘phlogiston’ 
and ‘deoxygenated air’. Putnam and Kripke suggest (Putnam 1975a, 200; 
Kripke 1980, 132) that baptising of theoretical terms is fixed by “causal 
description”, i.e. by the following formula (which would be an answer to the 
second problem): Whatever is responsible for the phenomena W is named X. 
Unfortunately, that would make ‘phlogiston’ referring as it was initially 
thought to be responsible for combustion. (Enç 1976, Nola 1980) 
(4) unable to explicate how the kind may be individuated by ostension. Pointing 
and perceiving cannot specify to what exactly is being referred to. (Sterelny 
1983, 121) 
(5) unable to explain the meaning of non-referring terms. In its strictest form the 
causal theory of reference equates meaning with reference. This seems 
unsatisfactory because many terms have been, and are used in science that do 
not, or have not been found to refer. (Suppe 1977, 203; note 520) 
 
There seems to be a consensus that simple causalism as such is not a 
satisfactory theory of reference either. Reactions to the above criticism, though, vary. 
Some philosophers have attempted to modify the simple causal theory to better 
answer its critique. Perhaps the most faithful modification is Michael Devitt’s 
Designation (1981). His suggestion that a term may be multiply grounded makes 
referential change possible due to a change in the pattern of groundings over time. 
Judging by the latest discussion on theories of reference, it seems that most 
philosophers agree that the causal theory needs a descriptive element in order to 
function. Even Devitt has come to this conclusion (see Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 11). 
A theory born out of this realisation is called causal descriptivism.  According to 
causal descriptivism, reference is based on the causal relation between a term and an 
object, but is supplemented by a description (Sankey 1994, Ch. 3; 1997, 9-13) Philip 
Kitcher has argued that it is a mistake to think that there is only one mechanism of 
reference fixing. He has tried to develop a theory in which the reference 
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determination of a term is associated with multiple ways of fixing, such as ostension 
and description (Kitcher 1978, Kitcher and Stanford 2000). Devitt and Sterelny 
consider several combinations between two extremes: a descriptive theory of 
reference fixing with no reference borrowing, and a pure causal theory of fixing with 
borrowing. According to Devitt and Sterelny, there are several possible “hybrid 
theories” (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 96-101) There are also some philosophers who 
return more explicitly to descriptivism, making it more limited than, for example, the 
alleged implied theory of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Such a modified descriptive theory 
is the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis account of reference determination, which is suggested 
by Papineau (1996)
23
 and advocated by Bird (2000, 185-88). This theory identifies a 
core meaning that picks out reference. The core meaning stays invariant between two 
theories despite the changes in some out-of-core beliefs. Still at least one 
unmentioned possibility is Ilkka Niiniluoto’s idea that employs the similarity account 
of approximate truth and truthlikeness in reference determination (Niiniluoto 1999, 
132). The debate on theories of reference certainly continues, and it can be said that 




In this chapter I have examined how Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s meaning change has 
been interpreted and received in the philosophy of science. In contrast to the early 
responses, the meaning-change thesis is seen in the recent analyses to have taken a 
further conclusive step in the development of some basic tenets of logical positivism. 
Kuhn and Feyerabend are understood to have generalised the contextual theory of 
meaning, already found in logical empiricism, so as to cover all scientific terms, and 
as a consequence, making all terms, not only theoretical, sensitive to meaning 
change. The crucial move on the way to full-scale meaning holism and meaning 
variance was through questioning the neutrality of observation. Meaning change is 
conceived primarily as a change in sense, which also often leads to a shift in 
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 See also the original proposal by Lewis (1970).  
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 42 
reference. One of the most troublesome consequences is incommensurability, which 
questions whether communication and understanding, rational comparison, and 
scientific progress as truth approximation are possible. It may be argued that it also 
leads to a kind of idealism. Meaning change is perceived, therefore, as the source of 
lots of problems and as a threat to scientific realism in philosophy. As a result of this, 
discussion on meaning change and incommensurability has focused on constructing 
arguments against the variance of meaning and the incommensurability thesis. A 
large number of philosophers have argued that the invariability of reference is the 
solution, and there are by now many differing suggestions for a good theory of 
reference. It is likewise widely accepted that if a term’s reference stays invariant in 
theory change, then comparison between theories is possible, and the realists’ image 
of science as approximating truth can be retained. The most successful theory of 
reference during recent decades has arguably been the causal theory of reference. Yet 
it has been pointed out that there are also many problems with the causal account, 
and the debate on the nature of reference determination is as yet open-ended.  
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3. Genesis and development of meaning theorising 
 
In the previous chapter we saw briefly how a number of philosophers thought that 
Kuhn and Feyerabend owe more to logical empiricism than has been recognised. In 
this chapter I will examine what the appropriate context is for these two 
philosophers. This examination is however concentrated more on Kuhn for the 
reason that is explicated below. My overall conclusion is that, although there are 
undeniable parallels between late empiricism and Kuhn, one should be wary of 
reading too much into these parallels. That is because connecting Kuhn too closely to 
logical empiricism conceals fundamental differences in the two views. In particular, 
we should not confuse a parallel with a historical continuum. The genesis of Kuhn’s 
views differs drastically, for instance, from those of Carnap. Firstly, I again take a 
brief look (but more detailed than in the last chapter) at some of the philosophers 
who emphasise the similarities between Kuhn and logical empiricism. After that, I 
argue that the proper origin of Kuhn’s argumentation is in his studies of history. 
Thirdly, I show how Kuhn’s notion of meaning developed in the course of his career 
from the early idea that stemmed from his historical interest towards a more 
philosophically  explicit account. A particularly significant source of influence was 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. My contention is that Kuhn did succeed in 
explicating some of his insights on meaning although he may not be said to have 
achieved a high level of sophistication in his meaning theorising. 
 
Logical empiricism and Kuhn  
 
At the beginning of the 1960s Feyerabend and Kuhn seemed to be on the same front 
in an attack against logical empiricism. However, their careers took a different turn 
by the end of that decade. Kuhn’s interest in the traditional problems in philosophy 
increased; consequently, he tried to answer to criticism that was directed at his 
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philosophy. In contrast, Feyerabend appeared to lose interest in such problems. That 
is well illustrated in the debate on meaning and meaning change. Kuhn continued to 
emphasise the significance of meaning until the end of his career. Feyrabend’s last 
writings that constructively address meaning and meaning change all appeared in the 
mid 1960s.
24
 Feyerabend had already said in 1965, “As far as I am concerned, even 
the most detailed conversations about meanings belong in the gossip columns and 
have no place in the theory of knowledge” (Feyerabend 1981b, 113). He agrees to 
deal with meaning only because it occurs so often in philosophical debates. 
Feyerabend’s decision to develop his radical ‘epistemological anarchism’ and such 
“methodological rules” as ‘anything goes’ also diminished his influence in 
philosophy, although it may have increased outside philosophy for the same reason.  
The rationale for my decision not to pursue Feyerabend further is precisely 
that he did not develop his sketchy idea of meaning. Even more importantly, Kuhn’s 
and Feyerabend’s advancements of the meaning-change thesis stem from different 
sources, and they cannot, therefore, be lumped into one. Ironically, it is Feyerabend, 
and not Kuhn, who is best understood against the tradition of logical empiricism. The 
supervisor of Feyerabend’s thesis was a former member of the Vienna Circle, Viktor 
Kraft. Furthermore, Feyerabend studied under Popper in London, and according to 
his own words, “fell for” falsificationism (Feyerabend 1995, 89). He was also deeply 
familiar in many other ways with logical positivism and in touch with the 
philosophers from that tradition. He regarded himself as an empiricist until the end of 
the 1960s trying to improve and reconcile empiricism with realism.
25
 Moreover, 
Feyerabend directed his critique in some of his early texts directly against the 
meaning theory of logical positivism and also against such logical empiricist theories 
as Nagel’s theory of reduction and Hempel’s theory of explanation
26
. In light of this, 
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 The four most important articles in which Feyerabend discussed meaning and meaning change  are 
“Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism”, “Problem of Empiricism”, “On the ‘Meaning’ of Scientific 
Terms” and “Reply to Criticism: Comments on Smart, Sellars, and Putnam”. The first was published 
in 1962 and the rest in 1965.  All except “Problems of Empiricism” (see Feyerabend 1965) are 
reprinted in Feyerabend 1981b. 
25
 In an article “Science without Experience” (Feyerabend 1981b) Feyerabend argues that science 
without experience, or sensory elements, is possible, thereby giving up empiricism.  
26
 See, for example, “Explanation, reduction and empiricism” (in Feyerabend 1981b) and “Problems 
of empiricism” (Feyerabend 1965).  
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Feyerabend may be said to have been still working in the 1960s in the tradition of 
logical empiricism. His criticism of the empiricist theory of meaning was essentially 
based on the challenge of the idea of observation as neutral. This stance is also 
partially responsible for his contextual theory of meaning
27
. He naturally attempted 
to make philosophy on the whole more compatible with the history of science, just as 
Kuhn did, but the influence of logical empiricism was much stronger in Feyerabend 
than in Kuhn. This different genesis of their arguments, and the fact that Kuhn 
continued to philosophise on meaning, make their views disparate in important 
respects, which become even more clearly visible later in Kuhn’s career. The 
apparent similarities may conceal the differences.  
 Let us, then, take a look at the differing ways in which some recent 
philosophers have connected Kuhn to logical empiricism. Jane English (1978) was 
probably the first who gave a detailed analysis of the parallels between Kuhn and 
Carnap
28
. English labels Kuhn’s and Feyrabend’s views of meaning change as 
contextualist in the sense that every substantial change in theory changes at least 
meanings of terms that occur in revised sentences. According to English, this makes 
intertranslation, contradiction and progress as increasing verisimilitude, impossible. 
English’s main point is that, in contrast to what has been thought, Carnap’s view 
faces these same objections as the meaning-change view. George A. Reisch (1991) 
explains Carnap’s appreciation of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in a 
letter on the possible publication of it in 1960 by the similarity of their views and 
claims “that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap’s 
shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn’s book” (264). That is, both 
Carnap and Kuhn adopted the distinction between radically different theories, 
languages or conceptual frameworks that change during the revolutionary period. 
They are incommensurable and can therefore be evaluated only pragmatically. John 
Earman (1993) writes that many of the post-positivist themes are extensions from 
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 Also the later Wittgenstein played a role in Feyerabend’s theory of meaning, and in Kuhn’s as well. 
It appears, however, that they adopted Wittgenstein’s idea differently. See footnote 37 of this chapter.  
28
 It is, however, interesting to note that, as early as 1969 at the symposium on the structure of 
scientific theories in Urbana, Kuhn was accused of being too close to, or of adopting some principles 
from logical positivism by such philosophers as Shapere (507), Putnam (513), and Achinstein (516). 
A similar accusation is made also by Suppe in 1977 (647) (All page numbers refer to Suppe 1977).  
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Carnap and other logical positivists and empiricists. Such themes are at least the non-
existence of neutral facts, incommensurability in the form of failure of 
intertranslatability and paradigm as analogous to Carnap’s linguistic framework. 
Also, according to Earman, a holistic view of meaning emerges from logical 
positivism. Gürol Irzik and Teo Grünberg (1995) conduct a comparative analysis 
between Carnap and Kuhn, and they as well want to challenge the conventional 
wisdom that the post-positivist philosophy of science constituted a radical rupture 
without too many affinities with logical positivism. They attempt to show that 
Carnap’s linguistic frameworks function in the same way as Kuhn’s lexical 
structures; Carnap’s scientific theories resemble, at least in some respects, Kuhn’s 
paradigms; and Carnap’s and Kuhn’s characterisations of scientific revolutions are 
nearly identical. Furthermore, they seem to agree with English and disagree with 
Earman that the Kuhnian type of semantic holism is inherent in later Carnap and that 
semantic incommensurability is a direct consequence of it. Michael Friedman (2003), 
in turn, agrees with Reisch that both Kuhn and Carnap accepted the philosophy of 
linguistic frameworks and he deepens this analysis by studying the influence of neo-
Kantianism. These affinities reflect, Friedman writes, an early-twentieth-century 
intellectual situation encompassing both the history and philosophy of science. 
Finally, Alexander Bird presents Kuhn in his various very recent publications on 
Kuhn
29
 as the last empiricist rather than the first post-empiricist. Bird argues that 
Kuhn failed to break entirely with the preceding tradition and consequently kept 
many theses from the logical empiricist tradition. Some of these are, for instance, 
intensionalism, meaning holism, and scepticism towards theoretical entities. In terms 
of meaning and meaning change, Bird (2002) introduces a catchy phrase that 
“Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis can be seen as positivism plus the theory-
dependence of observation” (14). This is essentially the view that emerged in the last 
chapter in my analysis of Sankey’s incommensurability thesis.  
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 Especially Bird 2000, 2002 and 2004b. Also Bird 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004c and 2005 support the 
view.  
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 All, or nearly all, these views imply or explicitly state that both Carnap and 
Kuhn held a view of meaning holism
30
. Their opinion is that meaning holism 
explains why Kuhn advanced the meaning-change thesis. However, it is not always 
clear whether these various writers are ready to claim that, regarding meaning and 
meaning change, there is also a historical continuum between Kuhn and logical 
empiricism. Some, such as Reisch and Irzik and Grünberg attempt to show merely 
analogies, while Earman and Bird argue that they at least partially shared the same 
tradition, and therefore, certain of Kuhn’s views can be traced to logical 
empiricism.
31
 I will not go into a deeper analysis of what others have said of the 
relationship between Carnap and Kuhn, but will formulate my own view of it instead. 
I contend that, with respect to Kuhn’s view on meaning and meaning change, there is 
no historical continuum between Kuhn and logical empiricism. Furthermore, even 
though the comparison of the views is naturally entirely legitimate, it should not hide 
the fact that Kuhn’s thinking stems from a different origin than those with apparently 
similar views in logical empiricism; and that his notion of meaning, in particular, is 
not just a further development of that notion from logical empiricism.   
  
Kuhn’s historical rationale 
 
In a very broad sense Kuhn and logical empiricism may be said to have shared the 
same tradition. However, they did not share it so specifically that this claim would 
have historical explanatory value in the context of this thesis. For instance, it is true 
that Kuhn adopted intensionalism, i.e. that intension or sense picks out extension or 
reference. But the group that has accepted this principle is rather large and not 
reducible to empiricism. Moreover, there are not that many pure “externalists”, i.e. 
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 Earman thinks that the route to semantic holism can be traced only to Carnap’s Aufbau. The rest of 
the analysts disagree. To me it seems that they are right; Carnap’s later philosophy clearly had 
features of holism.   
31
 John Preston (2004) and Bird (2004c) engage in a debate over the question of whether “the 
theoretical context view of meaning” that is attributed to Kuhn can be said to be positivistic, and if it 
can, then in what sense? Bird claims that it is positivistic “aetiologically”, i.e. the view was developed 
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those who think that reference or extension can be determined without any 
intensional elements and that intension is not needed to explain any part of meaning. 
The improvement in moving from intensionalism to externalism in semantics, i.e. to 
simple causalism, is actually in doubt at the moment, as argued at the end of the last 
chapter. Furthermore, continuity between logical empiricism and Kuhn on the one 
hand, and logical empiricism and the realistic post-empiricist philosophy on the 
other, cuts both ways. Admittedly, both Kuhn and logical empiricism held the idea of 
linguistic frameworks and a holistic view of meaning in some form. However, Kuhn 
did not share with logical empiricism the belief that, for instance, the history of 
science is cumulative, or the conviction that the meaning defining part can be clearly 
separated from the non-meaning defining part. The realistic philosophy does indeed 
assume that scientific knowledge is cumulative. And despite Quine’s writings, the 
sharp distinction between meaning constituting and non-constituting parts has still 
many advocates in the present philosophy.  
 It is clear that Kuhn’s understanding of the theories of logical empiricism was 
superficial at the beginning of his career. First of all, we should remember that he 
was, as Kuhn himself expressed, “a physicist turned historian for philosophical 
purposes” (RSS, 320-1). As a consequence of this, although his interest was 
philosophical, he did not know philosophy very well at the beginning of his career. 
After Earman had attempted to show the parallels between Kuhn and logical 
positivism, Kuhn felt compelled to answer:  
 
Whatever role the problems encountered by positivism may have 
played in the background for The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
my knowledge of the literature that attempted to deal with those 
problems was decidedly sketchy when the book was written. In 
particular, I was almost totally innocent of the post-Aufbau Carnap, 
and discovering him has distressed me acutely. (RSS, 227)  
 
                                                                                                                                          
by the logical positivists, and Kuhn adopted it from others who have followed that path further (see 
Bird 2004c, 338-40).   
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How limited Kuhn’s knowledge of logical empiricism was becomes apparent from 
an interview in which Kuhn tells that in his early career “I read some von Mises; I 
certainly read Bridman’s Logic of Modern Physics; I read some Philipp Frank; I read 
a litte bit of Carnap, but not the Carnap that people later point to as the stuff that has 
real parallels to me”. (RSS, 305-6) Kuhn’s ignorance can also be seen in references in 
SSR or in other early works. In SSR there are two unimportant references to 
philosophers that could properly be said to be logical empiricists; one is to Ernest 
Nagel and the other to Philipp Frank. 
 It is important to underline his ignorance of logical empiricism in order to see 
the proper context of Kuhn’s thoughts on meaning. He had some idea of logical 
positivism, but it was such a general idea that Kuhn himself later called it an 
“everyday image of logical positivism” (RSS, 306). The image entailed that science 
proceeds from facts given by observation. Facts are objective and interpersonal, i.e. 
accessible to all normally equipped human observers. They are also prior to laws and 
theories. After discovery, facts become data for science, and they subsequently form 
an objective and secure basis for science (RSS, 106-7). Kuhn says that he opposed 
this kind of view (RSS, 306) and that he was primarily motivated by difficulties in 
logical positivism and empiricism (RSS, 106). At this point, we have to ask why 
Kuhn objected to logical empiricism so much and what role such an opposition 
played in his thinking. In order to answer these questions, we need to ask a yet larger 
question: What were Kuhn’s main objectives in his career? 
 Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read in their book, Kuhn. Philosopher of Scientific 
Revolution, think that Kuhn had two major objectives: one was historical and the 
other philosophical. According to Sharrock and Read, the historical aim was to get 
people to understand the past on its own conditions and not in terms of the present. 
Too often, past science was used either to explain or justify the present scientific 
achievement to the public and to science students. (Sharrock and Read 2002, 7) 
Sharrock and Read write that the demand to consider the different periods of science 
in their own right “rather than as mere stepping stones to the present” may seem a 
modest and plausible suggestion, but that it could have far-reaching implications and 
transform the way “the relationship between changing ideas” in science is understood 
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(Sharrock and Read 2002, 8). The view that Kuhn opposed, they say, is so called 
Whig-history, according to which the past is a preparation for or even a prefiguring 
of the present. The abandonment of this conception of history would mean that the 
present science is understood merely as the latest date in history, not its fulfilment. 
Kuhn’s second, philosophical, objective was to change the public image of science. 
Insofar as the image of science is based on the history of science, it is distorted 
because the picture of past science is distorted.  Sharrock and Read argue that Kuhn 
attempted to correct the view of science as continuously cumulative, and replace it 
with an image that would be more adequate in the light of history research.  
 I think that Sharrock and Read are right about Kuhn’s purposes.
32
 They also 
correctly emphasise that the acceptance of Kuhn’s historical point of view would 
have far-reaching consequences in the philosophy of science, although I feel that 
Sharrock and Read have not really fully developed this idea. In Chapter 7 I will show 
how Kuhn’s historical inclination leads to epistemological anti-realism or 
epistemological scepticism. The relation of the cumulative image of science to an 
“everyday image of logical positivism”, or potentially even to a more sophisticated 
view of that philosophical school, is that the former is based on the latter. If science 
really discovers facts in the true sense of the word, i.e. objective and neutral states of 
affairs, they naturally cumulate expanding scientific knowledge in the course of time. 
Once a fact is found, it would be unreasonable to stop believing in it because it just is 
“how things are” in the world. A historian’s job is, then, to verify and chronicle this 
accumulation and explain deviations from the secure path of knowledge. Kuhn 
thought that the cumulative view is not a tenable picture of the history of science. It 
is, rather, at odds with the image of science that arises from the actual studies of 
history.  
 The starting point and an object of criticism in arguably Kuhn’s most 
important work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is the conception of history 
in science text-books. Kuhn takes it to be as accurate as an image of culture drawn 
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 I do not think, though, that their reading of Kuhn as a Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosopher is 
convincing because Kuhn clearly had philosophical ambitions based on his historical point of view. 
More on this, see this chapter below and Chapters 4 and 7.  
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from tourist guides. He implies that history is viewed in them as a “repository for 
anecdotes and chronology” (RSS, 1). Text-books present history as cumulative. The 
job that is left for a historian is to determine by whom and when each law, fact and 
theory was discovered. Beyond that, s/he needs to explain why the even more rapid 
and straightforward development of science to the present point has been hampered 
by errors, myths and superstition. Indeed, the main objective in SSR is to correct this 
image found in text-books. Kuhn writes:  
 
This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by them [text-
books] in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different 
concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the 
research activity itself. … Rather than seeking the permanent 
contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they 
[historians of science] attempt to display the historical integrity of that 
science in its own time. (RSS, 1-3) 
 
The historians of science who adopt the outlined alternative method of studying 
history examine, for instance, the relationship of Galileo’s views, not to modern 
scientists, but to his contemporaries. Furthermore, they try to give maximal 
coherence to those views and opinions. Finally, Kuhn tells us that “these historical 
studies suggest the possibility of a new image of science” and his “essay aims to 
delineate that image by making explicit some of the new historiography’s 
implications”. (SSR, 1-3)  
 Delving deeper into Kuhn’s mind, we also need to ask what made Kuhn, who 
was a scientist after all, conclude that the image of history taught in science 
education was wrong. The incident that leads to this realisation is undoubtedly the 
most profound and significant single intellectual experience in Kuhn’s career. It is 
worth quoting Kuhn here at length in order to catch his insight:  
 
My own enlightenment began in 1947, when I was asked to interrupt 
my current physics project for a time in order to prepare a set of 
lectures on the origins of seventeenth-century mechanics. … Like 
most earlier historians of science, I approached these texts knowing 
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what Newtonian physics and mechanics were. Like them, too, I asked 
of my texts the questions: How much about mechanics was known 
within the Aristotelian tradition, and how much was left for the 
seventeenth-century scientists to discover? Being posed in a 
Newtonian vocabulary, those questions demanded answers in the 
same terms, and the answers were clear. Even at the apparently 
descriptive level, the Aristotelians had known little of mechanics; 
much of what they had had to say about it was simply wrong. …  
Generalisations of that sort were widely current and apparently 
inescapable. But they were also puzzling. When dealing with subjects 
other than physics, Aristotle had been an acute and naturalistic 
observer. In such fields as biology or political behaviour, his 
interpretations of phenomena had often been both penetrating and 
deep. How could his characteristic talents have failed him so when 
applied to motion? How could he have said about it so many 
apparently absurd things? And above all, why had his views been 
taken so seriously for so long a time by so many of his successors? 
The more I read, the more puzzled I became. Aristotle could, of 
course, have been wrong – I had no doubt that he was – but was it 
conceivable that his errors had been so blatant?  
One memorable (and very hot) summer day those perplexities 
suddenly vanished. I all at once perceived the connected rudiments of 
an alternate way of reading the texts with which I had been struggling. 
For the first time I gave due weight to the fact that Aristotle’s subject 
was change-of-quality in general, including both the fall of a stone 
and the growth of a child to adulthood. … More consequential was 
my recognition that the permanent ingredients of Aristotle’s universe, 
its ontologically primary and indestructible elements, were not 
material bodies but rather the qualities which, when imposed on some 
portion of omnipresent neutral matter, constituted an individual body 
of substance.  
….those aspects of my new understanding of Aristotle’s 
enterprise should indicate what I mean by the discovery of a new way 
to read a set of texts. After I achieved this one, strained metaphors 
often became naturalistic reports, and much apparent absurdity 
vanished. I did not become an Aristotelian physicist as a result, but I 
had to some extent learned to think like one.  
… The discovery of hermeneutics
33
 did more than make 
history seem consequential. Its most immediate and decisive effect 
was instead on my view of science.  
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 Note that, although Kuhn was apparently somewhat acquainted with the continental hermeneutical 
tradition, his use of ‘hermeneutics’ does not indicate that he had adopted some specific hermeneutical 
theory that he applied systematically in his studies. (See Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 21) ‘Hermeneutics’ 
is here probably best understood as a practical attitude to historical texts that tries to understand them 
and maximise the coherence of the texts in the context of their own time. Or alternatively, it may be 
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…While discovering history, I had discovered my first 
scientific revolution, and my subsequent search for the best readings 
has often been a search for other episodes of the same sort. They are 
the ones that can be recognised and understood by recapturing out-of-
date ways of reading out-of-date texts”. (ET, xi-xiii) 
 
I think that the significance of the Aristotle experience on Kuhn’s thinking 
becomes evident from the above quotation. He felt that he could finally understand 
Aristotle so that “strained metaphors became naturalistic reports, and much apparent 
absurdity vanished”, and that he had learned to think like an Aristotelian physicist. 
Kuhn calls this moment his “first scientific revolution”. This new, “out-of-date”, way 
of reading made history “consequential” and had a “decisive effect” on Kuhn’s view 
of science. He returns to this incident on several occasions. First of all, Kuhn’s 
daughter, Sarah Kuhn, says that the importance of this experience cannot be 
overstated as his children heard about it from time to time (Andresen 1999, 56). 
Kuhn also mentions it in various papers. The citation was taken from the “Preface” 
of the volume Essential Tension, first published in 1977. An article, “A Function for 
Thought Experiments”, from1964 describes in detail one aspect of the Aristotle 
reading; how the meaning of ‘speed’ was different in Aristotle compared to the 
physics that came after him. In an essay “What are Scientific Revolutions”, 
published in 1987, Kuhn gives a very much similar, although longer, description of 
the above reading of Aristotle. In an article that appeared in 1989, “Possible Worlds 
in History of Science”,  Kuhn extends the attempt to understand apparently 
nonsensical“out-of-date” texts in relation to his other encounters with historical 
figures, such as Newton, Volta, Bohr and Planck
34
. In an interview less than a year 
                                                                                                                                          
taken as an attitude that tries to understand the thinking of people in the past in as authentic a way as 
possible. Andresen calls this orientation “empathetic historiography” (Andresen 1999, 55). Likewise, 
Kuhn’s children, Sarah and Nat Kuhn, said rather aptly in an interview that Kuhn’s “scientific 
methodology was based on an intellectual empathy that enabled him to see things from another 
person’s point of view”(Andresen 1999, 60).  
34
 “A historian reading an out-of-date scientific text characteristically encounters passages that make 
no sense. That is an experience I have had repeatedly whether my subject was an Aristotle, a Newton, 
a Volta, a Bohr or a Planck. … Apparent anomaly is thus ordinarily evidence of the need for local 
adjustment of the lexicon, and it often provides clues to the nature of that adjustment as well. An 
important clue to problems in reading Aristotle’s physics is provided by the discovery that the term 
translated ‘motion’ in his text refers not simply to change of position but to all changes characterised 
by two end points.” (RSS, 59-60) For a similar account that extends the reading also to Boyle, Carnot 
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before his death in 1995, Kuhn recalls the Aristotle experience. He says: “I had 
wanted to write The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ever since the Aristotle 
experience. That’s why I had gotten into history of science” (RSS, 292). It is essential 
to understand that this event is not interesting only for biographical or psychological 
reasons, but also because it colours virtually the whole of Kuhn’s later career and his 
thinking on the the notion of meaning in particular.
35
  
 Kuhn expressed particular anger, probably in part because he felt himself 
misunderstood, towards the attitude that ridicules past thinkers by pointing out how 
absurd were the things they believed or how incoherent their thinking was. Kuhn’s 
objective was to maximise the coherence of their thinking and assume historical 
“integrity” to his objects of research. The key to Kuhn’s reading of Aristotle was that 
he did not try to make sense of it from a modern perspective, but rather on its own 
conditions. That implied, as Kuhn described, getting “inside the heads of the 
people”(RSS, 276) or to “try to think as they did” (ET, 110; similarly ET, 8), a special 
skill that Kuhn believed he possessed. Such an attempt cannot be done piece-by- 
piece or by looking for one-to-one matches between the meanings of the terms of 
past and modern science. It is necessary to understand the whole world view of past 
scientists. For example, one needs to recognise that neither Aristotle nor his 
contemporaries meant what modern scientists do by ‘motion’ and also that his 
problems were in some way different. This, together with a few other realisations of 
Aristotle’s philosophy, explain the odd usage of ‘speed’ in Aristotle’s texts from the 
modern perspective.  
In respect of the understanding of past science, Kuhn contrasted philosophers 
and scientists to historians. The former are primarily concerned with what is right 
and wrong, and for this reason, tend to study historical texts in relation to what is 
                                                                                                                                          
and Maxwell, see Kuhn’s “Remarks on Receiving the Laurea of the University of Padua”, as quoted in 
Caneva 2000 (102).  
35
 For an interesting analysis of how various incidents in Kuhn’s personal life might have affected his 
intellectual life, see Andresen 1999. Andresen appears to be in agreement with the author of this thesis 
on the significance of the Aristotle experience: “Kuhn’s sudden understanding of Aristotle’s thought, 
which he considered to be an especially significant event, confirmed the efficacy of a methodology 
grounded in empathetic historiography” (55). For yet further confirmation of the significance of the 
Aristotle experience, see Kuhn’s remarks at the university of Padua, as quoted in Caneva 2000 (100). 
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known now, picking out the true and and the false. According to Kuhn, the latter try 
simply to understand why a particular person or persons thought as they did.(RSS, 
315) The objective to figure out truths and falsities may be an appropriate attitude for 
a scientist, but it leads to a distortion when projected as such to the history of 
science. The problem for scientific communitities regarding their view of history is 
that in scientific revolutions their conception of what is true and false may change 
drastically. Kuhn believed that scientific communities engage, therefore, in rewriting 
history after each scientific revolution. The reason for having the Whig-conception 
of history is that it makes both the student and the professional feel like participants 
in a long-standing historical tradition, who are working on the same set of fixed 
problems with the same set of canons, and that gives a tremendous psychological 
motivation for the participants in a scientific community.(SSR, 137-8) Kuhn even 
compares a member of a mature scientific community to a typical character of 
Orwell’s 1984 because s/he is “a victim of a history rewritten by the powers that be”. 
(SSR, 167).  
This brings us back full circle to where we started from. The fight against 
Whig-history that views history as heading towards the present was fundamental to 
Kuhn. Kuhn thought that philosophically the image derives from the doctrines of 
logical positivism and is typically found in science text-books. Whig-history may be 
pedagogically effective and increase the cohesion of the group, but it is historically 
unacceptable. What one has to learn is to study past scientists and communities on 
their own conditions. An intrinsic part of that attitude is to try to figure out what they 
meant by their terms. This leads inevitably to the realisation that, even if they might 
have used the same terms as we do, the meanings attached to those terms may be 
very different from ours. Understanding the proper meanings of the expressions used 
in history reveals the world view of past scientific communities, and is, therefore, 
essential for understanding the past science itself.   
This is, in short, the root of Kuhn’s meaning talk. It stems from an attempt to 
make sense of old texts that, at first sight, look incoherent and absurd. Kuhn’s notion 
                                                                                                                                          
Kuhn says, for example, “My attempt to come to terms with Aristotle’s texts determined my future 
life”. 
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of meaning implies two basic components that he carried forward throughout his 
career. The first is that Kuhn is talking about meaning either in the psychological or 
sociopsychological sense. He is interested in what people thought or believed. The 
presumption is that people expressed their views in their language, and that is why 
studying “meanings” is so important. The second component is that Kuhn strongly 
believed that meaning has to be holistic in some sense. It is not possible to 
understand the meaning of just one term. If a person understands one, s/he has to 
understand many, because meanings are somehow dependent on each other. Later, 
Kuhn tried to give a more precise definition of his notion of meaning and also took 
part in the discussion on the nature of meaning. The increasing influence of certain 
philosophical ideas, notably that of Wittgenstein, is clear in his theorising, but these 
two elements preserve their place in Kuhn’s philosophy. Later in the thesis we see 
that determination of extension begins to increasingly preoccupy Kuhn’s mind  soon 
after the early historical studies.  
Nowdays it is often pointed out that Carnap and Kuhn both held the holistic 
view of meaning and were committed to the meaning-change thesis. That may be 
right. However, now we can see also that the genesis of their views is different in 
crucial ways. Carnap arrived at his position after all the difficulties with the Received 
View of logical positivism, which were briefly described in the last chapter. Kuhn’s 
“meaning theory” and its holistic flavour are, in turn, positive constructions that 
arose from Kuhn’s studies of history. Moreover, Kuhn thought that respecting the 
holistic feature of meaning is a necessary precondition for understanding historical 
texts. It would be inappropriate to suppose or imply that Kuhn continued from the 
point that logical empiricism had reached. It is true that Kuhn and other historical 
philosophers challenged the idea of neutral observation and observation language, 
which was a central tenet in logical positivism. This questioning can be seen as 
adding to the difficulties of logical empiricism, making the tradition, on the whole, 
look quite bankrupt. But to suggest a clear continuity in the meaning theory would 
suggest that Kuhn and Carnap shared the same theoretical body and were led the 
same way towards a certain conclusion, only for Kuhn to end up with a more radical 
view. The proper context is that Carnap was led to his view by the careful 
examination of the Received View, while Kuhn aimed at better comprehension of old 
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writings and arrived at a somewhat similar view by reading and interpreting 
historical scientific texts.  
I disagree, therefore, with Bird’s claim that Kuhn’s notion of meaning is 
aetiologically positivistic (see note 8 above). Rather, it derives from Kuhn’s 
historical-interpretative objective. Bird (2004c) criticises Read and Sharrock’s 
(2002a) view of Kuhn as a Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosopher, a view which 
Preston (2004, 332)  also appears to share, on the ground that it is poorly supported 
by the textual evidence. I am in agreement here with Bird, and this point is also 
apparently conceded by Read and Sharrock (e.g. 223, note 3). But the same can be 
said of Bird’s and others’ attempts to connect Kuhn to logical empiricism via his 
notion of meaning. This is also poorly supported by textual evidence, which Bird, in 
turn, admits. He says: “the truth of my claim [that Kuhn’s meaning is aetiologically 
positivistic] cannot be established directly, because Kuhn does not even articulate a 
theoretical context view of meaning in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, let 
alone justify it or say what his source for it is” (Bird 2004c, 340). This is in contrast, 
for example, to Feyerabend who directly linked his “contextual theory of meaning” 
to the later Wittgenstein. But now we see that there is textual evidence for linking 
Kuhn’s theory of meaning to the historical interpretation of scientific texts. 
Furthermore, it is not convincing to try to support the thesis of Kuhn’s connection to 
logical empiricism, as Bird does, by the fact that Kuhn rejected “anti-positivistic and 
naturalistic” development in semantics, i.e. the causal theory of reference, because of 
his hidden positivism. As I argue in Chapters 4 and 5, Kuhn’s rejection can be seen 
as not only containing a serious philosophical criticism of the causal theory, but it 
can be also explained by a genuine metaphysical difference between Kuhn and the 
causal theorists. What is more, the rejection can be interpreted as receiving empirical 
support, and hence, can be seen as being compatible with the naturalistic philosophy.  
The divergent origin of his philosophy and logical empirism is also 
something that Kuhn himself remarked on in an interview. After confessing to being 
embarrassed at not knowing Carnap better at the time of writing SSR, Kuhn insists:  
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the view that emerges in Structure is not the same as the Carnap view, 
but it’s interesting that coming from what were partially different … 
Carnap staying within tradition had been driven to this – I had 
rebelled already and come to it from another direction, and in any case 
we were still different. (RSS, 306). 
 
It is indicative that Kuhn claims that not only the genesis of their views is different, 
but that the views themselves are not identical. The remainder of the chapter is 
devoted to closely studying what Kuhn said about meaning, and how his view 
changed over the course of time. In short, I will show how Kuhn’s views “were still 
different”. This exploration makes clear the distinctiveness of Kuhn’s thinking in 
general, and meaning theorising in particular.  
 
The development of Kuhn’s notion of meaning  
 
‘Meaning’, whatever that precisely turns out to be, was together with the concept of 
incommensurability, arguably the most important notion in Kuhn’s philosophy. Kuhn 
tells us how he thought that he had been talking about meaning change in SSR, only 
realising, to his surprise, how few references to meaning there were. Kuhn himself 
explained this by his ignorance of the philosophical debate on meaning, which had 
led him to rely on gestalt switches. (RSS, 298). He was also disappointed that the 
other historical philosophers abandoned the problem of meaning, which he held as 
central in philosophy (RSS, 309-10). In any case, the whole of Kuhn’s career is a 
testimony of how important that notion was to him. He tried to improve his “theory” 
of meaning until the end of his life.  
I think it is now clear that Kuhn’s knowledge of philosophy of his own time 
was rather limited, and he could certainly not be compared to the philosophical 
sophistication of Carnap. At the time of drafting SSR, he had in mind probably some 
kind of “contextual theory of meaning”, i.e. that the meaning of a term depends on 
the context in which it is incorporated. Yet, because his notion of meaning was still 
very sketchy, one should avoid reading too much into it without also paying attention 
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to what Kuhn postulated later. I believe that Kuhn is later able to specify certain 
aspects in his notion of meaning that capture the original historical insight better; 
therefore, it is reasonable to say that, over a period of time, we can find improvement 
in his meaning theorising.  
 
Early period - crude account  
 
In Kuhn’s early major historical work, The Copernican Revolution, there is little 
direct talk of changes in meaning. Instead, Kuhn writes a lot about how the 
conceptual scheme changed in the Copernican revolution. However, the historical 
material presented in the book reappears in SSR as one of the many examples of 
meaning change. The passages in the last chapter, all taken from SSR, seem mostly to 
state only that the meaning of scientific terms change. It is difficult to find in them 
much specification of in what sense meaning changes, or what this meaning is that 
changes. Nonetheless, from a purely historical perspective, they can be made fully 
intelligible. If one knows the Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy even 
superficially, s/he probably understands the point of saying that ‘Earth’ has a 
different meaning in these two systems. In the former, the Earth is a unique stable 
entity in the centre of the universe around which other bodies revolve, and in the 
latter, the Earth is one of many planets and is, therefore, circling around the sun
36
. 
Similarly, in the pre-Einsteinian period, space was thought to be flat, homogenous, 
isotropic, and unaffected by the presence of matter, but nothing like this after 
Einstein’s theory. Why not then say that the meaning of ‘space’ had changed. Or, to 
take one more example, if the pre-Lavoisier’s ‘element’ was a fundamental 
metaphysical substance found in all bodies and responsible primarily for their 
observable qualities, while Lavoisier’s ‘element’ was a so-far-indecomposable 
material substance responsible only for the chemical properties of bodies, then it 
seems reasonable to say that there was a change in the meaning of ‘element’ in 
                                                 
36
 Notice that Kuhn does not treat the Earth as a proper name in SSR. It is written as a common noun, 
‘earth’ (SSR, 200) 
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chemistry in the 18
th
 century. All in all, I do think that these passages can be read as 
expressions of Kuhn’s intuition as a historian.  
 Nevertheless, Kuhn already takes steps in SSR towards a philosophically 
more principled position. The first thing to notice, which is also in accordance with 
Kuhn’s historical viewpoint, is that he talks about “networks” (SSR, 45) or 
“relationship between concepts” (SSR, 149). This could just be the basic intuition of 
a historian who had realised that understanding Aristotle’s concepts requires the 
mastering of quite a few of them. It is, however, something more; namely, the later 
Wittgenstein’s influence is already clear in SSR. What Kuhn picks out from 
Wittgenstein is the idea of concept as family resemblance. Kuhn refers to 
Wittgenstein’s question of how much we need to know in order to be able to apply 
terms like ‘chair’, ‘leaf’ or ‘game’. He answers that it does not require knowing 
consciously, or even intuitively, what a chair, leaf or game is, i.e. grasping some set 
of attributes that these, and only these, have in common. Although some of the 
attributes are shared by a number of games, chairs or leaves, there is no single set of 
attributes that is shared by all and only these members of the class. According to 
Kuhn’s Wittgensteinian idea, the recognition and naming of objects is possible by 
noticing family resemblances between objects. Different types of chairs are chairs 
because they resemble each other. They are, thus, similar to, and also different from, 
each other. Kuhn concludes that “for Wittgenstein, in short, games, and chairs, and 
leaves are natural families, each constituted by a network of overlapping and 
crisscross resemblances. The existence of such a network sufficiently accounts for 
our success in identifying the corresponding object or activity.”(SSR, 45)  
I think Kuhn took Wittgenstein on board because Wittgenstein’s ideas caught 
Kuhn’s historically motivated holistic intuition and promised a specification of that 
view.
37
 For example, Kuhn tells us that the Wittgensteinian idea of family 
resemblance emerges from historical research. He says that in studying the evolution 
                                                 
37
 It is interesting that Feyerabend, who also advocated “contextual theory meaning”, was influenced 
by Wittgenstein. He had written a simplified version of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 
and he attributes his contextual theory of meaning to Wittgenstein. (Feyerabend 1981b, 74; note 68) 
Yet, Feyerabend did not fully utilise the family resemblance notion. He emphasises merely that the 
meaning of a term depends on the way in which it is incorporated into a theory.  
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of concepts such as ‘element’, ‘mass’, ‘force’, ‘space’, ‘caloric’, or ‘energy’ with the 
intention of finding out what they mean, a historian needs both to examine what is 
said about them, and how they are used. According to Kuhn, this leads to the 
discovery of a number of different criteria that govern the use of concepts and not to 
one unambiguous set of criteria. The “coexistence” of these standards can be 
understood only by studying the other scientific or extrascientific beliefs of people 
using these concepts. (ET, 259) 
Another issue that further proves Kuhn’s strong historical inclination at the 
beginning of his career is that in the 1950s, Kuhn’s earliest papers were all on 
historical topics, while none were on philosophical themes. Later this turned upside 
down, and Kuhn wrote almost exclusively on philosophical or meta-historical 
themes. Kuhn frequently analyses the meanings of specific terms or concepts in the 
early articles. It is interesting to think that Kuhn was at that point concerned with the 
identification of historical concepts and ideas in resemblance to studies on the history 
of ideas and intellectual history, but Wittgenstein’s influence, and also the 1970s 
discussion on reference, directed his interest away from historical preoccupation to 
these philosophical topics. Kuhn’s relation to the history of ideas and intellectual 
history is discussed more extensively in Chapter 6.   
 The employment of family resemblance in the characterisation of concepts 
defies the classic schema of defining concepts by a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions
38
. Another factor that comes with the family resemblance conception is 
the idea that concepts (laws and theories) are not learned in abstract but via their 
application to “some concrete range of natural phenomena” (SSR, 46). The idea 
seems to be roughly that the meaning of ‘chair’, for example, is learned by applying 
the word to different individual chairs. That way we form a concept of a stereotypical 
chair, i.e. an idea of the properties that a typical chair has.  
                                                 
38
 Interestingly, Kuhn latterly also gave credit for realising this to Quine: “his analytic-synthetic paper 
was coming out. …[it] had a considerable impact on me because I was wrestling already with the 
problem of meaning, and at least to discover that I didn’t have to be looking for necessary and 
sufficient conditions was extremely important”. (RSS, 279) Yet, references, both direct and indirect, to 
Wittgenstein are multiple. Quine’s paper probably further conviced Kuhn  that the classic account was 
wrong.  
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Furthermore, according to Kuhn, it is not possible to learn to see the world 
piecemeal, or item by item, unless the conceptual categories are already in place. 
Such an example of piecemeal learning would be discovering a new chemical 
element that is in conformance with the accepted conceptual category, or catching 
sight of a new house. Kuhn wants to say that people organise and categorise their 
experience in chunks, and significant changes are reflected in the net of resemblance 
relations. Kuhn’s example is a hypothetical case where a child transfers ‘mama’ from 
all humans to all females, and then to his mother. S/he does not only learn what 
‘mama’ means, or who the mother is, but also what differentiates males from females 
and something about their behaviour towards him or her. This case is compared to 
Copernicans who denied that the sun was a planet. By doing this they changed the 
meaning of ‘planet’ so that it could be used to make useful distinctions between 
different celestial bodies. During scientific revolutions, concepts “fall into new 
relationships”, or even “the whole conceptual web … had to be shifted and laid down 
again on nature whole”(SSR, 149).  
There is still one further potentially significant idea implied in the family 
resemblance notion. Kuhn claims in relation to thought experiments that “people 
learn their concepts and world together” (ET, 253). As a consequence, learning what 
a term means is at the same time learning something about the world. Learning what 
‘mama’ means is to learn all sorts of things about the world; for instance, how 
‘mamas’ behave towards a baby. And importantly, that is part of the meaning of 
‘mama’. Thus Kuhn assumes that there is not a principled distinction between the 
meaning constituting and the (non-meaning constituting) synthetic parts in our web 
of beliefs. In a familiar Quinean vocabulary, this is expressed metaphorically by 
saying that one cannot draw a line between a dictionary and an encyclopedia, or can 
say positively that linguistic meaning and empirical knowledge are intertwined. 
 Before moving on to deal with further developments in Kuhn’s thinking on 
meaning, there remains one issue that needs to be mentioned from Kuhn’s early 
period. In the last chapter I quoted Kuhn’s words where he claims that “physical 
referents” of space, time or mass are different in the Newtonian and the Einsteinian 
paradigms. That passage has attracted a lot of attention over the years. Remember 
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also Bird’s and Sankey’s (among others) idea that Kuhn had implicitly adopted a 
wide descriptive theory of meaning, or a “strict” and “thick” intensionalism in Bird’s 
terminology. According to strict and thick intensionalism, all theoretical claims 
belong to an intension, and a term refers only if all of them are true. Yet a mere 
descriptive theory of reference does not seem to explain Kuhn’s claim that both of 
the ‘masses’ refer to different references, unless we suppose that Kuhn thought that 
there are literally two different references. Bird thinks, therefore, that Kuhn uses the 
word ‘referent’ rather sloppily. Its meaning, he suggests, is akin to intension or sense 
(Bird 2002, 459). Bird proposes that “thin” intensionalism might suit Kuhn better, 
because it requires that only some of the theoretical assumptions have to be true of an 
entity in order for a term to refer to it. If we find a common core of theoretical 
assumptions that characterise the objects of the terms as used both in the Newtonian 
and Einsteinian frameworks, then they would refer to the same entity in the world. 
(Bird 2000 174-6) There are, then, two alternative explanations. One is that Kuhn 
really thought that there are two references or even two worlds and a paradigm shift 
changes a world and/or the reference of terms. This makes Kuhn an extremist of an 
idealistic kind. This is an implausible interpretation in light of Kuhn’s claims to the 
contrary, for example, that there is only world, as we saw in the last chapter. The 
other is that Kuhn had (implicitly) adopted some kind of descriptive theory of 
reference, only it was too strict and, therefore, an untenable one. This is clearly a 
better interpretation. Yet, it appears to presuppose that Kuhn’s mindset was very 
similar to the advocates of the causal or causal descriptive theory, i.e. that there are 
singular references and the only problem is to determine how terms refer. I do not 
think this is how Kuhn thought.  
Kuhn’s use of language was indeed philosophically-speaking rather loose on 
occasions
39
. I leave the specification of my view to Chapters 5 and 6 (especially 
pages 187-91). It is enough to say here that the key is the understanding of the 
relationship between the notions of reference and extension, as well as the fact that in 
this passage, Kuhn was making a historical point about the transformation of beliefs. 
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 64 
I argue later that Kuhn did not approve the notion of reference as it is applied in the 
modern philosophy of science, but he did, nevertheless, have a notion of extension. 
And yet it is questionable whether either of these notions is applicable without 
qualifications to the paragraph in question. Although I think that Bird is on the right 
track, it may be better to express the talk of ‘reference’ as denotation to mental 
concepts of some kind, or to sets of belief without the incorporation of the notion of 
reference at all, and specifically, without reference to mind independent entities. 
Admittedly, the fact that Kuhn used words ‘physical referents’ poses a challenge for 
this interpretation and may leave the impression that it is too far removed from 
Kuhn’s text. However, as already mentioned, it is important to understand that 
Kuhn’s use of reference does not appear to be in accordance with the standard usage 
either in philosophy or ordinary language, i.e. it is hard to conceive it as a connection 
between a linguistic expression and an external object (see Bird 2002, 458). 
Furthermore, the passage in question poses a challenge to any reading and any 
interpretation has to strike a balance between textual faithfulness, philosophical 
plausibility and coherence with the rest of Kuhn’s philosophy. My view is that Kuhn 
was here merely giving a description of a revolutionary episode in scientific 
thinking. Therefore, using the language of contemporary philosophy, the 
philosophical content of the passage can be expressed by saying that Kuhn’s 
‘referent’ is about hypothesised entities not existing independently of mind but as 
constructed by (the minds of) scientists. Finally, it is worth pointing out that this is 
not idealism but intellectual history.  
 
Middle period – some specifications   
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 The prime example is Margaret Masterman’s study that pointed out twenty-one different ways of 
employing the notion of ‘paradigm’. Kuhn himself noticed this in  “Postscript” of Structure. (SSR, 
174) 
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In the middle period, which covers the time since the publication of the 2
nd
 edition of 
SSR with “Postscript” in 1970 to the end of that decade, Kuhn outlines, relying on the 
family resemblance idea, an alternative theory of concept to the classic one
40
. On 
several occasions, he makes an attempt to spell out how concepts are learned and 
also how the family resemblance account can, in the first place, successfully divide 
objects into conceptual categories
41
. During the 1970s after the first wave of harsh 
criticism, Kuhn clearly adopts a more philosophical stand, despite the fact that he 
also published a fully historical research piece, Black-Body Theory and the Quantum 
Discontinuity (1978) at the end of that decade. I contend that Kuhn does succeed in 
specifying his theory, although it apparently did not achieve a high level of 
philosophical sophistication, and did not find, therefore, many advocates later in 
philosophy. Despite this, it does however pave the way for further developments in 
meaning theorising. 
In the “Postscript” in SSR, Kuhn returns to the family resemblance notion. 
The general idea is the same: objects are grouped together in similarity sets. He 
emphasises that a change in similarity and dissimilarity relations is a sign of 
scientific revolution. In such cases  
 
Objects that were grouped in the same set before are grouped in 
different ones afterward and vice versa. Think of the sun, moon, Mars, 
and earth before and after Copernicus; of free fall, pendular, and 
planetary motion before and after Galileo; or of salts, alloys, and a 
sulphur-iron filing mix before and after Dalton. Since most objects 
within even the altered sets continue to be grouped together, the 
names of the sets are usually preserved. Nevertheless, the transfer of a 
subset is ordinarily part of critical change in the network of 
interrelations among them. (RSS, 173)  
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 Note that Kuhn’s discussion on the Putnam-Kripke causal theory of reference is left for Chapter 5.  
41
 Kuhn deals with the notion of family resemblance in the following papers: “Postscript” ( first 
published 1970, SSR, 2
nd
 ed.), “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research” (first published 1970; 
in ET), “Reflections on my Critics” (first published 1970; in RSS), “Second Thoughts on Paradigms” 
(first published 1974; in RSS), and “Discussion on Second Thoughts on Paradigms” (first published 
1974; in ET). With regard to family resemblance, “Second Thoughts” is arguably the most elaborate 
and important text.  
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A change in similarity and dissimilarity relations is bound to cause communication 
difficulties, although it does not block communication completely. Conversely, 
during the period of normal science a group in a paradigm shares the same 
resemblance relations. Furthermore, Kuhn makes sharing similarity and dissimilarity 
relations a sign of a language community.  
 Kuhn is particularly preoccupied by the question of how similarity sets are 
learned. They are common to communities, but it is not clear how new members may 
acquire them. An answer could naturally be that in scientific revolutions people 
undergo a gestalt switch type of sudden conversion, and as a consequence of it, 
immediately learn to see the world differently. However, Kuhn is rather more 
interested in how a child who has not had any previous similarity sets, or a student 
who becomes a new member of a specialist scientific community, can come to 
possess an initially alien similarity set of the group. Kuhn compares children who 
first learn about dogs and cats, tables and chairs, or mothers and fathers, to learning 
from new instances in a scientific community. This process of learning involves a 
person who has already mastered the prevailing similarity sets and who points to 
objects telling into what category each of them falls. A person may make mistakes 
and is corrected by the teacher until s/he learns to use concepts correctly. The 
ostensive learning does not require any previous understanding of the criteria of 
categorization:  
 
They are prior, that is, to a list of criteria which, joined in a symbolic 
generalization, would enable us to define our terms. Rather, they are 
parts of a language-conditioned or language-correlated way of seeing 
the world. Until we have acquired them, we do not see a world at all. 
(RSS, 171)  
 
Kuhn apparently assumes that people are able to acquire the relevant category 
defining criteria or mechanism directly, without conscious mediation by mind from 
the world. This indicates that the process is unconscious and takes place pre-
linguistically. Kuhn does indeed refer to “neural processing”, which can be 
programmed differently and which establishes the pre-condition for learning to 
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 67 
cluster objects. (SSR 197, note 14) Interestingly, Kuhn appears to be anticipating 
some recent developments in cognitive science. This theme is discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 Kuhn also extends his theory of learning beyond immediately ostensible 
objects. The usage of ‘duck’ can be learned in a learning process where ostension 
plays a major role. Kuhn thinks that after mastering the application of ‘duck’, it is 
also possible to learn to apply that of ‘swimming duck’ and then the expression 
‘there is a duck swimming’ by the same means, given that a person has learnt syntax 
elsewhere. (Kuhn 1977, 504) It is not quite clear how this would work, but probably 
he regards ‘swimming duck’, for example, as a subkind of ‘duck’, which can be 
separated from it by its difference (not-swimming) in the same way as similarity sets 
are obtained. Furthermore, Kuhn thinks that learning the meaning of such terms as 
‘mass’, ‘force’, and ‘acceleration’ is possible, in principle, the same way as learning 
the meaning of observable terms. One learns them by applying a symbolic law-
sketch, such as ‘f=ma’, which can take various forms in problem situations and in 
this way we learn to notice the similarity between these and other problem situations. 
(Kuhn 1977, 504; SSR, 190-1) 
 The end result - a natural family bound together by similarity and 
dissimilarity relations - is thus not a definition in the mode of necessary and 
sufficient criteria. According to Kuhn, a person who has acquired a certain similarity 
set knows the meaning of a term in the sense that s/he is able to “apply these labels 
unequivocally and without effort”. This “meaning” is clearly empirical, since by 
learning an application a person has learnt something about nature. (ET, 312) The 
similarity set counts, thus, as knowledge acquired of the world, which is 
subsequently stored in the mind. Even though a similarity set is not a definition, it 
creates expectations, and therefore, it is a basis for rational action. Kuhn writes that, 
when a person who is already acquainted with swans sees a bird that is like a swan, 
s/he “may reasonably presume” that it requires the same food as the other birds and 
breeds with them, or one can draw a “behavioral conclusion” that the sight of a swan 
indicates that there is water nearby. (ET, 285-6; 312).  
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 However, the existence of neural processing that divides objects into groups 
is not yet enough for categorisation if the world itself is arbitrary. According to 
Kuhn, an ability to find natural families, such as ducks, swans, and geese depends on 
the “empty perceptual space between the families to be discriminated. If, for 
example, there were a perceived continuum of waterfowl ranging from geese to 
swans, we should be compelled to introduce a specific criterion for distinguishing 
them.”(SSR, 197) A natural family “is a class whose members resemble each other 
more closely than they resemble the members of other natural families.” (ET, 285) 
Kuhn believes that objects always fall into one or another family: “the entire 
population of the world can always be divided (though not once and for all) into 
perceptually discontinuous categories. In the perceptual spaces between these 
categories there are believed to be no objects at all.” (ET, 285) A continuum between 
kinds is thus not acceptable. We need to be able to tell swans apart from ducks and 
geese, and vice versa. It is, though, another question as to how a differentiating 
criterion can be established in the absence of unambiguous definition by a set of 
sufficient and necessary criteria. The demand that success in dividing objects into 
natural families presupposes the existence of an “empty space” between them may be 
read as implying realism, i.e. that the world itself has “joints” which scientists mirror. 
However, this would be surprising if we take into account Kuhn’s inclination to anti-
realism elsewhere in his philosophy. Consequently, I do not think that conceptual 
realism is behind this idea, although entity realism might be
42
. This question will be 
considered extensively in the two following chapters.   
 Kuhn is at pains to point out that learning to cluster objects into similarity 
sets does not require an answer to the question: ‘similar with respect to what?’. He 
writes:  
 
it is a truism that anything is similar to, and also different from, 
anything else. It depends, we usually say, on the criteria. To the man 
who speaks of similarity or of analogy, we therefore at once pose the 
question: similar with respect to what. In this case, however, that is 
just the question that must not be asked. (ET, 307)  
                                                 
42
 On this, see Andersen 2000 (320-2).  
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By rejecting this question, Kuhn is actually raising a problem that a Wittgensteinian 
similarity account is faced with. It is always possible to find some similarity between 
an instance of one concept and that of another. Therefore, it seems that family 
resemblance does not limit the extension of concepts, and we are driven to a situation 
where there is, for example, a continuum from ducks to geese and to swans. Kuhn 
did not offer a clear explanation of how this problem may be avoided, but Hanne 
Andersen (2000) has discussed this on Kuhnian grounds and has developed a 
possible solution. She argues that Kuhn’s employment of dissimilarity relations in 
addition to family resemblance succeeds in limiting the extension of concepts. This 
would explain the idea of empty perceptual space between natural families instead of 
conceptual realism, because it would give us a differentiating criterion. This needs 
much more explication and I will also return, therefore, to this problematic in the two 
next chapters.  
 
Last period – further explication  
 
In the “Foreword” to Hoyningen-Huene’s book on Kuhn, Reconstructing Scientific 
Revolutions (1993), Kuhn once again reminds us of what his main concern has been. 
After noticing that SSR has several references to changes in word meanings, and 
even more, to changes of the visual gestalt, Kuhn says that meaning change is more 
fundamental because the central concepts of incommensurability and partial 
communication are based on it (Kuhn 1993, xii). Yet, in “Afterwords”, written as a 
response to papers inspired by Kuhn’s philosophy and presented in a conference held 
in honour of Kuhn in 1990 in MIT, Kuhn candidly recognises that his “early 
assessment of incommensurability was ‘crude’”(RSS, 228). He says he had been 
preoccupied for much of his career with “the underpinnings of incommensurability”, 
i.e. the question of what it is for words to have meanings and in what ways they are 
fitted to the world they describe. That is the reason, Kuhn declares, why he 
emphasised similarity/dissimilarity relations as a way to acquire concepts in 
professional communities. The newest innovation is that such relations form a 
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taxonomy, or “professional ontology”, which is shared by practitioners in the field. 
Into a taxonomy is stored what the community knows about the world, and changes 
in it are central episodes in scientific revolutions. (Kuhn 1993, xii-xiii)  
 In the latter part of his career, from the early 1980s until the mid 1990s, Kuhn 
really attempted to seriously pin down his conception of meaning beyond what he 
had done before. Remarkably, there are no publications in this period on the history 
of science at all. Kuhn did attempt to systematise his earlier views, and to my mind, 




 The family resemblance conception is carried forward from Kuhn’s earlier 
works. It is described in a familiar way, and incorporated with his more novel ideas. 
Kuhn writes that if we are interested in the concept of science, for example, we do 
not need to, or in fact we cannot define science by a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions that unambiguously tell us what field is science and what is not. This is 
because not all fields of science share the same features; for example, not all sciences 
are experimental or predictive, although many are. Some group activities are 
recognised as science because of their resemblance to other fields in the same cluster 
and also because of differences from activities in the other clusters. As both 
similarity and difference relations are needed in order to master the concept, learning 
to use the term ‘science’ involves one in learning the use of other terms at the same 
time, such as ‘art’, ‘engineering’, ‘medicine’, and ‘philosophy’. Knowing the 
meaning of ‘science’ requires us, therefore, to know the semantic field that also 
contains other disciplines. More specifically, one needs to know what position 
‘science’ has in that field, and that, moreover, is equivalent to knowing what science 
is. (RSS, 213-14) 
In relation to the clusters characterised by family resemblance, Kuhn 
emphasises that a historian has to be sensitive to differences in how objects are 
categorised. For instance, one should not talk as if Greece before the time of 
                                                 
43
 The most important papers of Kuhn’s later career regarding meaning are “Commensurability, 
Comparability, Communicability (first published 1983), “Rationality and Theory Choice” (first 
published 1983), “The Road since Structure” (first published 1991), and “Afterwords” (first published 
1993). All are reprinted in RSS.  
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Aristotle had a division between philosophy and science. In fact, we may have to 
conclude that they did not have an enterprise quite classifiable as science or 
philosophy in the modern sense. Kuhn writes:  
 
Finding and disseminating a vocabulary that permits description and 
understanding of older times, or of other cultures, is central to what 
historians and anthropologists do. Anthropologists who refuse the 
challenge are called “ethnocentric”; historians who refuse it are called 
“Whig”. (RSS, 213) 
 
Kuhn’s objective, and one that was very apparent during his early career, of arguing 
against Whig-history is again exemplified here, and is connected to a new theoretical 
notion, ‘taxonomy’, in his philosophy. To take the above example of scientific 
disciplines, the names of disciplines label taxonomic categories. The clusters, or 
groupings of disciplines together, form taxonomies that are embodied in the 
vocabulary and applied in virtue of the associated field of characteristics.(RSS, 213-
14) In a taxonomy, terms or kind terms are ordered hierarchically. To Kuhn, being a 
kind term is part of what the term means. Interestingly, Kuhn’s conception of 
taxonomic terms is not limited to so-called natural kinds, since natural kinds, 
artificial kinds, or social kinds are all taxonomic terms. (RSS, 92; similarly RSS, 229) 
Something is a taxonomic term, then, if it is part of hierarchically organised 
taxonomies. This can be taken to mean that taxonomic term categories compose a set 
of classes structured in subset relations. However, an important caveat needs to be 
mentioned here. The subset relation between classes does not mean in Kuhn’s theory 
that individuals in a subset necessarily inherit common features from supersets as 
that would be in contradiction with the family resemblance account.  
Kuhn elevates discussion to a yet more theoretical level. The central 
theoretical notion in his later career is ‘lexicon’. He asks us to imagine that each 
individual referring term, i.e. taxonomic term, is  
 
a node in lexical network from which radiate labels for the criteria 
that he or she uses in identifying the referents of the nodal term. 
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Those criteria will tie some terms together and distance them from 
others, thus building a multidimensional structure within the 
lexicon.(RSS, 52)   
 
‘Criteria’ should be understood here as the above described family resemblance 
criteria that are associated with kind terms that together form a taxonomy in which 
kind terms define each other mutually by their similarities and differences. Kuhn 
claims that meaning consists of its structural relations to other terms in the network, 
and taken by itself, none of them has an independently specifiable meaning. (RSS, 
55) 
 A further terminological change is that Kuhn reinvokes his early use of 
‘conceptual scheme’
44
. “I might more appropriately speak of concepts than of words. 
What I have been calling a lexical taxonomy might, that is, better be called a 
conceptual scheme”. A conceptual scheme, Kuhn understands, not as a set of beliefs 
but as “a particular operating mode of a mental module”. A mental module is a 
prerequisite to having beliefs and supplies and bounds the set of beliefs that are 
possible. Furthermore, a mental module is taxonomic. (RSS, 94) Elsewhere, Kuhn 
describes his insight in the following way:  
 
What emerges is a mental module that permits us to learn to recognize 
not only kinds of physical object (e.g. elements, fields, and forces), 
but also kinds of furniture, of government, of personality, and so on. 
In what follows I shall refer to it frequently as the lexicon, the module 
in which member of a speech community store the community’s kind 
terms. (RSS, 229)  
 
The mental module is thus some kind of cognitive structure in people’s minds that 
organises and stores the community’s kind terms taxonomically.   
                                                 
44
 The expression ‘conceptual scheme’ is already frequently used in The Copernican Revolution 
(1985), originally published in 1957. Anticipating his later usage, Kuhn says that they are frameworks 
for the organisation of knowledge, for guiding future research and helping to recall data. (Kuhn 1985, 
37-41)   
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 There may appear to be a conflict here in Kuhn’s characterisation of 
taxonomy and lexicon. First, Kuhn was talking of taxonomy as some kind of 
linguistic structure, which is formed of terms, but then he starts talking about 
concepts and the mental modules that are mental entities. Therefore, we may ask at 
this point whether lexicon is a linguistic or psychological notion? In the light of some 
later writings it seems that the answer is the latter. But then the concept of lexicon is 
applicable to individuals only, and Kuhn’s philosophy of science becomes solipsistic. 
This would be an unexpected conclusion because Kuhn had a strong interest in 
scientific communities and science as a group activity.  
 The above dilemma may be regarded as yet another inconsistency in Kuhn’s 
philosophy. However, I think that this conclusion would be incorrect. I believe that 
Kuhn’s primary interest as well at the beginning as at the end of his career was in 
scientific communities. The apparent inconsistency may be explained by noticing 
that ‘lexicon’ is indeed a psychological notion, but that there is a communal 
equivalent to it. Kuhn asks us to conceive lexicon “as a module within the head of an 
individual group member” (RSS, 104). Yet, in addition to a mental module, Kuhn 
also introduced the concept of ‘lexical structure’. He says: “What members of a 
language community share is homology of lexical structure” (RSS, 52).  
Kuhn argues that the mere understanding of a concept is enough to allow the 
deduction of predictions of properties and the behaviour of objects. These 
expectations are stored “knowledge” that serve as criteria for the term application. 
Kind terms in (an individual’s) lexicon thus induce expectations of the object 
referred. A peculiarity of Kuhn’s theory of lexical structure is that expectations do 
not need to be the same in a community. If expectations of an object vary, it is still 
enough for communication that the lexical structure is the same. (RSS, 239; 242) 
Alternatively, the criteria that picks out objects in the world does not need to be the 
same, only the taxonomic structure needs to be the same, i.e. the sets of objects. If 
the taxonomic structures are different, then “the world” is different, language 
becomes private, and there will be communication difficulties until one of the 
discussants acquires the language of the other. (RSS, 52) The community has 
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“primacy” over its members in the sense that the shared conceptual or taxonomic 
structure holds the community together and separates it from others. Kuhn writes:  
 
what characterizes members of the group is possession not of identical 
lexicons, but of mutually congruent ones, of lexicons with the same 
structure. The lexical structure which characterizes a group is more 
abstract than, different in kind from, the individual lexicons or mental 
modules which embody it. And it is only that structure, not its various 
individual embodiments, that members of the community must share. 
The mechanics of taxonomizing are in this respect like its function: 
neither can be fully understood except as grounded within the 
community it serves. (RSS, 104; similarly Kuhn 1993, xii-i; RSS, 242)  
 
Thus Kuhn elevates the social aspect of meaning, the shared lexical structure of a 
community, to a central position. Variation between lexicons or mental modules of 
individuals is allowed, as long as the lexical structure is held in common. Lexical 
structure functions, then, as a distinguishing feature of a scientific community, as 




The proper genesis of Kuhn’s philosophy is the study of history. Kuhn’s experience 
of reading Aristotle awakened him to a recognition of the difference between the 
world views of ancient and modern scientists. It proved that if we want to understand 
the history of science, past science and its textual products have to be studied on their 
own conditions, not in relation to modern science. Part of this realisation is that one 
cannot assume that past scientists meant what we or modern scientists mean by the 
same terms. In order to find out the meaning of the terms used by them, one needs to 
pay attention to the context. This led to the statement that meanings have changed 
and that the meaning of a term depends on its relation to other terms. Kuhn’s 
‘meaning’, thus, stems from what he, as a practising historian, observed.  
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 Kuhn was “a physicist turned historian for philosophical purposes” (RSS, 
320-21). His shift from science to history is explained by a eureka-like-realisation 
with Aristotle that made him conclude that history is badly misunderstood. 
Throughout his career, Kuhn was preoccupied by the idea that a historian has to do 
justice to the past, even though he himself ceased doing historical studies in the latter 
part of his career. This is still evident later, for example, in his concern with the 
correct description of lexical structures of communities. However, his ultimate 
interest was to say or to correct something in the image of science as a whole. Thus 
his aim was philosophical. In many places, Kuhn expressed that the notion of 
meaning, together with the notion of incommensurability, were the most important 
themes in his philosophy. He thought that by understanding the role of these we can 
grasp something essential of the nature of science. Kuhn did, therefore, spend an 
increasing amount of time on philosophical considerations.  
In comparison to the early theorising on meaning, Kuhn succeeded over the 
years in developing and specifying his characterisation of meaning. That is naturally 
not to say that he ever achieved an elaborate level with his conception of meaning or 
that he had something like a meaning theory to offer, although he may have supplied 
the ingredients for one. The question of whether Kuhn’s notion of meaning was 
meant to be a theory of meaning or something else is discussed further in the 
following three chapters. Nevertheless, Kuhn’s basic insight that meaning is holistic 
and sociopsychological (or occasionally psychological) is much better argued in the 
last part of his career. At the beginning, as Kuhn himself noted, his understanding of 
meaning as a philosophical notion was very limited. The first philosophical insight 
that he actively used was Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance. Kuhn 
asserted that the meaning of words is not defined by a set of sufficient and necessary 
conditions, but is defined more loosely, by family resemblance. An important part of 
this realisation is the idea that concepts are categorised and recognised not only by 
similarity, but also by difference relations.  
In the middle period, Kuhn took his first serious steps towards an alternative 
theory of meaning by trying to explicate how family resemblance could work in 
practice. As a consequence, he develops an account of how concepts are learned. 
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Learning takes place in a situation where a teacher, by the method of ostension, 
teaches the names of objects to a learner. Knowledge acquired of objects is grouped 
in similarity sets, which enables their future application. This all comes nicely 
together in the last period when Kuhn starts talking about lexicon on the individual 
level, and lexical structure on the communal level, that form taxonomic structures 
storing kind terms and their related information. Concepts or their labels, kind terms, 
can be metaphorically understood as nodes with radiating connections to criteria that 
are used to apply the concept or the term. People in one community do not need to 
share the application criteria or expectations of an object, but they have to share the 
common lexical structure. The homogeneity of lexical structure is a prerequisite for 
there being a community; it also separates one community from another.   
Kuhn’s similarities with logical empiricism should not blind one from seeing 
the important differences between them. In particular, one ought to understand that 
the genesis of their views is different. The supposition that there is a continuum 
between logical empiricism and Kuhn is, in my view, simply unjustified in relation to 
most parts of Kuhn’s philosophy. Continuity between logical empiricism and Kuhn 
may be established best by a common interest to the themes that were current in the 
general philosophical climate of the time, such as the question of whether there is 
pure observational language and neutral observation. We need to remember that 
Kuhn was not well acquainted with any philosophical tradition at the beginning of 
his career. Regarding meaning, Kuhn took almost all his conscious influences from 
somewhere other than from logical empiricism. Even the most important 
philosophical influence on Kuhn’s thinking, the later Wittgenstein, is very unlike 
logical positivism and empiricism.  
Dialogue on the genesis of Kuhn’s views and the proper context of his 
philosophy is certain to continue. My conclusion is that Kuhn drafted his notion of 
meaning on the basis of his historical experience and used the later Wittgenstein in 
attempts to specify it. His ideas on taxonomy, lexical structure, and mental module 
continued this line of reasoning. Taking everything into consideration, it is fruitful to 
see Kuhn as outlining something new that has only recently been understood more 
precisely, rather than to see him as developing something old. In the next chapter, I 
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will consider what kind of theories can be built on Kuhn’s insights on meaning and 
concept.  
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4. Knowledge representation and similarity relations  
 
Throughout his career Kuhn argued that conceptual and empirical knowledge are 
intertwined and stored in the mind in some kind of organised structure. At the end, he 
introduced the notion of lexicon and its communal equivalent lexical structure, which 
consist of kind terms in a taxonomic structure. Kind term categories are classes of 
objects that fall under a concept.
45
 They are, thus, Kuhn’s earlier ‘natural families’. 
Objects are categorised as kinds, not because some specific description of them all is 
true, but because of family resemblance criteria, according to which, instances of a 
kind resemble each other more than they resemble instances of other categories. Each 
instance fulfils some of the category features, but not necessarily all. In short, this is 
the “meaning theory” that emerges from Kuhn’s later writings.  
 However, it is not clear whether Kuhn actually wanted to develop a meaning 
theory or not. There are indications that, despite being poorly acquainted with 
philosophy, Kuhn initially had a view of what meaning is. This is the impression that 
Kuhn’s words at the end of the 1960s convey, when he claims to have become much 
less confident about what meaning is.
46
 Yet, in response to Mary Hesse’s comment 
on Kuhn’s “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability” in 1982, Kuhn 
says, “traditional meaning theory is bankrupt and that some sort of replacement, not 
purely extensional, is needed”. According to Kuhn, Hesse misses the point that his 
“brief remarks about homologous taxonomies” are concerned “directly and literally 
with meaning” (RSS, 55). In the 1990s the uncertainty returns. Kuhn writes: “to the 
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 There is no uniform usage of such notions as category, class, and kind. Philosophers have tended to 
use ‘category’ more narrowly than cognitive scientists and psychologists, meaning some kind of 
ultimate class whose number is small. A case in point is Aristotle or Kant. The latter use it to mean 
basically any class for which there is a common name, i.e. lexical category. In the thesis I will adopt 
the more liberal understanding, which is also consistent with how Kuhn used it. In the adopted usage 
‘category’, ‘class’, and ‘kind’ are used interchangeably unless indicated specifically otherwise. See 
Hacking (2001, 476-80) for differences and similarities in understanding these concepts in philosophy 
and cognitive science and psychology.  
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extent that I’m concerned with language and meanings at all … it is with the 
meaning of a restricted class of terms. Roughly speaking, they are taxonomic terms 
or kind terms.”(RSS, 92) This also seems to be Kuhn’s position later. Responding to 
Hacking’s paper in which Hacking tries to eliminate all talk of meaning from Kuhn’s 
philosophy, Kuhn says that “with respect to kind terms, aspects of a theory of 
meaning remain at the heart of my position” (RSS, 229). Kuhn travels thus from 
confidence about meaning to uncertainty, then becomes more assured again, until he 
finally settles on a more limited concern with meaning.  
 The safest conclusion at this point is that there is no meaning theory per se to 
be found in Kuhn, but that Kuhn tried, nevertheless, to bring forward some essential 
aspects of meaning that he thought indispensable for an understanding of the history 
of science.  Interestingly, Kuhn’s meaning theorising has received a new momentum 
by some recent innovations in cognitive psychology and science. During the last and 
the present decade various philosophers have attempted to specify Kuhn’s insights by 
the tools developed in these disciplines
47
. Furthermore, a number of philosophers 
have also applied cognitive science directly to the history of science.
48
 I will examine 
first how cognitive science may be used to explicate Kuhn’s insights. This 
examination is concentrated on the relationship between Kuhn’s suggestion of how 
information is stored in the mind and on some recent proposals in a sub-discipline of 
cognitive science - knowledge representation. Secondly, I will study how a number 
of philosophers have sought to extend the domain of application of some 
contemporary innovations in cognitive science for the advancement of a theory of 
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 “At least I would agree if I still felt at all confident that I knew what a ‘meaning’ or a ‘partial 
definition’ was”. (Kuhn 1977, 506) (Italics mine) 
47
 Andersen, Barker and Chen 1996; Andersen and Nersessian 1998; Barker, Chen and Andersen 
2003; Nersessian 2003. In separation from these, Bird (2000, 71-5; 2004c, 2005) has also raised the 
possibility of cognitive interpretation of some of Kuhn’s ideas. His focus is, however, different. While 
the former see a potential application primarily to Kuhn‘s theory of concept and conceptual change, 
Bird interprets the notions of paradigm and paradigm change with the tools of cognitive science. Their 
theoretical orientation is also different. The former see that the frame notion, and especially Lawrence 
Barsalou’s theory of it, is the most fruitful theoretical orientation. Bird, in turn, is interested in 
applying connectionism to Kuhn’s philosophy. I will concentrate here on the application from the 
former direction but return later commenting on the relation between these two alternatives. Yet 
another cognitive scientific application is an explanation of reasoning practices behind problem-
solving and the emergence of new conceptual structures by the following mechanisms: model- or 
case-based and mental modeling. (On this see, Nersessian 2003, 195-204; Nickles 2003). 
48
 Barker 2001; Nersessian 1985, 1992, 1998; Thagard 1992, 2000.  
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concept on the basis of Kuhn’s idea of similarity relations. Moreover, there are also 
earlier studies on similarity relations independent of cognitive science. Barry Barnes 
and Mary Hesse have tried to develop a meaning theory relying on that notion. I will, 
therefore, also take a look at their thoughts on the subject. At the end, I draw all 
aspects together in order to see what the philosophical contribution of the debate is. 
In this chapter I will evaluate the applicability of one such contribution in particular, 
i.e. Kuhn’s theory of learning concepts.  
 
Kuhn and knowledge representation 
 
As we saw in the last chapter, Kuhn was concerned with the questions of how we 
acquire, structure and store “knowledge”
 49
 of the world in our minds. His theory of 
learning similarity relations addresses the question of how information on the world 
is acquired. He attempts to answer the questions of how information is structured and 
stored by assuming, first, that there is a conceptual scheme and, later, that there is 
something called a ‘lexicon’ or ‘mental module’ that stores kind terms in taxonomic 
trees. Kuhn’s interest in figuring out how our beliefs, or sets of beliefs, are structured 
is something that has not been studied much in philosophy. Admittedly, there are 
some philosophers who have taken an interest in this issue, such as Quine with his 
web of beliefs or conceptual schemes, and also others who have argued strongly 
against any idea of organised schemes, such as Davidson with his argument against 
the existence of conceptual schemes. However, arguments in philosophy have 
generally had little to say about the specifics of that putative structure.  By contrast, 
cognitive science has had a keen interest in this for decades. It is noteworthy that 
Kuhn was originally explicitly interested in cognitive psychology, of which an 
indication is the introduction of the notion of gestalt switch in SSR. However, he 
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 There is a terminological difference between philosophy on the one hand, and Kuhn and cognitive 
science on the other. Whereas ‘knowledge’ is usually taken as something like true justified belief in 
philosophy, both Kuhn and cognitive science use it more freely. ‘Knowledge’ is close to a set of 
beliefs in the philosopher’s language. Philosophically, it could also be understood as information, for 
the reason that there is no commitment to truth.  
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failed to follow the development in cognitive psychology (or science). This is 
unfortunate because, had he retained his interest, it might have helped him to specify 
some of his intuitions.  
 In philosophy, a kind of tacit assumption seems to have been that beliefs are 
not stored in any specific structure, other than as a list of unordered beliefs or 
propositions in the mind. I say ‘tacit’ because that the case is so is not necessarily 
argued for, but simply assumed. For example, the assumption underlying the debate 
on theory choice is that people simply either confirm or abandon their beliefs from a 
list of propositions, depending on the evidence available. Likewise, the presumption 
in cognitive science until the 1960s was that propositions in the mind just form an 
unordered list. They were normally represented by the first order predicate calculus, 
the main tool of representation in philosophy until today. With just a few rules of 
derivation a person is, in principle, able to deduce conclusions from a set of beliefs. 
Belief revision would in this view proceed roughly along the following lines: We add 
a new belief, and with the help of derivation rules deduce certain consequences that 
lead to the deletion of some old beliefs, for example, in the case of a contradiction 
between a new and old belief, leaving the set changed. There have been naturally 
many, Kuhn and Imre Lakatos included, who have pointed out that scientists tend to 
be more stubborn and often just to stick to their old beliefs, even when confronted 
with contrary evidence. This is particularly the case if some of the fundamental 
beliefs are contradicted by evidence and there is no clear alternative belief system 
available for replacement. This can be taken as an indication that there is actually 
something beyond singular beliefs that at least partially constrain changes of beliefs. 
Yet, despite the debate on theory choice and rationality, not much has been said 
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 Just to take one example: Scientists calculating paths of newly discovered planets did not rush to 
modify the Newtonian physics that had been used as the basis for calculations when they did not get 
the expected result. Instead, they suggested that a further planet disturbs the path of the planet, which 
would explain the deviation. Sometimes this strategy seems to have worked, as with Uranus whose 
path was disturbed by an unknown planet, Neptune. But sometimes it does not, as was the case with 
Mercury. The planet Vulcanus was never found in the vicinity of it. It is remarkable that not even in 
the latter case the validity of Newtonian physics was in doubt. (See Lakatos 1999, 68-9)  
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In the 1960s, it was realised in cognitive science that the idea of an unordered 
list of beliefs as a knowledge base is untenable. We can find both negative and 
positive evidence for this conclusion. Firstly, it was pointed out that in respect of the 
human mind, the view is psychologically unrealistic because it does not reflect how 
people process their systems of beliefs. Searching for information from a large list of 
unstructured sets of propositions would be laborious and time-consuming and does 
not accord with the ease with which information is actually retrieved. (Stevenson 
1992, 29) Such a system would also run the risk of combinatorial explosion, which 
can be shown in computer simulations, because it does not constrain what 
information is used and what gets deduced in the system (see Thagard 1984, 235; 
1992, 23).  
Allen Collins’ and Ross Quillian’s research (1969) suggested that information 
stored in the mind has a specific structure. They set out to test the verification times 
of certain simple sentences and noticed that the verification of simple sentences with 
similar grammatical structure varies considerably. The sentence “a canary is a 
canary” was verified faster than the sentence “a canary is a bird”, which was verified 
faster than “a canary is an animal”. The same is true in the same order of the 
following sentences: “a canary is yellow”, “a canary can fly”, and “a canary has 
skin”. They proposed that beliefs of animals, and beliefs generally, are stored in a 
semantic network composed of nodes representing concepts such as CANARY, 
BIRD, and ANIMAL
51
, and of attribute descriptions associated with each concept. 
Furthermore, they argued that concepts form taxonomic trees. For example, a canary 
and an ostrich are birds, and birds are animals, or a shark and a salmon are fishes and 
fishes are animals. Subkind concepts (of ANIMAL), such as BIRD, and its subkind 
CANARY, inherit attributes in the semantic network from higher order concepts, and 
have, in addition, their own species specific features. The attributes describing 
canaries in Collins’ and Quillian’s semantic network, for example, are that it can sing 
and it is yellow; attributes describing birds are that it can fly, it has wings, and it is 
feathered; and attributes describing animals are that it has skin, it can move around, it 
eats, and it breathes. If we now suppose that it takes more time to move further in 
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this hierarchical structure, we can explain why confirmation of the sentence “a 
canary is yellow” can be carried out faster than that of “a canary has skin”. That is 
because, before verification of the latter sentence can be made, a person has to move 
in a semantic network upwards, first to the BIRD node, and then to the ANIMAL 
node, because having skin is a general feature of animals, which BIRD as a 
subconcept inherits. Yellowness is, in contrast, a specific feature of canaries; 
therefore, finding this information does not require much searching in the network, 
and for that reason an assertion that a canary is yellow can be verified quickly. In the 
light of such empirical information, Collins’ and Quillian’s semantic network seemed 
a psychologically plausible suggestion for information ordering. 
52
  
However, the semantic model has since faced difficulties which have 
prompted scientists to improve the model. Nevertheless, the fundamental assumption 
that information organisation is best represented in terms of multiple interconnected 
associations, relationships and pathways is now widely shared among cognitive 
scientists (e.g. Gross & McIlveen 1997, 105-6). What is important is that there is a 
lot of empirical evidence for this general idea, of which some is presented above. 
This gives, in turn, more force to Kuhn’s suggestion that there is some kind of mental 
lexicon that organises and stores information, and which can be accessed when 
needed.  
One problem with the semantic network model is that it does not portray  
accurately enough how quickly information is in some cases retrieved. It makes no 
distinction either between instances of a concept. Yet, some instances of a concept 
are, in fact, taken to be more typical than others, and are therefore verified faster. In 
the model there should be no difference. For example, a robin is judged to be a more 
typical bird than a penguin; as a consequence of this, the sentence “a robin is a bird” 
is verified faster than the sentence “a penguin is a bird”. In the semantic model their 
status should be equal since logically they are both kinds of bird. Psychologist 
Eleanor Rosch generalised these conclusions in her studies on instances of concepts. 
Rosch’s research showed clearly that not all instances of a concept are as 
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 On Collins’ and Qullian’s semantic networks, see for instance Stevenson (1992, 30-4) or Solso 
(1995, 235-8).        
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 84 
representative. For example, the Dani tribe in New Guinea took a particular colour as 
the best example of the colour concept. Afterwards there have been numerous studies 
with other type of concepts such as tools, clothing, furniture, animals, trees, fish and 
birds that come to the same conclusion: some members of a category are better and 
more typical examples than others. Human concepts thus show graded structures 
varying on the goodness of the example. (Andersen et al. 1996, 352)
53
  
When considering individual objects that fall under concepts, the semantic 
model is confronted with further problems. It was noticed above that some 
representatives of a conceptual category are judged to be more stereotypical. Paying  
further attention to individual objects, we notice that attributes associated with a 
concept of which an object is an instance may be true generally of that type of 
individual, but not of a particular individual of the kind. Canaries can normally sing, 
but there may be a canary that cannot. However, it should still presumably be 
counted as a canary. The problem is that this kind of deviation is not allowed in the 
semantic network model, because being a member of a category is an all-or-nothing 
affair: an instance either fulfils membership criteria, or it does not. If not, then an 
individual is not a member of the kind concept in question. (e.g. Stevenson 1993, 29-
34) 
The above criticism motivates an examination of two related questions. We 
need to re-consider how information is stored in the mind. We cannot simply assume 
that it is as logically organised as the original semantic model implied. What is 
needed is a more complex and nuanced way to present conceptual information that 
could allow some instances to be more typical than others and to also allow for a 
variation in features that decide the membership of kind categories. Secondly, we 
have to ask how concepts can be defined. There seem to be strong reasons to think 
that defining membership by features that apply equally and necessarily to all 
members is an unsatisfactory theory of concept.  
Interestingly, Rosch explicitly called into question the classic account of 
concept definition by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. All members of a 
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category just do not share any set of exactly the same features. Features determining 
membership can be better described as a large set over which individual instances 
overlap, but do not coincide. Naturally, this idea was brought forward in philosophy 
much earlier by Wittgenstein with his notion of family resemblance
54
. And, Rosch 
does in fact refer to Wittgenstein’s account of concepts. We may, therefore, think 
that Rosch and various other cognitive psychologists since have managed to give 
independent empirical support to Wittgenstein’s theory of concepts
55
. The lesson of 
Rosch is that if we want a psychologically realistic notion of concepts, i.e. if we are 
interested in the human concepts, we should not stick to the classical account. That is 
because it is almost impossible to find – or at least all attempts have proved to be 
unsuccessful (perhaps with the exception of mathematics) - any human concept that 
can be characterised by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
 
Kuhn’s role, as 
we saw in the last chapter, was to apply Wittgenstein’s account to the philosophy of 
science. It is therefore remarkable that Kuhn’s insight can be supported by research 
in cognitive science.  
Rosch’s and others’ studies that indicate the inadequacy of the semantic 
network model were also observed in artificial intelligence in cognitive science.
 56
 
One of the most successful ideas for improvement was Marvin Minsky’s (1980) 
suggestion that information is stored in frames that have an internal structure that 
contains a cluster of “knowledge” associated with a concept.
57
 More precisely, a 
                                                                                                                                          
prototype effects.  
54
 I believe it is widely accepted that Wittgenstein was the first serious critic of the classical view. Yet, 
Hacking thinks William Whewell made the point much earlier. In addition, it is claimed that  
Nietzsche, John Stuart Mill, and William James also criticised the classical view before Wittgenstein. 
(See Hacking 2001, 480) 
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 Whether they also manage to give vindication, as Andersen, Barker and Chen claim (Barker et al. 
2003, 218-9) for a family resemblance theory of concepts, see below.  
56
 However, note that not every philosopher approves of the above type of philosophical interpretation 
of Rosch’s results. According to Lakoff, Rosch denied in her later research that studies of prototypes 
can be used to characterise the structure of the category as it is represented in mind and that prototypes 
constitute mental representations, or that prototype studies even provide any alternative theory of 
mental representation. In particular, Lakoff considers that it is a mistake to think that Rosch’s research 
yields a conclusion that conceptual categories are graded. (Lakoff 1987, 42-5) This may appear to 
contradict what Andersen, Barker and Chen say about Rosch. Yet, they all endorse Barsalou and the 
idea that concepts have internal structures. That makes all instances 100 per cent members of a 
conceptual category but, nevertheless, manages to accommodate Rosch’s typicality results. (See 
below).   
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 It should, however, be mentioned that the frame concept resembles the notion of schema that was 
introduced into cognitive psychology in the 1930s and described how people store information of 
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frame can be characterised as a collection of slots and slot fillers that describe a 
stereotypical item. Alternatively, we may say that a frame is composed of attributes 
and their values. The stipulation that a frame describes a stereotypical item means 
that its description does not function as a definition as in the classical account of 
concepts. In other words, description is not true of all instances that are in the 
extension of a concept. All that can be said is that, typically, such objects have 
features postulated in the frame, and a frame thus induces expectations of what kind 
of things objects are. Because the question is of stereotypes, a slot can have different 
values than is generally expected to be true of an instance. Expressed in computer 
science jargon, a slot can have different values than a default value in the frame. Let 




     DOG 
Slot/Attribute      Slot filler/Value 
superset:       animal 
number of legs:  default     four 
subset:    optional values  collie, spaniel 
situations:   optional values  park, house, shop… 
owner’s actions  optional values  walk, feed, buy … etc.  
 
 
Above we have a typical “knowledge” of dogs. First of all, dogs have 
normally four legs, and that is why FOUR is here a default value. It is however 
possible that, for instance, some injured dog has only three legs. The frame also 
contains information of where one can see dogs: in parks, houses, shops, and 
naturally in numerous other places not mentioned here. Here, all values are optional 
implying that there is no single stereotypical situation where one can come across a 
dog. Furthermore, there is also information of what an owner might do with dogs in 
                                                                                                                                          
objects or events together. ‘Frame’ is also similar to the script concept. The difference is that the 
former is used to characterise information of concepts and the latter of typical events. 
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 87 
various places, and similarly, there is no default value. In addition, the frame here 
includes SUPERSET, indicating that dogs are classified as animals and also 
SUBSET, saying that collies and spaniels are kinds of dogs. SUPERSET and 
SUBSET as attributes show how a frame can form a taxonomic structure. That is, the 
value ANIMAL opens a new hierarchically higher order frame that contains 
stereotypical information on animals. Similarly, COLLIE and SPANIEL as values of 
SUBSET open new frames downwards. Frames forming taxonomies mean also that a 
frame lower in the taxonomy inherits stereotypical features of higher order frames. If 
dogs have typically four legs, so also do collies, typically. Yet, note that membership 
determination is different from typicality. In other words, an atypical dog that does 
not correspond to a stereotypic dog is still a dog, i.e. a member of the dog category. 
On the basis of the above frame we could form a specific description, for instance, of 
some particular dog that we have seen, or a characterisation of a particular breed. In 
that case we would realise some of the optional values. If that dog is typically met in 
parks, then it becomes a default value. Or if its colour (attribute) is black (value), 
then this attribute-value combination is realised. This does not mean that that 
particular dog could not be met elsewhere than in the park, or that a white dog of that 
breed would not be possible. Naturally, we are not talking of physical possibility or 
impossibility, but of the functioning of the descriptive mechanism in the frame 
theory.  
The frame model answers the criticism of the semantic network model. 
Because a frame is composed of features describing a typical object, it explains why, 
for example, a robin may be taken as a more representative sample of BIRD than a 
penguin, even though both are kinds of birds. A penguin with its longish body and 
standing posture is not what a person (at least living in Britain or in continental 
Europe) normally expects of birds. Because the frame model allows a variation in 
values, or even empty slots, it is able to take into account that individual members of 
a category do not necessarily fulfil the description of all features commonly true of 
members of a category. For the same reason, the frame model offers a presentation of 
the family resemblance account of concepts. For example, chairs form a natural 
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family bound together by family resemblance. A frame of CHAIR, a description of a 
typical chair, may include the following information of chairs: four legs, support for 
the back, and sitting as a function. Even if these are default values for CHAIR, the 
frame allows also a three-legged object, and an object without a support that 
otherwise resemble instances under the CHAIR frame, to be classified as chairs. 
What is important is that they are more similar to other members that belong to the 
CHAIR category than to members in the contrasting categories, such as TABLE, and 
that is enough for classification and naming.   
 Lawrence Barsalou (1992) offers us some further terminological explications. 
It is worth taking a look at his theories because, as we can soon see below, Andersen, 
Barker and Chen have employed Barsalou’s ideas for understanding Kuhn’s theory 
of concepts. According to Barsalou, concept means the descriptive information that 
people represent cognitively for a category. Barsalou argues that concept resembles 
intension or sense. His model of frame also includes, in addition to the attribute-
value sets, structural invariants representing conceptually “relatively” invariant 
structure between attributes, as well as the inclusion of constraints that express 
dependence between the values of frame attributes.
59
 However, I can safely ignore 
these sophistications as for the purpose of this thesis the main idea of frame is 
enough.  
Barsalou’s model can be located in the scale of the non-classical alternative 
theories of concepts. The classical view may be described by three basic 
assumptions: (1) the representation of a concept is a summary description of an entire 
class of instances that fall under it; (2) the features that represent a concept are singly 
necessary and jointly sufficient to define that concept; and (3) features are nested in 
subset relations, i.e. if a concept C is a subset of concept Y, the defining features of 
Y are nested in those of C. For this reason, features are sometimes referred to as 
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 One of Barsalou’s examples on invariants is how the CAR frame, which has attributes DRIVER and 
ENGINE, are related by a structural invariant OPERATES, which expresses the conceptual 
understanding that the driver controls the engine’s speed. An example of an attribute constraint is the 
dependence between SPEED and DURATION in the TRANSPORTATION frame. That is, when a 
form of transportation becomes faster, its duration becomes shorter over the same distances. (See 
Barsalou 1992, 30-40) 
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defining or essential. (Smith and Medin
60
 1981, 22-5) It may be said that there are 
two main rival accounts in cognitive science: the probabilistic or prototype account 
of concepts and the exemplar view of concepts. The former accepts the first 
assumption but rejects the two latter ones. The essence of such a view is that the 
representation of a concept is a measure of the central tendency of the properties or 
patterns of instances. The features describing instances are not necessary ones. 
Properties can take weights that reflect the probability that an instance has them. 
(Smith and Medin 1981, 61-2) The latter suggestion rejects all three assumptions and 
says that concepts are represented by their individual exemplars rather than by an 
abstract summary of properties. Instances are thus directly compared to an exemplar 
representation of a concept (Smith and Medin 1981 143-4).  Barsalou seems to be in 
agreement with the probabilistic account in accepting the first assumption and 
rejecting the latter two. Yet, in contrast to the probabilistic view, his theory may not 
be described as a feature list model. The difference is that the feature list models take 
features as independent, while Barsalou’s model emphasises the fact that multivalued 
features are integrated by structural connections.  
 The moral of our exploration of recent research in cognitive science is that it 
appears to give support to Kuhn’s insights. Kuhn’s early idea of conceptual schemes 
as “frameworks for the organisation of knowledge” (1985, 41) and his later 
preoccupation with lexicon, lexical structures, and mental modules that store and 
organise kind concepts, come strikingly close to the studies and theoretical 
innovations in cognitive science. Therefore, it is exciting to see how those 
innovations may be used for explicating Kuhn’s philosophy, and also more generally, 
for enhancing our understanding of scientific change. As already mentioned, it seems 
at present that there is little doubt, either in the field of cognitive psychology or 
artificial intelligence, that beliefs or the informational content of belief systems are 
stored in some kind of interrelated structure. In the light of this, it is worth 
remembering what Kuhn said in 1982 of lexical structures:  
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 Smith and Medin’s Categories and Concepts (1981) is probably the most comprehensive study on 
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Imagine, for a moment, that for each individual a referring term is a 
node in a lexical network from which radiate labels for the criteria 
that he or she uses in identifying the referents of the nodal term. 
Those criteria will tie some terms together and distance them from 
others, thus building a multidimensional structure within the lexicon. 
(RSS, 52)  
 
The description sounds very much like those of semantic networks or of the frame 
model, if we remember their representation of information by concept-attribute 
description or attribute-value structure and their taxonomy building feature. Kuhn’s 
similar interest and fruitfulness in respect of cognitive science is something that has 
only been recognised in the 1990s. Perhaps surprisingly, this fact makes Kuhn appear 
ahead of his time.  
 An intermediate conclusion is that the frame model gives an interesting and 
useful suggestion of how information is stored in the mind. In addition, it gives a 
medium for explicating the family resemblance account of concept. Many 
philosophers have, furthermore, found the notion of frame to be particularly useful 
for describing conceptual changes in the history of science. Paul Thagard has written 
generally of frames (e.g. 1984a, 1984b) and has placed the notion in the context of 
the history of science, even though he has not applied it in Kuhn’s philosophy. In his 
model of conceptual revolutions (1992; see also 1990, 2000), Thagard employs the 
frame model, having been influenced by George Mille’s WordNet, which is an 
electronic lexical reference system based on psycholinguistic theories of the 
organisation of the human lexical memory. Thagard’s idea of concepts as complex 
structures akin to frames gives a special priority to kind and part-whole relations that 
establish hierarchies and express factual information in rules that may be more 
complex than simple slots. (Thagard 1992, 28-33) The notion of frame has been 
utilised even more directly by Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker and Xiang Chen in 
their collective articles (1996, 1998, 2003), and also by Nersessian with Andersen 
(2000). They have attempted to illuminate Kuhn’s insight on the basis of Lawrence 
Barsalou’s frame theory. I will now take a look at their project.   
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The Andersen-Barker-Chen application of the frame model 
 
Andersen, Barker, and Chen
61
 have formulated a theory that incorporates what Kuhn 
says about learning and defining concepts with the frame model as developed by 
Barsalou. Kuhn’s idea was that new concepts are learned by recognising similarities 
and dissimilarities between objects. In practice, the process of learning starts from 
observing exemplars or individuals. Kuhn’s example in “Second Thoughts on 
Paradigms” (ET) is Johnny-boy who learns to recognise swans, geese and ducks 
under the supervision of his father. This process involves firstly, ostension and 
naming a bird by the father; secondly, naming is tried by Johnny; and finally, 
correction when needed is made by the father. In this way Johnny learns to identify 
similarities and dissimilarities between objects. As a consequence, he forms 
similarity classes. Andersen et al. emphasise that objects in one class need only to 
resemble each other so that each object is successfully named and separated from 
others. Therefore, concepts corresponding to these similarity classes are family 
resemblance concepts.  
 Andersen et al. invoke Rosch’s studies that proved how concepts show 
graded structures to support the family resemblance notion of concepts. Importantly, 
they take note of Rosch’s conclusion that in order to take into account the fact of 
graded structures, concepts themselves must have a complex internal structure. This 
conclusion is now widely accepted among cognitive psychologists. (See Andersen et 
al. 1996, 353; Lakoff 1987, 45-6) This is where Barsalou’s frame model comes into 
the picture. Namely, we may represent the complex structure of concepts by 
attributes and values.
62
 Their fundamental conclusion is that the frame model, in fact, 
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 The writers have written several articles collectively. If I talk generally on their account, I will refer 
to them just as Andersen et al. The presentation of their view is, in general, based on their three 
collective articles: Andersen et al. 1996, Barker et al. 2003, and Chen et al. 1998. 
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 Bird (2005) thinks that connectionism offers a natural interpretation of pattern recognition, no 
matter whether the question is regarding the recognition of objects or problem-situations. 
Connectionism is indeed a potent alternative to the frame model in explaining pattern recognition. 
Both start with Kuhn’s assumption that recognition is a result of repeated observations and 
applications to similar objects, which results in mental models of the recognition target. The 
difference is that the frame theory takes this model to be composed of the attribute-value structure, 
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supports the existence of graded structures. Because of flexibility, the frame model 
can accommodate variable representations of instances in one and the same frame. 
Of the instances that can be represented in the frame, the one that is represented most 
often in the structure becomes a prototype concept. That is, the commonly used 
attribute/value combination forms the prototype. Kuhn’s similarity and dissimilarity 
relations are taken into account by the possibility of the different values that a given 
attribute can take. A prototype bird may be a robin with its associate values in the 
frame; yet, an ostrich or a penguin may be represented as atypical birds in the same 
frame with different value realisations. In the Andersen et al. application, generic 
concepts, which behave as universal concepts, are thus interpreted as prototypes. An 
instance of a generic concept, which is in other words an individual, is a better or 
worse exemplification of the prototype.
63
 This is, again, an illustration of how graded 
structures can be embedded in the frame model. 
Kuhn’s theory of concepts, interpreted through Barsalou’s frame model, also 
allows interpersonal variation in features that are used to pick out objects. Andersen 
et al. bring forward a case that shows how dissimilarity and similarity relations 
between duck, goose and swan can be constructed by five attributes (size, colour, 
beak, neck, gait), which each have two possible values. For example, person A 
recognises certain birds as swans by their large size and long neck. Person B, in turn, 
pays attention to their rounded beak and long neck, while the third person C picks 
them out by their white colour and rounded beak. In the same way we can form 
similarity sets for geese and ducks without any one shared feature by the members of 
that community. The crucial thing is that the extension of a specific concept is the 
same for all persons. (Andersen etc. 1996, 353-56) This reminds us of Kuhn’s 
                                                                                                                                          
making a clear separation between data structure and processing, while connectionism sees the 
resulting model as neural pathways of which some become stronger due to frequent use. In the current 
state of cognitive psychology and science there seems to be no consensus as to which theory offers a 
more realistic representation of information storing and other related cognitive functions. All seem to 
agree that we should let research in these fields decide the issue. Yet, it may be pointed out that in 
regard to the theory of concept, there are problems that connectionism has not answered satisfactorily 
so far (see Thagard 1992, 27).  
63
 Another way to interpret the frame model is to understand a generic concept as a genuine set, in 
which case the relation of nodes representing individual to generic concepts is one of set membership. 
(See Stevenson 1992, 33) I will discuss the possible interpretations in the following chapter.   
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insistence that the structure of lexicon has to be the same in a community, but the 
features that are used to determine the structure need not be the same. 
Another feature of Kuhn that the frame model identifies well is the idea that 
conceptual knowledge induces expectations. We expect birds to be able to fly 
because that is our prototype of birds. The knowledge stored in the frame has thus 
behavioural consequences. If the frame for SWAN includes the information that 
swans eat bread crumbs, I may well take bread crumbs with me when going to a 
pond. Yet, because the frame merely presents a stereotype, not a definition, there is 
no problem if an entirely rational expectation turns out to be false. In this case and 
especially if the scenario is repeated, one may be prompted to make changes in the 
default composition of the frame.  
A further Kuhnian element that can be incorporated into Barsalou’s frame 
model is taxonomy building. According to Andersen et al., a taxonomy is a specific 
structure in the conceptual field defined by a frame. Being in the same taxonomy 
means sharing the same frame for an upperhand concept. Differences in taxonomy 
reflect differences in frame and in the concept generating mechanism. Let us now 
look briefly at how it would work in practice. An example of Anderson et al. is the 
frame for the ‘celestial body’ of around 1700. Attributes and their possible values in 
parentheses are: orbit centre (star, planet, none), orbit shape (elliptic, parabolic, other 
including hyperbolic), distance (far, medium, near), luminance (self-luminous, 
reflecting), and size (large, medium, small). For example, STAR is a subkind of 
CELESTIAL BODY with the following specific attribute/value combinations: orbit 
centre/none, orbit shape/other, distance/far, size/large, and luminance/self-luminous. 
Similarly, MOON is a subkind of CELESTIAL BODY with the following 
attribute/value realisations: orbit centre/planet, orbit shape/elliptic, distance/near, 
size/small, and luminance/self-luminous. (Andersen et al. 1996, 357-8) This can be 
further subdivided into kind categories, if, for example, there are different types of 
moons. Although this case is not directly used by Kuhn, I believe it is in the spirit of 
his philosophy. In general, then, Andersen et al. project attempts to give support for 
the family resemblance concept and for Kuhn’s employment of the notion with the 
help of recent cognitive science. Their belief is that the family resemblance account 
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is the only realistic notion psychologically, and also that it can be used to adequately 
represent historical concepts of science.  
However, we should still spell out clearly what their concept of concept is. 
Barsalou’s frame model appears to be merely a tool for them, albeit a very useful and 
important one. Let us remember that for Barsalou ‘concept’ means the descriptive 
information that people represent cognitively for a category, which comes close to 
what intension or sense is. His concept is clearly concept as stereotype in Putnam’s 
sense. Now, Andersen et al. make clear that knowing concept is not equal to knowing 
the frame, because one may not know all the information in the frame, but yet use the 
concept correctly (Andersen et al. 1996, 353-4). But ‘concept’ does seem to be 
neither a collection of particular attribute/value combinations, as Barsalou’s 
representation of information for a category might be said to be, because a concept 
may be “represented by many different value combinations” (Andersen etc. 1996, 
355). And people using similar frames, or knowledge bases, may construct different 
prototypes for the same concept (Chen et al. 1998, 10-11). Furthermore, they say that 
in the case which showed how a person with an American cultural perspective has a 
prototype of ‘bird’ similar to a robin, and a person with a Chinese perspective has a 
prototype of ‘bird’ similar to a swan, “subjects were asked to generate the prototype 
of a specific concept”. It is noteworthy that they do not talk of different prototypes of 
the same objects, but of the same concept. In other  words, this “specific concept” is 
BIRD, but not in its intensional or stereotypic sense.  
It appears that the concept of concept according to Andersen et al. is 
extensional in a specific sense
64
. A criterion determining the sameness of concepts is 
not a specific attribute/value combination or a stereotype, but the co-extensiveness of 
objects. The Andersen et al. account would not pass the famous Fregean test for a 
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 Hacking makes an interesting remark regarding the uses of ‘concept’ in cognitive science, analytic 
philosophy, and in ordinary English. Typically, philosophers talk of what falls under a concept, which 
is not the understanding in standard English. A philosopher’s understanding is different from what 
Frege called an “associated idea”, which is roughly what cognitive scientists try to capture. Yet, 
cognitive scientist Medin’s concept is half-way between concept as an extensional concept and 
associated idea. (Hacking 2001, 478) In light of the investigation of Andersen et al., this 
characterisation strikes me as apt.  
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rational thinker, because their notion of concept is not, after all, intensional
65
. Let us 
suppose there is a person who knows both an American and a Chinese prototype of 
birds, but does not realise that they refer actually to the same objects. Perhaps s/he 
thinks that there are two separate winged and flying orders of creatures, which is, I 
think, conceivable. S/he could then rationally believe that a certain animal is a bird 
(in the American sense), but also that it is not a bird* (in the Chinese sense), if the 
animal in question is very close to the former prototype. A Fregean would say that 
this is because s/he has two distinct concepts of birds
66
. Andersen et al. talk about the 
same concept with different prototypes, and for them the concept is thus the same if 
the same objects fall under both prototypes.  
The same conclusion also seems to follow if we pay attention to what they 
oppose. That is, they argue against concept as defined by a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. A natural question is: What is behind that idea? Definitions by 
a set of sufficient and necessary conditions are a norm in philosophy. Yet, this type 
of definition can be used for at least two different purposes: real definition or 
linguistic definition. The former attempts to state what are essential properties for 
something to be something. The latter tries to define meaning in the sense of 
analyticity or synonymy. In the philosophy of science real definitions are arguably 
more of interest. For example, we might try to make a list of the properties of ‘atom’. 
Something is, then, an atom if it fulfils those conditions. Talking about references, 
this would be a familiar descriptive theory of reference. What is essential for us now 
is the fact that a set of necessary and sufficient conditions is used to define properties 
that an entity has to have in order to belong to the extension of a concept. They “pick 
out” objects belonging to the class.  
Andersen et al.’s notion of concept is naturally not a real definition that tries 
to pin down essential properties. We might say that it is a “real” definition as used by 
a person or persons at a certain time, i.e. what people who use concepts think objects 
falling under concepts are. In other words, as has been evident all the time, they talk 
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 Note that their meaning theory may be still described as intensional, because extension is 
determined by intensional elements. See more below.  
66
 For a clear and illuminating modern account of Frege’s theory of propositions and concepts that 
also gives the background to the view adopted here, see Schiffer (2000).  
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about human concepts. Their denial is that among human concepts any unambiguous 
set that defines concept can be found. What is really at stake here is criteria that 
determine objects falling into a class. They argue that such criteria have to be 
understood flexibly: Not all instances of a concept fulfil all criteria, nor do all 
persons use the same criteria to pick out the same instances. What unites the family 
resemblance account of concept with the classical account is that they both try to 
figure out how extension is determined. The difference is that the latter tries to find a 
strict definition that applies equally to all members. The former account takes this to 
be impossible, and is therefore focused on finding the framework in which several 
characterisations of instances are possible. The family resemblance account of 
concept allows variation in the set of properties that pick out instances. What 
differentiates the family resemblance account from the classical one is that, in the 
latter, a change in extension determining criteria is likely to cause a change in 
extension itself, while in the former that is not so. The essential point is that the 
sameness of concept in the family resemblance account is defined by the sameness of 
extension, not via the sameness in the extension determining mechanism or in the 
criteria that vary between instances of the same concept.   
This brings us to familiar philosophical ground. Philosophically, it might be 
clearer if we say that a description associated with a term is its intension or sense, 
and  in the Andersen et al. theory that is a specific attribute/value combination. An 
addition, though, is that we cannot find one such specific combination per term but 
that extension determining intension is a collection of such combinations that are 
used variably in picking out instances. Interestingly, Putnam wanted to reject the 
view that an intension that is an expression of a stereotype of objects determines 
reference. He writes that a three-legged tiger is still a tiger, even though it does not 
correspond to a stereotype of tigers. Putnam argued for a new kind of essentialism 
where reference is determined directly by linking a term to a kind that comprises 
objects that share the same underlying structure, whatever that turns out to be. 
However, it may be maintained the Andersen et al.’s account of the Kuhnian family 
resemblance does avoid Putnam’s critique. They have shown exactly that there can 
be variable criteria that determine an extension of a term. A stereotype might be 
violated, but because of the family resemblance mechanism, extension determination 
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is successful. Thus, even though something like an intension picks out objects in 
extension, a three-legged tiger is counted as a tiger.  
The Andersen et al. view also has affinities with the so-called cluster theory 
of reference, which is normally attributed to Wittgenstein and John Searle. 
According to the cluster theory, a proper name is associated with a cluster of 
descriptions that express its sense and determine its reference. A name refers to the 
object that most, but not necessarily all, of the descriptions denote. (See Searle 1997; 
also Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 50) The difference is naturally that Andersen et al. are 
not interested in proper names, but in general terms. However, the idea that 
descriptions loosely determine the object referred to is the same. Moreover, closer to 
our topic, Alexander Bird has argued that “loose intensionalism” suits Kuhn better. 
This means that terms have associate sets of descriptions that play a role in fixing 
reference and extension. According to loose intensionalism, fixing is not a matter of 
an entity satisfying the descriptions exactly. For example, an entity is in the 
extension of a term if it satisfies X per cent of the descriptions in the intension.(Bird 
2000, 176-79) Andersen et al. do not talk about percentages but the underlying idea 
is the same. Only part of the associate description of a concept needs to be fulfilled, 
and there is no implication that those descriptions need to be the same for all entities.  
 
Barry Barnes’s finitism and Mary Hesse’s network model 
 
There have not been many studies on similarity relations. However, before Andersen, 
Barker and Chen, two other scholars worked on the notion. One is Barry Barnes, 
whose theory of “finitism” appears to be influential in science studies. The other is 
Mary Hesse, who has, in turn, influenced Barnes’s thinking. I start with Barnes’ 
finitism.  
          In his T.S. Kuhn and Social Science (1982), Barnes also invokes Kuhn’s 
example of Johnny learning to distinguish between ducks, geese, and swans. He 
writes familiarly that instances of a cluster both resemble and differ from each other. 
No cluster is formed of identical or indistinguishable particulars. Therefore, a person 
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is always confronted by “an array of similarities and differences” (Barnes 1982, 28), 
when s/he is faced with a new putative instance of a term. Judgement that an instance 
belongs to one class or to another is contingent depending on the perceived 
similarity. The future application is guided only by the communal routine. The 
proper use of a term is, thus, when the usage is taken communally to be proper. Yet, 
past experience and the use of a concept does not determine the future usage. The 
usage is conventional and not predetermined by a set of rules or instructions. 
Sometimes it occurs that the routine is not able to help. Barnes argues that in such 
situations standard usage must be actively developed and extended via further social 
interaction. According to Barnes, it is negotiable, for instance, whether deuterium 
oxide is water, whether nine-carat (eight-carat, seven-carat etc.) gold can be 
classified as gold, and whether totemism is a religious practice. The crucial point is 
that concept application is revisable and open-ended. (Barnes 1982, 22-35) 
Barnes calls finitism the conception of knowledge according to which proper 
usage is developed step-by-step involving a succession of “on-the-spot judgements”. 
His radical claim is that nothing external determines what concepts refer to or 
determine the truth and falsity of verbal statements. Moreover, his overall conclusion 
is that knowledge is conventional, because what a term is taken to refer to, and what 
sentences are taken to be true, depends on contingent future judgements.
 67
 Barnes 
opposes what he calls “extensional semantics”. According to him, in that view, the 
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 Barnes implies that Mary Hesse advocated finitism. Reference is made to chapters 8 and 12 in 
Hesse’s The Structure of Scientific Inference (Barnes 1982, 30). However, I would hesitate to attribute 
Barnes’ finitism to Hesse. First of all, finitism does not appear to be a theory for Hesse. In Chapter 8 
Hesse does talk about finitism, but in reference to assigned probabilities as confirmation of prediction 
from hypothesis. The point is that if the basic language of the confirmation theory is infinite, then 
infinite hypotheses are possible. This makes it impossible to have anything but zero probability 
without violating the axiom that the probability of their total disjunction is 1. Hesse considers, 
therefore, theories for the purpose of confirmation as quantified only over finite domains. As far as I 
can see, Hesse’s finitism is just a requirement that the domain for theories is finite. Hesse’s theory is 
also some kind of hybrid between instrumentalism and realism. For example, Hesse is committed to 
the truth-values of theoretical statements, but she does not believe that their truths cumulate. Yet she 
believes forms of laws approximate, and entities and systems of entities are significantly similar 
between one theory and another after that in the history of science. Admittedly, she clearly holds the 
view that several systems of classification are possible and classification is open-ended. But I do not 
find anywhere a statement that reference and truth are entirely conventional. In fact, she explicitly 
says that recognition of similarities and dissimilarities is correct on at least some occasions. Although 
we cannot judge from evidence when it is correct, it does “commit us to some form of ontology with 
regard to the reference of universal terms”. (Hesse 1974, 48) I fail to see how Hesse’s stand could be 
compatible with the radical conventionality of knowledge of Barnes’ finitism.  
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universe is divided into two parts, and an empirical concept is true of one and false of 
the other. The set of things of which it is true is the “extension” of the term. Barnes 
draws from this a conclusion that “to talk of the extensions of terms is to imply that 
future proper usage is determined in advance, that everything already lies within or 
without the extension of a term”. Furthermore, unlike “extensionalism”, finitism does 
not presume that “any such entity as an extension” is associated with the concept. 
The same goes for “intension” or “sense”, which Barnes does not think exist. (Barnes 
1982, 31-4) 
The first point to evaluate in Barnes’ finitism is its relation to Kuhn’s 
philosophy. In contrast to finitism, Kuhn appears to assume that all instances belong 
to one or another class. Consider the following quotation:  
 
The experience of generations has to date confirmed that all observed 
objects fall into one or another natural family. It has, that is, shown 
that the entire population of the world can always be divided (though 
not once and for all) into perceptually discontinuous categories. In the 
perceptual spaces between these categories are believed to be no 
objects at all (ET, 285).  
 
Barnes might, though, say that the real point is whether naming is pre-determined or 
not. I still think that at any moment, for Kuhn, it is, although the criteria for 
determination may change. It is, in other words, determined insofar as the objects 
have the same and not unexpected features or similarity/dissimilarity relations as 
objects before. A person has developed some criteria in practice that decide whether 
an instance goes to this or that similarity set. It is, we might say, a default assumption 
that any object falls always into a category.  
Nevertheless, Barnes is right in emphasising the open-endedness of naming. 
It is always possible that a new instance does not quite fit the classification scheme 
that we have created. But this is just a natural consequence if we let nature influence 
what type of kind concepts we form. As Kuhn said, “Nature cannot be forced into an 
arbitrary set of conceptual boxes” (RSS, 159). To use Barker, Chen, and Andersen’s 
example, it is likely that the seventeenth century ornithology that divided birds into 
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either “water bird” or “land bird” assumed that all birds belong to one or other of the 
categories. It is not the case that each time a new bird is seen, we have no clue as to 
how to name it. Both our chosen criteria and the bird itself affect our classification. 
Barnes is right in saying that nothing strongly determines how a bird is named - of 
course not. But certainly there is something that guides and constrains our future 
categorising. Ornithologists in the seventeenth century classified on the basis of beak 
shape and foot structure. When they discovered a South American bird called 
“Screamer”, which had one feature of each class - webbed feet like waterbirds, but 
pointed beak like land birds - they had to revise the system of categorising. Sundevall 
introduced a more complicated scheme, which accommodated the anomaly. (Barker 
etc. 2003, 227-8) 
 The problem here is how Barnes understands the concept of extension. A 
conventional understanding of an extension of a predicate is that the extension is all 
those things to which the predicate applies. An extension of ‘horse’ is all horses; an 
extension of ‘red’ is all red things etc. There is no implication that extension could 
not be changed or revised, should we change for one reason or another the extension 
determining criteria.  Barnes also points out that this occurs constantly in the history 
of science. To talk about extension is in this sense simply to talk about individual 
things in the world that are counted as some kinds. There is nothing that prohibits us 




In fact, I do think that Barnes himself is interested in how extension is 
determined. He supposes that judgement on whether to include an instance into a 
class is contingent. This is not difficult to accept, if we think what has been said 
about the family resemblance features that determine classes. Another question is 
how to determine that an object X is a. Barnes thinks that all that a person can do is 
to find a clue from the past practice. In this way, Barnes links object categorising to 
Wittgenstein’s rule following: naming is not determined by the properties of objects, 
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 However, that view is possible, as can be seen for example in Bird (2000, 162). Yet, mere 
employment of the notion of extension is not enough to commit to such a view, as I argue in detail in 
the next chapter.  
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but by the rule-bound behaviour of the community. The problem of rule following, 
inspired by Wittgenstein, is a problem of its own, and there is no need to discuss that 
here. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree with Bird that it is questionable whether 
Kuhn actually commits himself to such a view (Bird 2000, 223). He clearly does 
invoke the family resemblance notion, but not the view that categorising is 
determined merely by community rules. Let us think about the above example of 
water birds and land birds in order to see how an object might be named. Why did 
people change their system of classification when the Screamer was found? The 
answer is simple: because the Screamer had neither a rounded beak nor webbed foot 
to make it a water bird, or a pointed beak and clawed foot to make it a land bird. In 
other words, they changed the system because of a bird! They clearly had specifiable 
criteria to compare to nature and on that basis were able to reach a rational decision. 
These criteria might be called intension because they determine extension. But, as we 
have seen, it is not a mysterious entity associated with words, but is instead an 
entirely natural stipulation with which people operate when including and excluding 
object into kind categories. 
Barnes correctly focuses on how an individual is named and emphasises that 
it is always undetermined whether it will fit with the existing system. He is, however, 
wrong to think that everything depends on the conventions of the community. There 
are features that are associated with each natural family and used as a basis for 
classification. It is not conventional that a particular screamer does not have, for 
instance, a rounded beak. I am, nevertheless, not saying that there is nothing 
conventional in categorising, and that Kuhn was, for example, a realist in thinking 
that categorising is just “carving the nature at its joints”. There is, indeed, a 
conventional aspect in categorising, and Kuhn clearly was not a realist in this sense. 
Yet, there is better explanation for conventionality. This is something that Hesse  
brings up and which I will study more extensively in the next chapter.  
 Hesse develops a “network model of theories” that relies on Wittgenstein’s 
notion of family resemblance. It is much in the spirit of Kuhn and Andersen et al. in 
the sense that it essentially takes categorising to be a recognition of the similarities 
and dissimilarities between predicates. She talks about “a resemblance theory of 
universal terms”, and she brings forward a useful theoretical distinction in regard to 
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this. The distinction of interest is universal versus individual. According to Hesse, 
there are two classic types of theories of universals: the absolute theory and the 
resemblance theory. The former asserts that P is correctly predicated of an object a in 
virtue of its objective quality of P-ness. The epistemological question: ‘What is it 
about a that leads us in the absence of other information  to correctly predicate P of 
a?’ would be answered by saying that the quality of P-ness is directly recognised in 
the experience which leads to the predication of a. Similarly, the ontological 
question: ‘What is it about a that makes it P?’ would be answered by saying that it is 
the absolute quality of P, whether it is directly recognisable or not. In contrast, 
according to the resemblance theory, P of objects a and b is predicated because of a 
sufficient resemblance between a and b. Hesse illustrates the difference by asking 
why it is that we classify some a, for example, as ‘red’. It is not because we 
recognise redness as such, but because we see a, b etc. (post boxes, St George’s 
cross, roses etc.), and learn to associate the term ‘red’ in virtue of resemblance with 
each other and the difference to such objects as sky, grass and common salt. (Hesse 
1974, 45-6)  
In thinking about Kuhn’s example of learning to recognise birds, the 
corresponding answers would be that we can name individual swans as swans, either 
because they all partake in the somehow recognisable universal property of being a 
swan, or because individuals resemble each other and differ from some others in 
some respects, and for this reason, we end up by putting them in one class. I think it 
is clear what Kuhn thinks the right answer should be. My view is that a plausible 
interpretation of Kuhn’s position can be found following this line of reasoning. That 
is, I think that Kuhn is an anti-conceptual realist, i.e. he does not believe that 
universals exist as mind-independent. As a consequence, universal properties cannot 
be used to explain our systems of classification. Whether Kuhn is better described as 
a nominalist or a conceptualist is discussed in the following chapter. At this point, 
the important issue that Hesse made us recognise is that the family resemblance 
account goes against the absolute account of universals or conceptual realism. My 
interpretation of Barnes’ stance is that a similar position would also fit him. 
Classification is conventional and open-ended because it is not given by the world, 
but created by us. Yet it does not make all facts conventional. Although it is 
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contingent that we divide birds as we do, it is not contingent that, say, certain birds 
resemble each other as they do. Again, it is conventional that we pay attention to 
those similarities and dissimilarities, and not to some others. Barnes’ 
conventionalism of knowledge goes too far in claiming that every fact is dependent 
on us.  
Hesse writes that her network model does not solely deal with extension 
because classes are not defined merely by the objects contained in them. They also 
involve “intensional reference”, i.e. classes depend on recognitions of similarities 
and differences in producing the initial classification. Furthermore, intensional 
reference is the relation that exists between a descriptive predicate in a given 
language and a property of an object when the statement ascribing the predicate to 
the object is true. The relation between intensional reference and extension is defined 
by the following dependency: the same extension does not entail the same 
intensional reference, but the same intensional reference does entail the same 
extension. As Hesse herself recognises, intensional reference characterised in this 
way, comes close to what is more commonly known in philosophy as sense or 
intension. However, there is a crucial difference, writes Hesse. According to her, 
sense is often used to express a definition of a term, or to express a synonymous 
relation between two expressions. Hesse argues that sense, understood this way, is 
dependent on context and is trivial: whenever there is a change in the context that 
defines a term, sense changes. Hesse commits herself, in other words, to the wide 
theory-dependency of meaning discussed in Chapter 2. Taking everything into 
account, the upshot for Hesse is that intensional reference is not the same as sense. 
The former is dependent on the physical conditions under which the recognition of a 
property is correct. Consequently, the “meaning of P as intensional reference changes 
when some or all of the empirical situations to which we have conventionally learned 
by recognition of similarities and differences to assign the predicate P, are 
deliberately ascribed the predicate not-P
69
 ” (Hesse 1974, 63).  
On the one hand, intensional reference is a less sensitive notion than the 
context-dependent sense. In other words, the latter may change while the former may 
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stay invariant. But Hesse’s understanding of sense is holistic, and therefore as we 
have seen, any change in the context alters sense. In contrast, even if some of my 
beliefs about birds change, I may continue recognising birds as before, i.e. they have 
the same similarity/dissimilarity relations or intensional reference as before. Hesse’s 
understanding of sense here does not appear to be entirely useful. It is the same 
holistic sense that was attacked because of the incommensurability consequences and 
that was thought to be avoided by the causal theory of reference. Moreover, 
understanding sense in that wide sense is less common than its understanding in a 
more limited form: a non-holistic intentional notion that determines extension or/and 
reference. Therefore, Hesse’s intensional reference is much closer to a philosopher’s 




On the other hand, intensional reference appears to be a more sensitive notion 
than the Andersen et al. concept. To Hesse, intensional reference may change while 
extension stays invariant. For example, if there is a change in the “threshold of 
degrees of similarity delimiting the class [of Dutch painter]‘Vermeer’, … such as the 
desirability of making distinctions between paintings by a master and copies by his 
immediate pupils”(Hesse 1974, 63), then intensional reference is changed and 
possibly, but not necessarily, extension is changed as well. But, crucially, to Hesse, 
change in intensional reference counts as meaning change.  This would make persons 
A, B, and C above that had different but co-extensive similarity sets for swans to 
have different meanings, because the empirical applications of the term ‘swan’ are 
different. To Andersen et al., in turn, change in the similarity relations without a 
change in the extension does not count as a change in concept, i.e. as meaning 
change.  
                                                                                                                                          
69
 Note that here I use a different notation from that of Hesse’s. 
70
 In another sense, the distinction between intensional reference and sense would be illuminating. All 
writers discussed in this chapter are primarily interested in intensional meaning as a function to 
extension. None of them is interested in intension as a propositional content of mind that explains a 
person’s behaviour. The question of interest would be regarding what it means to possess a certain 
concept, not what is in the extension or how the extension is determined. This issue is further 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
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What may be troubling for some in Hesse’s thinking is her strong emphasis 
on the physical conditions in determining intensional reference. She seems to limit 
the application of intensional reference to observable entities of which similarities 
and dissimilarity relations are easy to determine.
 71
 This is a question that can also be 
asked of Kuhn’s family resemblance account. The question more specifically is, how 
closely is intensional reference, or Kuhn’s family resemblance criteria, tied to 
empirical conditions or observable objects? In other words, is the family resemblance 
theory applicable only to empirical concepts or also to more abstract concepts?   
 
The theory of concept learning evaluated 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I examined Kuhn’s changing position in respect of 
developing a theory of meaning. The appropriate conclusion is that there is no full-
bloodied meaning theory to be found in Kuhn’s work. In any case, the question of 
what meaning is, or even what a meaning theory should include, is one of the most 
difficult and fundamental disputes in philosophy
72
. Therefore, I think that first and 
foremost Kuhn’s philosophising of similarity relations should be understood as a 
theory of learning concepts. His theory is that concepts are learned ostensively by 
recognising similarities and dissimilarities between objects. So far, I have confined 
my analysis to concepts that have a clear empirical application. In Chapter 3, I 
mentioned that Kuhn thought that the same theory is applicable in more theoretical 
cases in science via recognition of the similarity of problem situations. I will now 
briefly evaluate how widely applicable Kuhn’s theory of learning concepts is.  
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 It may also be asked whether the account faces the same difficulties as that of Carnap’s when he 
tried to define theoretical terms by their test conditions. Carnap’s problem was that there will be 
always a new situation where a term can and will be applied, and thus there will be innumerable 
meanings, which is very uneconomical. However, the expression is underdetermined because it is 
impossible to take all possible physical conditions into account. (On this, see Carnap 1956 and 
Papineau 1979, Ch. 1) Most importantly, a consequence implied was the incommensurability thesis. 
72
 To obtain a taste of different possible orientations, see, for example, Gilbert Harman’s short article 
“Three Levels of Meaning” (in Harman 1999). Or, alternatively, just think what, for instance, Frege, 
Quine and Dumment think a meaning theory should be and can be.  
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 The fundamental tenet of Kuhn’s theory of learning concepts is that concepts 
are learned in an ostensive situation by interaction between an instructor and a pupil, 
without the conscious specification of the application criteria for concepts. Thus they 
are learned in practical situations. We need to ask, firstly, what enables this kind of 
learning? How is a pupil able to recognise previously unknown objects and learn a 
concept that s/he has not possessed before? Hoyningen-Huene argues that there are 
three preconditions for this process. Firstly, the pupil must be able to understand the 
instructor’s acts of reference as such, and not, for example, see them as mere 
physical motions. Secondly, such acts must be understood not just as reference, but 
as reference to something particular. Thirdly, the pupil has also to understand 
ascription and the exclusion of instances into similarity sets. (Hoyningen-Huene 
1993, 80)  
 On the two former points, the best we can do is to suppose, together with 
such scholars as Quine (1969, 114-138), that there are fundamental innate abilities 
that enable the recognition of relevant objects. Therefore, people have an ability, 
developed over the course of evolution to understand the act of pointing and be 
inclined to conceptualise the world with some most basic categories, such as things, 
attributes, relations, as Hoyningen-Huene suggests (1993, 80). One does not need to 
know the concept bird, but one needs to be able to divide objects into separate 
physico-material entities and regard them as having properties before a person is able 
to learn the concepts of birds. In fact, the innateness hypothesis also appears to be  
empirically well-grounded. Children seem to have, for example, a born ability to 
perceive objects as whole units (e.g. Stevenson 1993, 198-9). Quine also extends 
innate ability to the third point. He says that a standard of similarity is innate (Quine 
1969, 123). Kuhn’s referral to “a mental module that permits us to learn to recognise 
not only kinds of physical object (e.g. elements, fields and forces) but also kinds of 
furniture, of government, of personality and so on (RSS, 229)”, and his conviction 
that it is possessed by animals and that it evolved is an indication that he would have 
accepted the innateness hypothesis. Another possibility, suggested by Andersen, is to 
treat the third question as a so-called problem of wide-open texture (Andersen 2000a, 
325-6). The problem for the family resemblance theory is how to limit the extension 
of concepts if we only compare similarities of instances. The difficulty is that there 
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are innumerable possible similarities between objects. Andersen’s solution is to refer 
to features or dissimilarity relations that exclude an instance from falling into the 
wrong categories, which thereby keeps the boundaries of concepts sharp. In general, 
I am sympathetic to Andersen’s idea and will evaluate it more specifically in the 
following chapter. It is not, in any case, incompatible with the thesis that we have an 
innate ability to recognise similarities and dissimilarities between objects, but it can 
be seen rather as an attempt to specify the mechanism of recognition.   
An important indirect endorsement to Kuhn’s theory of learning concepts 
comes from the previously mentioned empirical studies. Rosch’s and others’ studies 
on the graded structures of concepts make the idea of learning concepts by 
recognising similarities quite plausible. If concepts are learned by observing the 
similarities and dissimilarities between objects, it is only natural that some instances 
are judged to be more typical than others, because objects falling under the concept 
are not identical. In general, I do think that there are no serious flaws in Kuhn’s main 
theory of concept acquisition. His ideas were rather tentative, but we have seen that 
they accord well with some detailed studies in cognitive science. Later applications 
by Andersen et al. appear admittedly to be still tentative, although they do not strike 
one as being incorrect. Nevertheless, I think their application of the frame model 
succeeds better in giving a representation of concept, than of explaining what the 
actual mechanism of learning is. A description of an ostensive learning situation and 
the resulting family resemblance concept represented by frames do not appear to 
explain the internal reasoning practices that lead to this result. For this reason, I 
believe that more theoretical work is needed before the micro mechanism of learning 
can be said to be understood.  
 Another question to consider is how widely the theory of concept learning 
could be applied. The problem is, of course, that Kuhn presented his theory in 
“Second Thoughts on Paradigms” (in ET) with an example in which objects are 
middle-size material objects that can easily be ostended, i.e. birds. There are such 
concepts in science, usually taken from ordinary language, such as ‘planet’, ‘star’, 
‘satellite’, ‘gold’ etc., but perhaps the most important concepts that appear in 
scientific theories are rarely such. Let’s just think about terms in one of Kuhn’s 
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favourite examples, in the theory of dynamics: ‘mass’, ‘force’, ‘time’ certainly 
cannot be ostended, and no contrasting concept is available as with ‘swan’, ‘duck’ 
and ‘goose’. Kuhn also noticed the difficulty in extending his theory of concepts to 
certain scientific concepts. Yet he thought that  
 
The same technique, if in a less pure form, is essential to the more 
abstract sciences as well. I have already argued that assimilating 
solutions to such problems as the inclined plane and the conical 
pendulum is part of learning what Newtonian physics is. Only after a 
number of such problems have been assimilated, can a student or a 
professional proceed to identify other Newtonian problems himself. 
The assimilation of examples is, furthermore, part of what enables 
him to isolate the forces, masses and constraints within a new problem 
and to write down a formalism suitable for its solution. (ET, 313).  
 
Kuhn’s suggestion was that more abstract scientific terms are learned together in 
problem situations. For example, the law, or law-schema, F=ma can be applied in 
different circumstances and it can, accordingly, take different expressions
73
. This 
gives a clue for the future so that a student can look for similar problem situations 
and apply concepts in those cases in a similar way.  
Andersen and Nersessian have tried to put Kuhn’s theory into use. They rely 
on Kuhn’s later distinction between ‘nomic’ and ‘normic’ generalisations that he 
briefly introduced. The former can admit exceptions, such as the generalisation 
‘liquids expand when heated’, while the latter do not, such as Boyle’s law for gases. 
This difference corresponds, according to Kuhn, to the way concepts are learned. 
Nomic concepts are learned like his main theory of concept acquisition states, i.e. via 
recognising similarity relations. Normic concepts are learned, in turn, in applications 
of scientific laws. (RSS, 230-1) Andersen’s and Nersessian’s solution is an extension 
of the frame schema to represent the similarity class of problem situations for nomic 
concepts. For example, Nersessian has argued that ‘electromagnetic field’ cannot be 
separated from the problem situation in which it participates; furthermore, the 
various instances of the field concept in the theories of Faraday, Maxwell, Lorentz 
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and Einstein exhibit a family resemblance structure. (Andersen and Nersessian 1998, 
see also Nersessian 1984) 
However, I think that Kuhn’s extension of his theory of learning concepts to 
abstract terms is on much less firm ground than his initial theory that covers ordinary 
concrete middle-sized objects. Therefore, I think that much more research is needed 
to see whether this is a realistic theory of learning concepts in science. Andersen’s 
and Nersessian’s application is interesting, but they do not sufficiently prove that the 
learning of abstract scientific terms actually occurs by the recognition of similar 
problem situations. Perhaps such innovations as case- or model-based reasoning may 
provide supplementary explanations (e.g. Nickles 2003; Nersessian 1992, 2003). 
More specifically, I think Nersessian’s application of the frame schema (1984) in the 
history of science is better described as a suggestion of how to represent historical 
concepts, i.e. more as an issue in knowledge representation than as a theory of 
learning concepts. For these reasons I remain sceptical of the idea that Kuhn’s theory 
of learning concepts can be generalised to cover all concepts in science.  
  
Conclusion: Kuhn’s three contributions 
 
Perhaps the most interesting outcome of this chapter is the realisation that some of 
Kuhn’s insights can be given independent empirical support. Therefore, my verdict 
on the question of whether cognitive science manages to illustrate some of Kuhn’s 
fundamental ideas is positive. We have seen that throughout his career Kuhn took an 
interest in what form “knowledge” is structured in our minds. Sometimes he wrote 
just about conceptual schemes, while at others he wrote about lexicons or mental 
modules that all essentially serve this same function. His idea that there is some such 
structure that can be explicated is corroborated by research in cognitive science. It is 
not necessarily clear what specific form is the best candidate, and the debate goes on 
in this theme, but we can say that Kuhn was clearly onto something. I think that 
Kuhn’s stubborn preoccupation with the questions of how the information of objects 
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is stored and organised in the mind, even if the philosophical climate was not always 
very amicable to these type of studies, has finally paid off. I believe, therefore, that 
the first main contribution of Kuhn’s theorising in the context of this thesis is that he 
took seriously the idea that information is structured in the mind, tried to specify the 
shape of the structure in the way that still has relevance to cognitive science, and 
most importantly, applied this idea to explanations of scientific change. And, 
interestingly, this all has occurred in the spirit of naturalistic philosophy. There is 
nothing non-empirical or non-scientific in this theorising. As all practitioners admit 
in cognitive psychology, their views are open to correction if evidence asks us to 
reformulate our suggestion of the structure of representation. In considering theory 
change, the idea that there is some structure that stores information begins to gain 
more prominence later in the thesis. I mentioned earlier Kuhn and Lakatos as 
philosophers who have reminded us of the epistemological conservatism of 
scientists. The idea that knowledge has a structure that needs restructuring may be an 
explanation of conservatism. I will continue this debate on theory change in Chapter 
7.  
 Kuhn had also something potentially interesting to say on at least one aspect 
of meaning. As already stated, Kuhn’s stipulation that instances under concepts are 
related by their mutual similarities and dissimilarities can be understood with the 
traditional philosophical terminology. It is an intensional theory in the sense that it 
relies on the idea that people use certain psychological criteria to determine 
extension. In other words, Kuhn is primarily interested directly in extension and 
indirectly in the determination of extension. Kuhn argued that people can have 
different criteria for recognising classes of objects, but yet still have the same 
concept because there is no difference in their respective classes of objects. As Kuhn 
joked, no matter whether you differentiate between men and women by the features 
of their being dressed or naked, it is important that people make the same class 
distinctions (RSS, 50).  Alternatively expressed, Kuhn was interested in the 
homology of lexical structure, i.e. that people pick out the same objects, even if their 
criteria for picking them out and expectations in regard of objects vary. This aspect 
of Kuhn’s philosophy has gone virtually unnoticed. Talk of “wide intensionalism” 
that makes extension or reference change as soon as sense changes does not do 
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justice to Kuhn if his later writings are also taken into account. ‘Extension’ in Kuhn’s 
philosophy is more stable than that.  
However, it is not easy to find an interpretation of Kuhn’s terminology that 
makes it consistent overall. Kuhn’s ability to define and be philosophically consistent 
improved significantly later in his career, but I think he suffered from the problem of 
looseness of language throughout his career - something that Masterman pointed out 
forcefully on the usage of ‘paradigm’ in SSR. As a consequence, in thinking about 
‘concept’ and ‘meaning’, and their relation, it is not easy to find a fixed 
interpretation. For example, in SSR Kuhn at times writes almost interchangeably of 
meanings and concepts. Then he says that the meaning of celestial bodies, such as 
‘planet’ or ‘earth’ changed when they were placed in different similarity sets. This is 
similar to his later understanding of ‘concept’ as extensional. Nevertheless, the usage 
of ‘concept’ eventually settles at something like this. His understanding of ‘meaning’ 
also becomes rather stable after all. In one of the last texts he writes:   
 
The expectations acquired in learning a kind term, though they may 
differ from individual to individual, supply the individuals who have 
acquired them with the meaning of the term. … Changes in 
expectations about a kind term’s references are therefore changes in 
its meaning, so that only a limited variety of expectations may be 
accommodated within a single speech community. So long as two 
community members have compatible expectations about the referents 
of a term they share, there will be no difficulty. (RSS, 231)   
 
 
A bit earlier he had said that meaning change is “change in the way words and 
phrases attach to nature, change in the way their referents are determined.” (RSS, 29) 
Thus, ‘meaning’ appears to be those expectations or what has been learned of 
individuals for the purpose of classifying objects into similarity classes. All in all, 
‘concept’ is very near to extension, and ‘meaning’ is very near to intension or sense, 
remembering its family resemblance nature. For Kuhn to end up with this view is 
slightly surprising because it is so much the mainstream usage in philosophy. That is 
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where I, anyway, believe his theorising comes to at the end. Naturally, there are 
many other points of divergence, as we have seen and will still see in the thesis.  
The second contribution of Kuhn’s theorising of similarity relations is, then, 
his theory of extension determination, which says that extension is determined by 
observing similarities and dissimilarities of objects. In relation to it, there are two 
things that should be noticed. One is that the theory is naturally closely related to 
Kuhn’s theory of concept learning. Secondly, it is something that Andersen et al. 
have called a family resemblance theory of concept, which is supposed to question 
the classical account of concept. Although Kuhn never put things like this, this 
extension of his philosophy is possible without any discernible distortion of Kuhn’s 
thinking. The question that we need to ask is whether the case against the classical 
account is proven. That question has to be asked from Andersen, Barker and Chen, 
who make the claim.   
 Andersen, Barker and Chen have created an interesting implementation of 
Kuhn’s idea of family resemblance concept by applying Barsalou’s frame model. 
Their use of Barsalou’s idea strikes me as both empirically robust and instrumental. 
The strongest domain of application is in concept learning and use. The fact that 
there is a large amount of empirical research in the background makes the model 
more forceful. Yet, arguably, it is not the only way we can substantiate the idea of 
family resemblance. Nevertheless, it does manage to catch some of the important 
insights of Kuhn, and I think also that their creation is fruitful, which can be seen in 
successful illustrations of cases in the history of science which were briefly 
mentioned in the thesis. But are they right in claiming that cognitive psychology has 
given “empirical vindication of the family resemblance account” and that empirical 
findings have shown that “necessary-and-sufficient condition definition of concepts 
will be impossible” (Barker et al. 2003, 219)? I do not think so.  
 As the writers themselves say, Rosch’s and others’ research of the graded 
structures of concepts describe the behaviour of people ordering exemplars in 
categories according to their typicality (Chen et al 1998, 11). This does not yet prove 
that definition in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions is impossible. 
Different persons may use different features to classify objects, and they may apply 
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concepts so that instances of their concept application do not share any set of 
common features, and for this reason they may judge some instances as being more 
typical exemplifications of the concept. But this does not mean that it is impossible to 
find a set of common features of all instances. Interestingly, Andersen and 
Nersessian appear to explicitly admit this. They say that the fact that concepts are not 
defined does not mean that they could not be (Andersen and Nersessian 2000, 227). 
Moreover, Smith and Medin write that so-called empirical support for the family 
resemblance account of concepts which goes against the classical view can be taken 
as a theory of how objects are actually identified. That often occurs through some 
perceivable properties. Yet one can, in principle, maintain that concept is defined by 
its core in the classical way and thus avoid direct criticism of how the actual 
classification of objects occurs. (Smith and Medin 1981, 20; 27-9; 57-60) Smith and 
Medin even construct a possible addition to the classical account that makes it 
compatible with the findings of Rosch (but which, however, gets into trouble for 
other reasons) (Smith and Medin 1981, 36-8).  
We may think that Wittgenstein’s famous family resemblance “theory” of 
concepts reflects the failure to find even one single definition of a natural concept by 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Yet, the past failure does nothing to make future 
success impossible, as we have learned from numerous studies on the problem of 
induction. The argument of impossibility based on a lack of progress by the classical 
view makes the sentence “no one has yet determined the defining features of concept 
X” equivalent to “there are no defining features of concept X” (see Smith and Medin 
1981, 30-1). I think it is possible that somebody is able to discover satisfactory 
definitions in the classical fashion. Perhaps we need a little more work in order to 
find those features that all instances share. The fact that people actually do not have 
such a set in their mind and use a shared set of features in concept application does 
not yet make the task of defining impossible. Maybe at some point it will be possible 
to agree on the set of features that characterise swans, for example. Naturally, I am 
not saying that it is possible, as empirically, evidence does point to the contrary. All 
that I argue is that Andersen et al. in their reference to cognitive psychology have not 
proved the contrary either. Strictly speaking, they are talking about the learning and 
the use of concepts. Still, nothing said here makes the family resemblance account 
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less interesting as a theory of concept. In the case of Kuhn, who did not try to 
explicitly develop a theory of concept, I will treat his family resemblance account as 
a rival theory of extension determination. In the next chapter we will see whether it 
can  successfully determine extension.  
The third contribution I take to be Kuhn’s theory of learning concepts. 
Although we have seen that its application is likely to be limited, Kuhn has 
nevertheless brought forward an interesting theory. Its domain of application is 
indeed with empirical concepts. And interestingly, it has, as has the idea of 
information structuring, received empirical support from the cognitive sciences. Yet 
in order to give Kuhn’s theory a chance to work, a necessary pre-condition is the 
assumption that people have an innate ability to conceptualise the world in a certain 
way. Furthermore, as a theory of learning concepts, it also offers a theory of how 
objects are categorised. Kuhn’s suggestion, which Andersen et al. endorse, is that 
objects are put into classes according to their respective similarities and 
dissimilarities. We need to recognise that this theory can apply only to some 
concepts. Firstly, objects that can be categorised directly by their similarity are 
perceivable objects, and there is a large number of concepts that have no instances 
with observable qualities. Thus, they cannot be constructed by their observable 
similarities and dissimilarities. Andersen et al. tried to extend Kuhn’s theory of 
learning concepts to abstract concepts via their use in problem situations. Even if it 
made sense and reflected the actual practice in science, for which more 
argumentation is needed, it does not give an immediately evident theory of how 
classification functions with abstract concepts. Supposedly, they are not classified by 
the problem situations that they occur in.  
 Finally, what is interesting in Barnes’ application is his emphasis on the 
openness of future categorising. This is something that is implied in Andersen et al.’s 
historical cases. However, I think his view of the conventionalism of knowledge is 
too far-fetched. The naming and categorisation of objects is not as undetermined as 
he suggests. Both the world and our old systems of classification constrain and direct 
the future usage. I do think also that we are able consciously to know what kind of 
criteria are used in classification; if not at the time of learning concepts, then after we 
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have learned them. Criteria may be ambiguous and vary interpersonally, but 
nevertheless can still be within our reach. To my mind, Andersen et al.’s applications 
are able to show this. The problem is that Barnes feels too much aversion towards 
extension. We can quite neutrally take extension to be the set of objects falling under 
a concept and still think that extension may change, and has changed, in the course of 
history. Finally, Hesse’s most interesting contribution was the idea that the family 
resemblance account goes against conceptual realism or against the idea that there 
are mind independent universals that determine our classes of objects. I personally 
think that this is roughly the position that Kuhn holds.   
Our exploration of Kuhn’s meaning theory is far from over. I have been able 
to say that Kuhn’s meaning is about criteria that determine extension. I have not yet 
said anything of Kuhn’s attitude to the causal theory of reference. Neither have I 
dealt with the debate with Putnam on the issue. Kuhn objected to the causal theory as 
a general theory of reference, but for what reason? Nor have I said much of what 
Kuhn thinks of the relation between similarity sets and the world, other than that he 
might have opposed conceptual realism. His position has to be specified in regard to 
this. We need to ask whether there is any limit on what kind of similarity sets we can 
form. Furthermore, it is important to inquire whether family resemblance can 
maintain the distinct boundaries between natural families. Cannot we always find 
similarities in some sense and conclude that practically all objects are similar in some 
respects? In other words, does Kuhn’s family resemblance account of extension 
function satisfactorily? All these issues will be discussed in the following chapter.   
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5. Kuhn’s conceptual anti-realism  
 
We have seen so far that the function of similarity and dissimilarity relations is to 
define the extension of terms. The family resemblance account of concepts, grounded 
on similarity and dissimilarity relations between instances, is meant to be an 
alternative to the classical account of concepts that relies on the idea that all 
instances of a concept share the same features. Kuhn argued that by recognising 
similarities and dissimilarities between objects, people are able to group them in 
natural families or kind categories. Now we come to the crucial question in regard to 
that account. The question is whether there is any limit to what kind of natural 
families we can form. Is it, as Barnes indicates, entirely up to us, or does the world 
force the form of our categories? Barnes’ stand would be a form of anti-realism, or 
more precisely, of constructivism. I mentioned earlier that Kuhn implied that our 
categories are not arbitrary because nature constrains our conceptual categorising. 
But if this is so, we have to ask what role the human mind can have in such a picture. 
Are we just trying, then, to mirror reality, as a scientific realist argues?  
 The key to revealing Kuhn’s stance on the issue of realism and anti-realism is 
his dispute with Putnam’s causal theory of reference. Kuhn was a critic of Putnam’s 
view that has become popular in many modified forms in philosophy, as Chapter 2 
showed. By studying this debate closely we will find out where Kuhn stands, and 
furthermore, be able to assess his point of view in relation to some other central parts 
of his philosophy, notably in relation to his theorising on concepts and epistemology. 
The first issue to be tackled is essentialism in the causal theory. This is an 
assumption that certain natural objects share an underlying essence that makes them 
members of a natural kind. Kuhn opposed such a view on the grounds that, firstly, in 
normal circumstances it is impossible to categorise by one feature only, and 
secondly, it is not possible to make a separation between essential and accidental 
features in the first place.  
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We can also discover properly metaphysical reasons for Kuhn’s opposition. I 
argue that Kuhn was an anti-realist in respect of universals. When talking of 
comparison, for example, Kuhn always dealt with individuals and their sets, and 
never of universal properties. This conceptual anti-realism violates one of the 
requirements needed for a causal theory to function, i.e. that there is a constant 
(universal) in theory changes as a common point of reference. As an extension of 
this, I will show how Kuhn’s theory of categorisation by similarity and dissimilarity 
relations departs from conceptual realism and also from nominalism. The family 
resemblance account has even been taken as a solution in the dispute between 
realism and nominalism (see Bambrough 1970). I have chosen to call Kuhn’s theory 
conceptualism because of Kuhn’s emphasis on mental concepts, which are formed by 
learning similarity and dissimilarity relations between instances and which order 
individuals and create the basic conceptual categories.   
There is yet another related issue that has to be addressed in this chapter. We 
need to ask, given that nature does not dictate our conceptual categories, how we can 
have borders between kind categories, if all that we have is similarities and 
dissimilarities between instances? Cannot we move in all directions finding always 
some similarity between even very different objects? This question touches on the 
issue of how tenable Kuhn’s theory of extension determination by family 
resemblance is. The answer is that the dissimilarity relations function as an excluding 
factor of instances from categories, and for this reason manage to keep a separation 
between kinds of objects.  
 
Causal theory and general terms 
 
Kuhn was against the causal theory of reference as a general solution to meaning 
change. He focused his criticism on Putnam’s Twin-Earth case introduced in the 
second chapter of this thesis. In the current upsurge of interest in Kuhn, we find three 
different takes on the Kuhn-Putnam debate in three different recent monographs on 
Kuhn’s philosophy. Bird sides with Putnam and says that Kuhn misses Putnam’s 
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point that the extension of ‘water’ on the Earth does not include anything composed 
of XYZ, and that is the reason why people discovering the Twin Earth would report 
that ‘waterE’ and ‘waterTE’ do not have the same meaning (Bird 2000, 183). 
Andersen, and Sharrock and Read, in turn, think that Kuhn introduces a worthwhile 
point. The latter two write that Kuhn’s claim was that Putnam’s scenario is 
impossible because it does not take into account that kinds are organised 
systematically in taxonomies of which components are dependent on each other. 
Taxonomy infects a “whole style of thinking”, and Putnam’s description, therefore, 
is flawed. Any discovery of XYZ that has the same surface properties as our water 
would prompt a revision in the chemical theory in a holistic fashion. (Sharrock and 
Read 2002, 184-8; see also Read and Sharrock 2002). Andersen’s point of view is 
that Kuhn’s disagreement reflects his rejection of realism. She describes Kuhn’s 
position as “neither purely realist, nor sheerly constructivist, but something in-
between”. That “something in-between” position comes down, according to 
Andersen, to a Kantian distinction between the thing-in-itself and its appearance. 
Using terminology borrowed from Hoyningen-Huene, Andersen says that Kuhn’s 
conceptual categories were of “the phenomenal world”, not of “the world-in-itself” 
(Andersen 2001a, 60). Andersen tries to develop this position in her article 
“Reference and Resemblance” and comes to the conclusion that neither realism, nor 
anti-realism is correct. Instead, she suggests a position that explains referring as 
“carving the world at its joints”, but this world is “a phenomenal world with variable 
joints”, and that “it exists only in a historical process in which they [variable joints] 
are transmitted gradually from one generation to the next”. Furthermore, Andersen 
holds that similarity relations are constitutive of the phenomenal objects. (Andersen 
2001a, 50; 55). 
 I think, first of all, that Bird does not quite see what Kuhn was trying to say. 
That may be because Kuhn as an anti-scientific realist takes an opposing view to that 
of Bird. In fact, Bird sincerely admits in one of his articles that his defence of 
Putnam is from a realist point of view and excludes the Kuhnian type of criticisms 
that object to the realist way of framing the argument (Bird 2004a, 90). Secondly, 
Sharrock and Read raise an interesting issue, namely the observation that Kuhn’s 
theory of the classification of objects is holistic. Yet, merely saying that does not 
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specify what Kuhn’s objection to the causal theory is. We need to say something 
more of the relation between holism in this specific sense and the Putnam-Kripke 
idea of essences. Why does Kuhn’s referential holism prevent us from discovering 
essences? Furthermore, given holism, why would it not be possible to find a match 
between the whole theory and the corresponding large part of the world without 
gradual one-to-one matching? Bird returns to the Kuhn-Putnam debate in his recent 
article “Kuhn on Reference and Essence” (Bird 2004a) by attempting to show that 
Read’s and Sharrock’s argument does not pose a threat to the causal theory or 
essentialism. I think Bird gets the better of Read and Sharrock in this dispute, not 
necessarily because the latter have no good point to make, but rather because they do 
not make it well enough. Thirdly, I agree with Andersen’s main claim that at the root 
of the debate is Kuhn’s rejection of Putnamian realism. Her reference to Kuhn’s 
Kantianism is also well-placed. However, although I think that Andersen’s view that 
Kuhn’s categories were dynamic and historical, which new generations inherit, is 
interesting and worth studying, her overall position strikes me as unfortunate. The 
ontological status of the ‘phenomenal world’ is not clear at all. If they are made of 
similarity relations created by us, as she says, then what else is her position but that 
of the idealist or constructivist? As such, it would be a form of anti-realism that is not 
very attractive. And if we create “the world”, what is there to discover in its “joints”? 
I think Andersen ends up with a position that is not internally coherent, and 
therefore, indefensible as an alternative to realism and anti-realism. Moreover, I 
believe the rhetoric of “carving the nature at its joints” is not helpful and makes the 
matter rather more confused.  
  In order to understand why Kuhn opposed the Putnam-Kripke causal theory, 
we need to reconstruct his argument against it.
74
 Kuhn already displays philosophical 
sophistication in his evaluation of the causal theory. This can be seen from his 
comment on how traditional empiricism had tried to determine reference of proper 
names by an associated description of the reference. What is also apparent is that his 
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attitude towards the causal theory is not overall negative. Kuhn thinks that by 
denying the descriptive determination of the reference of proper names, the causal 
theory has brought “a great advantage” (RSS, 198, similarly RSS, 312-3). The 
problems arise if the same theory is also extended to natural kind terms:  
 
When one makes the transition from proper names to the names of 
natural kinds, one loses access to the career line or lifeline which, in 
the case of proper names, enables one to check the correctness of 
different applications of the same term. The individuals which 
constitute natural families do have lifelines, but the natural family 
itself does not. (RSS, 199)  
 
Kuhn gives us an example of the case in which the causal theory works, and of the 
other in which it does not. A single act of ostension is, according to Kuhn, enough to 
fix reference of ‘Richard Boyd’. If a person’s memory is good, s/he will be able to 
recognise Richard Boyd after many years. The situation is entirely different if one is 
presented with the deflected needle of a galvanometer and simultaneously told that 
the cause of the deflection was an ‘electric charge’. In this case a person needs 
something more than just a good memory to apply the term correctly in a 
thunderstorm or to the cause of the heating of an electric blanket. Kuhn concludes 
this case somewhat ambiguously by saying that with natural kinds “a number of acts 
of ostension are required”. Nonetheless, his argument is that in regard to natural kind 
terms such as ‘swan’, goose’, ‘electric charge’ etc., an establishment of reference 
requires exposure not only to “varied members of that kind but also to members of 
others – to individuals, that is, to which the term might otherwise have been 
mistakenly applied.” (RSS, 200).  
 A few pages later in the same essay (“Metaphor in science” in RSS) Kuhn 
writes that “the techniques of dubbing” and “of tracing lifelines” allow us to track 
astronomical individuals such as the earth, moon, Mars and Venus, through episodes 
of theory changes. There is no change in the “lifelines” of individuals in transition 
from the heliocentric to the geocentric theory. ‘Mars’, for example, still refers to the 
same individual, i.e. Mars. But there was a change in natural families, for example, 
because ‘the moon’ and ‘the sun’ did belong to the family of ‘the planets’, but ‘the 
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earth’ did not, and so on. A consequence of the transitions is that the list of features 
that determine the “referents” of that term changed. (RSS, 205). Kuhn makes his case 
exceptionally forcefully in the last interview. Giving credit first to Kripke and 
Putnam for the development of a theory of reference for proper names he says, “I 
simply could not reconcile myself to saying, ‘if heat is molecular motion, then it 
always was molecular motion.’ ” But it was the Copernican revolution that brought 
the fundamental realisation:    
 
Look, you can trace the individual planets, Mars, heavenly bodies 
through the Copernican revolution – what you can’t trace through it is 
‘planets’. Planets are just a different collection before and afterward. 
There was a sort of localized break that fitted very closely. And now it 
turns out that some people, to an extent that surprises me and others, 
simply say, “In the Ptolemaic systems planets go around the Earth and 
in the Copernican system they go around the sun.” But that’s an 
incoherent statement!  ...  I do not think it [the causal theory] works 
for common nouns.” (RSS, 312-13) 
 
Why is the statement incoherent? Because it includes a contradiction. ‘Planet’ is a set 
of individuals whose members are different in the Ptolemaic and Copernican 
astronomy and thus induce contradictory statements. No description of this kind can 
be applied to both sets without absurdity. We cannot say that, for example, the sun 
i.e. a planet in the Ptolemaic system, goes around the earth and also that it i.e. the 
centre of the universe in the Copernican system, goes around itself. Nor can we say 
that the earth goes around the sun and that it also goes around itself. We see that the 
same individual - being a member of the set ‘planetP’ and not being a member of the 
set ‘planetC’ - assumes contradictory descriptions in these contexts. In this case, we 
need to differentiate between the reading of ‘planet’ in the Ptolemaic and Copernican 
frameworks. Kuhn emphasises that although terms may survive in transitions, the 
changes in membership of the sets of items that terms are used to refer are “massive” 
(RSS, 85).  
 We may draw intermediate conclusions on the discussion of the causal theory 
so far. Firstly, Kuhn thought that the causal theory of reference may work with 
proper names, but not with common nouns or natural kind terms. Secondly, Kuhn 
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writes of individuals that form natural families. He does not talk of fixing reference 
straight to a natural kind or any other abstract or universal being. The underlying 
assumption is that reference fixing of kind terms has to be done via individuals 
falling under the kind category in question. Thirdly, he points out that the 
composition of kind categories changes in the course of history. Thus, kind term 
categories may be different collections of individuals at different times. A case in 
point is the Copernican revolution.  
 Kuhn is not alone in being sceptical about extending the application of the 
causal theory from proper names to kind terms. Keith Donellan (1983) remarks that 
the theory of natural kind terms is intimately connected with the causal theory of 
reference. Further, he writes that the causal theory was applied to singular terms, 
which leaves one wondering whether the transition to general terms works. It is 
neither obvious that the general terms taken from natural language, such as ‘tiger’, 
‘water’, ‘gold’, and ‘heat’ are applicable as such in science, nor that terms taken from 
science function in ordinary language. Donellan’s argument is that Putnam’s and 
Kripke’s reliance on rigid designation and identity, which seems to work so well for 
proper names, is not enough to give us a theory of natural kind terms, which goes 
strikingly well in accord with Kuhn’s main line of argument. Donellan writes that 
there is a crucial difference between proper names and general terms. In the case of 
proper names there is one individual to be referred to, but in the case of general terms 
there is not. ‘Tiger’ does not designate any individual (at least normally), but a 
certain species. This is problematic for Putnam and Kripke, because they need to 
assume that general terms refer to abstract entities or universal substances. Further 
problems also arise here. According to Donellan, rigid designation is not able to 
make a difference between intuitively natural and non-natural kind terms if the 
reference is taken to be to such abstract entities. ‘Bachelorhood’ and ‘water’ or 
‘tiger’ refer as rigidly
75
. Furthermore, rigid designation cannot guarantee the identity 
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 Donellan refers here to David Kaplan. Kaplan’s point is that not all rigid designators are proper 
names. For example, designators like ‘red’ in ‘Your eye is red’ and ‘penguin’ in ‘Peter is a penguin’ 
are not normally thought to be proper names, yet they may be rigid, if regarded as designating the 
appropriate entities. Kaplan says that if ‘red’ designates the property of being red, it is probably rigid. 
If it designates, in turn, the class of red things, it is not rigid. Further, he regards almost all single 
words excluding particles as rigid designators. The upshot seems to be that if a reference is taken to a 
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of kinds for general terms. The extension of terms such as ‘hearted thing’ and 
‘livered thing’ is the same, but we may say that they name different kinds. Thus co-
referentiality, or even rigid co- referentiality, does not show the identity of kinds.  
In order to obtain the same results for general terms as for proper names, 
Putnam and Kripke need to refer to the “important physical properties” of an instance 
and its relationship to instances of the same kind. But it is not at all obvious what 
will be chosen as important physical properties. Donellan drafts an alternative 
imaginary Twin-Earth story. In that story, the difference between the earths is the 
fact that on the Twin-Earth one of the isotopes of a particular chemical substance – 
gold, for example - forms almost all of that substance as it appears in nature. 
Donellan admits to not knowing whether this is actually the case on our Earth. If this 
is so, it does not matter for the sake of the story since this makes the Earth even more 
similar to the twin-Earth. If this is not so, the only difference is with the distribution 
of things, and not with the physical possibility, and no question of the reformulation 
of scientific theories arise. In this respect, Donellan’s story is less radical than 
Putnam’s. Donellan assumes that the Twin-Earthians identify things by their isotope 
numbers, not by their atomic numbers. For example, gold is not an element with the 
atomic number 79 but with a certain isotope number. The rare isotopes having the 
atomic number 79 would not  “really” be gold. Donellan’s conclusion from his story 
is two-fold. Firstly, there is “slackness” in how ordinary language terms for kinds are 
mapped onto the scientific classifications. Secondly, the extension of the term ‘gold’ 
on the Earth and the Twin Earth diverge, and as a consequence, the truth-values of 
certain sentences also vary. In general, it cannot be the case that natural kind terms in 
ordinary language have the same extension before and after scientific discoveries, 
and that there is the same mapping of those terms on to the discoveries. 
John Dupré has also provided material worthy of serious consideration by all 
advocates of the natural kind concept. (Dupré 1993, chs. 1-3; 2002) Dupré remarks, 
in the same way as Donellan, that the examples of natural kinds that Putnam and 
Kripke offered were drawn from ordinary language whose essence was supposed to 
                                                                                                                                          
universal property (as Kaplan does), it designates rigidly, no matter whether a term is putatively a 
natural kind or not. (Kaplan 1970, 518; note 31)  
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be determined by science. Typical examples are ‘water’, ‘gold’ and ‘lemon’. What 
we are looking for is an essential property that a thing that is a member of a natural 
kind must have. Putnam and Kripke’s emphasis on ordinary language is unfortunate, 
because almost without exception ordinary language terms fail to correspond to a 
scientific equivalent that would form a natural kind. Dupré proves the point by 
giving numerous examples of biological terms, both in the vegetable and animal 
kingdoms. One of his examples deals with the case of American pears. People 
familiar with American pears can easily make a distinction between a prickly pear 
and cholla on the basis of leaf shape. Yet in biology they belong to the same genus, 
and so the property of being a prickly pear is not recognised in biology. Or to take 
another example: whereas gastronomically it is fairly important to separate between 
onions and garlic, in biological classification there is no difference. (see Dupré 1993, 
26-34) Dupré’s general point is not that these kind terms and distinctions do not 
make sense, but that they are biologically meaningless. In other words, ordinary 
language makes distinctions that do not have a biological significance. Moreover, in 
biology the basic unit of classification is the species. According to Dupré, no 
biologist would claim that higher order concepts, such as genera, families etc. would 
form a natural kind. Yet, ordinary language terms typically refer to such higher 
levels. Many names of trees refer to genera, while some names of birds refer to 
genera and some to families etc. Thus, an attempt to pick out ordinary language 
kinds and specify their essence by science is bound to fail, or its success will be 
limited at least.  
Note that Kuhn writes specifically of the problem with biological species and 
of difficulties with determining gene structure (see RSS, 84; note 30). Much more 
importantly, we have seen that Kuhn was not alone in doubting whether the causal 
theory can also be extended to general terms and specifically to scientific kind terms. 
Kuhn’s main reason for this, as well as Donellan’s and Dupré’s, is that, in contrast to 
proper names, it is difficult to find a singular point of reference with general terms. I 
think that those defending the causal theory relying on the notion of natural kind 
depreciate the pratical problems that extension to general terms in science causes. 
Bird (2004a, 63), for example, correctly reminds Read and Sharrock that essentialism 
and referentialism are different theses: the former is a metaphysical thesis about 
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things, while the latter is a thesis about words. But this realisation should be enough 
to take the problems associated with attempts to make the causal theory work with 
scientific terms in general more seriously. Let us now proceed further and see what 
the fundamental reasons are for Kuhn’s rejection of reference fixing in the mode of 
causal theory.  
 
Contra essentialism  
  
I now want to pay attention to Kuhn’s attack on Putnam’s Twin-Earth case
76
 that the 
above Kuhn-scholars discussed. Kuhn’s first point of criticism is focused on the 
imagined reaction to the situation where scientists find a substance like our water that 
has complicated chemical composition XYZ. Instead of saying that Twin-Earthians’ 
‘water’ means XYZ, people would, according to Kuhn, respond ‘Back to the drawing 
Board! Something is badly wrong with the chemical theory’. That is because both 
H2O and XYZ, which is thus an abbreviation of an elaborate chemical formula, are 
drawn from the chemical theory which is incompatible with the existence of the latter 
kind of entity. Kuhn says that it would be in the light of the modern chemistry, for 
example, too heavy to evaporate at normal terrestrial temperatures. The discovery of 
XYZ would necessitate changes in the chemical lexicon, and after that, ‘H2O’ might 
not refer to what we call ‘water’.  
 I think Kuhn’s claim is reasonable. It would be totally surprising if scientists 
find a substance which is an unknown combination of familiar chemical elements 
and molecules, but which produces the same surface properties as the substance 
made of H2O. Yet, I do not think this alone threatens Putnam’s argument. What it 
primarily shows is that Putnam’s story is implausible as an example (see Bird 2000, 
182-3). Scientists might well report back home in a even more Kuhnian fashion that 
‘What they call ‘water’ is a substance with the chemical composition of XYZ. It has 
the same superficial properties as water. But how on earth is that possible? Back to 
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 See “Possible Worlds in the History of Science” (RSS, 58-90). 
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the drawing board! Something is wrong with the chemical theory.’ It may well 
happen that the investigation would produce the result, as Kuhn says, that ‘water’ 
cannot be said to be ‘H2O’. Maybe scientists have not, after all, discovered the 
essence of water. Perhaps the substances that are known as ‘H2O’ and ‘XYZ’ are 
only two of several isotopes of a more fundamental chemical combination, which 
would then determine what ‘water’ is. But this conclusion is compatible with 
Putnam’s claim, which is that the essence of a kind determines the meaning of a kind 
term.  
A problem is, of course, that one may continue this fictive story appealing to 
intuitions, practically as long as one wants without necessarily persuading the 
opponent, because the intuitions themselves do not coincide. This becomes very 
apparent from Donellan’s (above) and Dudley Shapere’s papers (below) in which 
they manage to turn the Putnam-Kripke example against itself. But if Putnam’s point 
is that the essence of a natural kind defines meaning, I do not think that Kuhn’s 
argument above does anything to prove that point wrong. Kuhn’s insistence on the 
need to restructure a lexicon may be read merely as a reminder that the established 
usage of terminology forbids some descriptions without changes in our system of 
beliefs. Before calling a spiritual healer who succeeds in curing cancer a medical 
doctor, we would need both to make changes in our medical theory and our 
definition of a doctor.  
However, there is admittedly a deeper issue stemming from the lexical 
dependency of scientific terms, as Sharrock and Read pointed out. This has to do 
with Kuhn’s theory of how terms are needed to form contrasting relationships with 
each other in order to successfully pick out objects. This theory is already familiar to 
us from the previous chapters. But we have not yet seen why Kuhn opposed 
essentialism, other than through his implication that another type of theory is needed 
to explain why certain objects are given a name of the kind. The question that needs 
to be asked is: Why could we not use one essential property to determine what water 
is, for example? Let us now move on to Kuhn’s second point on Putnam’s Twin-
Earth, which turns out to be more important. 
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 Firstly, Kuhn draws attention to the fact that water is neither identical with 
H2O, nor is H2O the reference of ‘water’. He says that H2O can be in three states of 
aggregation: solid, liquid and gaseous. Consequently, ‘H2O’ picks out not only water, 
but also ice and steam. Kuhn writes that around 1750, which is Putnam’s choice of 
year with regard to the development of chemistry, ‘water’ referred to only a liquid 
substance. This fact is historically important, because states of aggregation 
established a major difference between chemical substances. Water was thought to 
be an elementary body that was essentially liquid. For some it even referred to a 
generic liquid. Chemistry needed to go through a scientific revolution at the turn of 
the 18
th
 century in order to allow the possibility that a certain chemical substance 
could be in three different states of aggregation.
77
 This revolution also brought the 
discovery that water is actually composed of two gaseous substances, hydrogen and 
oxygen.  
 However, Kuhn’s fundamental point is not that it is impossible for historical 
subjects to imagine that a substance can be in three different states of aggregation. 
The crucial claim is that the reference of ‘water’ cannot be H2O because the latter 
covers a much wider domain than we want, i.e. liquid, ice and steam. According to 
Kuhn, a more proper description would be that ‘water’ refers to liquid H2O or close-
packed H2O particles in relative rapid motion. By this description we can obtain a 
rough equivalence between the reference of ‘water’ in 1750 and now
78
. Yet this may 
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 Note that Bird (2004a, 85-6) disputes this historical description, claiming that phase transitions were 
widely regarded as changes in one and the same species long before Lavoisier. However, Bird’s 
counter that refers only to Aristotle and Locke does not quite convince me. I think that the relevant 
context here is chemistry before Lavoisier, and especially the French chemical community that formed 
the background for Lavoisier’s innovation. The French Stahlians were in the dominant position at the 
time, and they at least took water to be a generic elementary substance, i.e. a substance that causes 
certain “liquid” observable qualities in bodies. For them, a “solid water” would be an entirely different 
thing than a liquid one. A potential cause of confusion is the fact that ‘water’ can be taken either as 
our ordinary observable water or as a metaphysical elementary water, and their relation in the 18
th
 
century chemical thinking is not clear.   
78
 Bird argues that this concedes to realism because it is an admission that modern science is capable 
of picking out “the same stuff” as people did in 1750. If ‘stuff’ is understood as all that exists in lakes 
and rivers; rains from the sky and comes from showers; is sold in bottles etc., as Kuhn seems to 
indicate, there is undoubtedly no problem with the equivalency, but that does not yet concede to 
realism of at least the essentialist kind that is often associated with the causal theory. In this case, the 
question is of the equivalency of samples, i.e. extension, which is determined by two different but co-
extensive descriptions. The real problem is to fix the reference to an essence, and that is what Kuhn 
denies can be done. “Stuff” needs to be understood as a universal or abstract substance and the 
determination of reference to that single property has to be possible. Kuhn had reasons to object to 
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sound like stating a triviality: of course H2O covers also ice and steam in addition to 
water, but not vice versa. However, this trivial observation has a far-reaching 
consequence. Before fleshing it out, it is worth noting that Kuhn is not interested in 
tinkering with the itself reasonable point that, except under special laboratory 
conditions, we can ever actually have liquid that is totally pure H2O. The point 
underlying Kuhn’s critical claim is: “But this modern description leads to a new 
network of difficulties, difficulties that may ultimately threaten the concept of natural 
kinds and that meanwhile must bar the automatic application of causal theory to 
them” (RSS, 82). Problems arise if we need more than one property to describe a 
natural kind. Kuhn writes that if only one single essential property is required by 
each natural kind, then the causal theory has promise because we may be able to 
establish the identity relation between a name and its reference via that property. 
This reminds us of the case with proper names. But when two properties are needed, 
such as liquidity and H2O denoted by their names, then each name of a property 
denotes a larger class than they do conjoined. Naming properties that limit the class 
becomes crucial:  
 
For if two properties are required, why not three or four? Are we not 
back to the standard set of problems that causal theory was intended 
to resolve: which properties are essential, which accidental; which 
properties belong to a kind by definition, which are only contingent? 
Has the transition to a developed scientific vocabulary really helped at 
all? I think it has not. (RSS, 82-3) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
these postulations, as I argue below. It is still another question that the description is constructed from 
a modern perspective with modern terminology, e.g. ‘H2O’ and ‘close-packed particles’. It is always 
possible to describe the past so that it shows a natural development to the present, both in and out of 
the history of science. (For instance, the time that Finland was a grand duchy of Russia, 1808-1917, 
can be seen, as it indeed has been sometimes seen, merely as preparation for independence). But that 
type of description is naturally not a genuine historical explanation because it does not give, for 
example, an account of the use of the term ‘water’ in 1750, which is surely odd from our perspective. 
It does not describe either how actual people determined their extension or reference. In regard to the 
theory of reference or extension, Kuhn is interested in a historically explanatory theory, and so a mere 
referral to the existence of essence is not such without permanent reduction to Whig-history that 
glorifies our present state of being and knowing. For more on this, see Chapter 7. 
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 What Kuhn really wants to say is that except perhaps in rare circumstances, 
we need to identify more than one property that an instance in a class must have in 
order to be a member of it. Kuhn thinks, as we have seen, that categories are formed 
by recognizing similarities and dissimilarities between instances. Samples of ‘water’ 
may be thought to be both H2O and liquid. Liquidity is needed to separate it, for 
example, from steam and ice. The most crucial further point, I believe, is that what 
properties we choose is not given or self-evident. We need to make some selection, 
i.e. pay attention to some features and ignore others. In other words, it is not given 
which properties should be regarded as essential and which as accidental. There is no 
“theory-independent way of distinguishing fundamental or important similarities 
from those that are superficial or unimportant”. (RSS, 205) Kuhn writes further: 
 
The so-called superficial properties are no less necessary than their 
apparently essential successors. To say that water is liquid H2O is to 
locate it within an elaborate lexical and theoretical system. … If water 
is liquid H2O, then these properties are necessary to it. If they were 
not realized in practice that would be a reason to doubt that water 
really was H2O. (RSS, 83)  
 
Kuhn is talking of necessity for categorising and usage in a certain theoretical 
system, not of physical necessity. In other words, so-called superficial properties 
have a necessary role to play in separating instances of kinds from each other and 
assigning expectations to substances.  
Furthermore, Kuhn says that new theories raise difficult questions of 
discrimination between objects, and superficial qualities are called upon. For 
example, one may ask whether deuterium is really hydrogen, or if viruses are alive. 
We are asking here how to draw “boundary lines that delimit referents of ‘water, 
‘living things’ etc.” And this questions the notion of natural kind, because the notion 
relies on the premise that an essence of an individual of a kind can be determined. To 
Kuhn, defining a kind normally requires taking several chosen properties into 
account. Kuhn reminds us of a case of a biological species that reveals a special 
difficulty. That is, even individuals who unproblematically belong to a species do not 
have the same set of genes. Do we not need also “superficial criteria”, such as the 
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ability to breed, to make clear criteria that set boundaries between specimens? (RSS, 
84)   
 However, Bird makes a reasonable remark that we may need not claim as 
much as Kuhn implies. That is, we do not need to draw the conclusion from 
Putnam’s story that water and H2O are identical. The necessary moral of Putnam’s 
story is only that “in all possible worlds water consists (largely) of H2O; nothing 
compels us to think the reverse, that every occurrence of H2O is an instance of 
water” (Bird 2000, 183). Bird is right. We need only think “one way”, i.e. from 
‘water’ to the world. And from our modern perspective, we would say that all 
samples of water (ignoring impurities) are made of H2O. This is true, but is it enough 
to fix the extension of ‘water’? Clearly that information is not helpful when thinking 
about the original naming ceremony. It might be helpful if we have already 
succeeded in forming the category ‘water’. But the problem is how to make that 
category? It seems that in doing this we need to specify some further qualities, such 
as liquidity. Moreover, crucially, we cannot later give up those properties as 
classification criteria, or at least not without replacing it by a description with the 
equivalent function in a lexical network. This can be seen if you consider the 
following situation. We may say that ‘water consists of H2O’, but also that ‘steam 
consists of H2O’, and further that ‘ice consists of H2O’. If this is all the information 
we have, we are left to wonder what on earth the difference between these is. Why 
do we have three terms instead of one? And so we are back to the situation of trying 
to separate and specify them further. This point becomes all the more potent when 
we remember, as already stated, that the causal theory is a thesis of words, not a 
metaphysical thesis of essences. ‘Water’, ‘steam’ and ‘ice’ are all ordinary words, 
and the difference of their use requires an explanation, even if they have a shared 
essence. Of course we can stretch the boundaries of language, but to me it seems 
rather difficult to deny that the use of these terms are inherently related to a 
distinction between liquid, gaseous and solid substances. We need to make a 
difference by naming some properties that the samples in each category have. We 
may use such properties as liquid, gaseous and solid in this task; perhaps we may 
also use some others, such as boiling and freezing points, optical wavelengths and so 
on. The fundamental point is that it is always we people, in and outside of science, 
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who decide criteria that are used to put objects in categories, and we almost always 
need to use more than one property to establish an appropriate difference to other 
categories: “categories are interdefined” (RSS, 30).   
 The question is not that something is water only if it has the surface 
properties of water, or that water can be defined in terms of surface properties alone 
– these being the claims that Bird attributes to Read and Sharrock (Bird 2004a, 77-8). 
Bird says, morever, that that is exactly the idea that Putnam’s and Kripke’s causal 
theory tried to undermine. Firstly, Kuhn did not talk of definitions in the classical 
mode, i.e. definitions by necessary and sufficient conditions (“if and only if”), but his 
definitions, if they can be called such, were the family resemblance type. The crucial 
function of the family resemblance definition is the separation of instances of 
different kinds, not the postulation of the set with exactly certain features. More 
importantly, Kuhn’s assertion is that there is no self-evident distinction between 
essential and accidental properties; that is why they are all needed. Bird sees also that 
Kuhn was leaning towards the causal theory at one point, but then made “the wrong 
turning” towards an emphasis on incommensurability (Bird 2004a). However, I do 
not detect a change of mind in this respect. We have seen that Kuhn appreciated the 
application of the causal theory to proper names but not to general terms. This is a 
position that stayed constant. In the context that prompted the above interpretation by 
Bird, Kuhn says, “In the process I attack the often implict assumption that anyone 
who knows how to use a basic term correctly has access, conscious or unconscious, 
to a set of criteria which define that term or provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions governing its application” (Kuhn 1977b, 302; note 11). Kuhn also talks of  
“direct attachment” to nature. That may sound as if he were giving support to the 
causal theory, but I do not think this is the case. It is true that he thought that the 
mind is directly, without mediating description, connected to nature. That is why he 
wrote of the mental module that automatically does the organising of received 
information. Yet, his target of criticism is the concept as defined by necessary and 
sufficient conditions that picks out instances by fulfillment of those conditions. 
According to Kuhn, the application of concepts relies rather on the ability to 
recognise similarities and dissimilarities between objects. Although the idea of direct 
connection is similar to what the causal theory implies, Kuhn’s thinking hardly lends 
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support to the causal theory as a general theory of reference determination simply 
because Kuhn denied that there are natural kinds in the sense that the causal theory 




 Kuhn’s claim that there is no obvious way to decide between essential and 
accidental properties can be also supported by Shapere’s argumentation. First of all, 
Shapere makes an insightful remark that the notion of essential is unpleasantly 
obscure. There are properties that a substance may possess, which are, nonetheless, 
not counted as essential. More importantly, an essential property does not appear to 
be necessarily a fundamental one. For example, being an element of atomic number 
79 is not a fundamental property of gold, at least in terms of quantum mechanics. 
(Shapere 1982, 4-5) Shapere turns Putnam’s and Kripke’s science fiction stories 
against their conclusions. According to Shapere, it would be unscientific if a scientist 
takes a substance to be essentially something because that prevents any changes, 
even if a change were reasonable on empirical grounds. He says that if there is a 
substance that is in all other respects like gold, except for the fact that it is not an 
element of atomic number 79, scientists would rather ask “Why is gold in this region 
not an element of atomic number 79?”, than exclude that item out of hand as being 
gold. The same applies to Putnam’s water example. It would be an unreasonable 
apriorism to exclude anything that does not have a chosen essence. Shapere thinks 
like Kuhn:  
 
it is not just one property or set of properties – the “essential” ones – 
that determines or affects how scientists will apply terms in new 
situations; all the (true) properties may … play a role, and 
furthermore, the properties and behaviour of other entities (substances 
etc.) may also play a role. (Shapere 1982, 7)  
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 The fact that extension is determined also by contrasts, i.e. by differences from other objects, in 
addition to similarities of objects in the same category, places Kuhn interestingly somewhere between 
the English analytic and the continental tradition. Although extension in Kuhn’s theory is determined 
by objects, unlike Saussure’s structuralism where the important relationship is the one between 
symbols, Kuhn in analogy to Saussure and other structuralists emphasises the importance of 
differential relations to other objects in the system.  
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What is more, Shapere holds that a reasonable attitude in science is to try to find 
relationships and differences between substances, use them as bases for 
classification, shape the vocabulary in the light of these relationships and differences, 
and refuse to make any kind of a priori commitment to a philosophical view 
(Shapere 1982, 10).  
 One more issue still needs to be mentioned here. In the second chapter I 
briefly introduced the so-called qua problem. This is the problem that ostension is 
not enough to fix reference because we need also to specify what exactly is referred 
to. The connection of the qua-problem to Kuhn’s idea of kind determination is clear. 
Kuhn’s point was that, in order to specify a kind, we need to pick out several 
properties that determine that kind
80
. Sterelny points out that an object can be a 
member of many kinds, and in ostension we should somehow specify what kind is 
ostended. Sterelny asks us to suppose that we go to Mars and come across a catlike 
animal. We introduce a term ‘schmat’, and so schmats are animals that bear a certain 
relationship to this individual schmat. But we still do not know what that relationship 
is. There can be many possible relationships, because schmat may be a member of 
many kinds: physical object, animate object, animate object of a certain biochemical 
kind, animate object with certain structural properties, schmats, schmats of a certain 
sex, schmats of certain maturational state etc. Ostension does not specify the kind in 
question. Sterelny mentions, and simultaneously rejects, the possibility that we might 
appeal to descriptive vocabulary or to the “schmat theory”. That is because the 
descriptive vocabulary is made of other kinds, and we have the same problem of 
specifying extension with them. Sterelny adds that calling this holism (rather than 
circularity) is unhelpful. (Sterelny 1983, 120-1; see also Sankey 1997, 8; 2000, 133-
4).  
Nevertheless, Kuhn chose the descriptive way. He would have given a 
description of ‘schmat’ by some properties that form a similarity class that is in 
contrast to other kinds, perhaps ‘sdogs’ and ‘stigers’, for example. Sterelny goes the 
other way and defends the causal theory, and together with so many other 
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 Note, as should be clear from the previous chapter, that the bundle of properties is not identical to a 
kind. A set of things may be identified by several different “bundles”.  
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philosophers, “solves” the problem by positing the existence of the shared structure, 
in this case the shared genetic structure that determines the extension of ‘schmat’. Or 
more precisely: “ ‘Schmat’ applies to all animals that have a structure that is the 
same as that in the paradigm schmat responsible for the causal powers associated 
with the exemplar.”(Sterelny 1983, 121) And, according to Sterelny, the same form 
of argument in terms of the atomic structure applies to kind terms like ‘gold’ and 
‘platinum’.  
Thus, Sterelny addresses basically the same problem of how to define a kind 
category indicating the inadequacy of the original causal theory, although he ends 
with the opposite conclusion to Kuhn. Criticism from a Kuhnian point of view at this 
stage is that Sterelny’s idea is not enough to define a kind category because of the 
problems in picking out a singular essence. Sterelny still needs his “schmat theory”, 
or more generally, a descriptive vocabulary in this task. Kuhn’s solution is such a 
holistic one that Sterelny rejects because he uses descriptive vocabulary in defining 
extension. Extensions of kinds are mutually limited, but this does not make it 
necessarily dysfunctional. The worry is that extension(s) cannot be limited because 
they rely on each other. As we will see below, Andersen has tried to overcome the 
so-called problem of wide-open texture by referring to the dissimilarity relation 
between instances of contrasting concepts. The idea is that an extension may be 
limited via a feature that excludes an instance of the closely related concept. In the 
same way we are able to answer Sterelny’s critique. Sets can thus actually restrict 
each other without shared essences. I return to this theory at the end of the chapter. 
  We can see here that Kuhn’s criticism of the causal theory is more serious 
than is commonly assumed. The point is, on the most general level, that without 
some description it is impossible to recognise objects as exemplars of kinds. This 
criticism is now widely accepted, as was shown at the end of Chapter 2. Furthermore, 
reference determination cannot be carried out by people themselves straight to a 
natural kind or an essence. Scientists in the past did not know essences and it is not 
certain that we know them now. In Kuhn’s theory, extension is determined by 
features that can be accessed by historical subjects. If we start describing kinds, we 
need to pick out several properties that together establish a kind category and that 
stand in contrast to other kind categories. Moreover, it is not obvious what properties 
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should count as essential and what as accidental. A referentialist would, as a 
semantical externalist, probably insist that it is does not matter whether people have 
direct access because nature, or more specifically, natural kinds themselves do the 
determination of reference of our terms for us. Of course that may be so, but we do 
not know
81
. It is important to notice that this strategy makes the argument reliant on 
the belief that there are natural kinds, categories of objects with the shared essence, 
which transforms the dispute metaphysically. The question is whether there are such 
entities. Finally, Kuhn’s emphasis on the several features needed for extension 
determination does bring in through the back door his theory of categorising by a 
network of similarities and dissimilarities.   
 
Universals and natural kinds  
 
We now come to the stage that is possibly one of the most important in Kuhn’s entire 
philosophy. Besides the above argument that several properties without a clear 
distinction between essential and accidental properties not only specify but also 
determine a kind at large, which contradicts the requirement of the causal theory, 
there is a further disagreement that is metaphysical by its nature. The notion of 
natural kind implies that all individuals of a certain kind are related by the fact that 
they share the same essence. As a consequence, the essence is not something that, by 
already being a property, belongs to any individual, but is instead a universal in 
which all instances of the same kind participate or which they share in. The essential 
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 Preston points out that the Putnam-Kripke view involves semantic scepticism (Preston 2004, 330). I 
believe that what he means is that it is odd to think that we have a theory of meaning, according to 
which meaning is reference, while also maintaining that we may not be able to tell the reference. Bird 
objects to this, saying, he prefers to call the view semantic fallibilism, that we do not need to be 
personally acquainted with, for example, Ronald Reagan in order to know the reference of ‘Ronald 
Reagan’. Bird continues that, similarly, one may know the extension of ‘water’ without knowing the 
microstructure of water (Bird 2004c, 340-1). I agree, but this counts as a shift in the argument. The 
Putnam-Kripke claim is that the reference of ‘water’ is H2O, not that the extension of water is 
everything similar to this or that droplet. The latter is a Kuhnian statement. I do not understand how 
we could know that the reference of water is H2O without being aware that there exists such a 
structure. I think it is clear that in 1750 knowing the microstructure was not possible for the reason 
that chemistry had not developed enough. Do we have to conclude that they did not know the 
meaning/reference of their terms? Are we sure we know them? 
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property underlying a natural kind is thus a universal. The causal theory postulates 
continuity and comparability via this universal property. Even though beliefs change, 
terms continue to refer to the same substance that defines a natural kind. And when 
we know that terms in different theories refer to the same substance, we can compare 
what is claimed of it. Now I wish to argue that Kuhn was an anti-realist in regard of 
universals as mind independent entities. He never made an explicit argument for it, 
but it is clear from the context that universals do not have any use in Kuhn’s 
philosophy. After the elaboration of Kuhn’s conceptual anti-realism, I discuss how 
feasible Kuhn’s theory of the functioning of the scientific classification terms is.   
At the beginning of the chapter I suggested that Kuhn’s focus in respect of 
theory change was on individuals and sets of individuals. He wrote of individual 
astronomical bodies that form natural families differently before and after 
Copernicus, of samples of water classified by several features, of swans, geese and 
ducks making natural families, and so on. We saw how he was concerned that the 
establishment of reference to a natural kind required exposure to “varied members of 
that kind but also to members of others – to individuals”. There is an associated 
theoretical distinction to be drawn that helps us to see what is at stake. Although 
quite often ‘extension’ and ‘reference’ are used synonymously, they should not be 
taken as synonymous: reference is about a universal property, but extension is about 
things and sets of things
82
. For example, the term ‘red’ may be said to refer to the 
property redness, but to have as its extension the set of all red things. Alternatively, 
in regard of general terms, reference is taken to universal substances, while extension 
stays on the level of individual things and sets composed of individuals.
83
 In the case 
of proper names, there is naturally no difference between extension and reference. 
The reference of ‘George W. Bush’ is George W. Bush, and the extension of ‘George 
W. Bush’ includes one individual, George W. Bush. As Kuhn argued, there is a big 
difference in this respect between proper names and natural kind terms. We may 
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 Cf., for example, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, “Intension”, page 439.  
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 Of course, it is possible to hypothesise that, for instance, horses in the extension of ‘horse’ share the 
property of being a horse, and hence, the reference of horse can be fixed to such an existing abstract 
property.  In this way, extension and reference would become nearly identical. Yet, the notion of 
extension does not imply such an assumption and does not by itself yield such a metaphysical 
stipulation.  
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trace the lifelines of the names of individual planets, but our job is more complicated 
if we try to do the same with the general name ‘planet’ or ‘water’. Reference requires 
a singular substance, an abstract entity or a universal property. So the crucial 
question for the causal theory is whether there are such universals that are 
instantiated by particulars and that form a natural kind category.   
When Kuhn wrote of theoretical changes, he was, thus, interested in how sets 
of individuals changed. Furthermore, he inquired what criteria were used to 
determine the set. He did not make an assumption like Putnam, Kripke and others 
that there is a natural kind with an essence, i.e. a universal property to which 
reference is determined by ostension of a sample of that kind. Sometimes Kuhn 
talked about ‘reference’, but by paying attention to the context it is clear that he 
usually meant what philosophers mean by ‘extension’, or then he had been talking 
about a reference to an individual. The only philosopher in the Kuhn commentary 
that recognises this important difference is Bird. He writes that when Kuhn talks 
about the referential change of ‘planet’, he actually means that the set of things in the 
extension of ‘planet’ has changed. According to Bird, we may think some terms such 
as ‘gold’ have both extension and reference. They are respectively all things made of 
gold and “the substance gold, perhaps best thought of as the single entity, the natural 
kind gold” (Bird 2000, 160). ‘Planet’ would not have a reference in this sense unless 
we think there is some property of being a planet.  
Bird’s stipulations make sense philosophically but the curious conclusion that 
Bird draws is that it is not even obvious that there has been a shift in extension. What 
has changed, Bird says, is merely what people believed to be the extension
84
. From 
this perspective, people once called the Sun a planet but do not do so any more 
because they had the wrong belief that the Sun behaved like Mars, Venus, etc. in 
having a large orbit about the centre of the local system. And so, “if the Sun is not in 
the extension of ‘planet’ now, it never was. People can be mistaken about the 
extensions just as they can be about references.” (Bird 2000, 161) I think this a bold 
view both historically and metaphysically, i.e. of a description of the history of 
science and in terms of our capability of knowing the truth as moderns. I will discuss 
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this issue and find out Bird’s and others’ grounding for this type of view in Chapter 
7. It is enough to say now that I think this distorts what I believe is the Kuhnian 
view, both metaphysically and historically. From the Kuhnian perspective, when 
describing history and assessing the relation of the present state of scientific 
knowledge to that of the past, it is important to take into account the epistemological 
question of whether we are capable of attaining knowledge in the proper 
philosophical sense. I will draft a full response from this point of view in the 
penultimate chapter of the thesis.  
The distinction between extension and reference is, nevertherless, crucial for 
understanding where Kuhn stands. My argument is that the dispute between those 
that advocate a straight referential solution, such as Putnam and Kripke and their 
followers, and Kuhn, comes down to the question of the existence of universals. And 
this dispute is, in other words, an argument between realism and anti-realism in 
respect of universals. Omitting any difficulties in determining what an essential 
property of an object is in each case, Kuhn’s scepticism regarding the existence of 
universals explains why he could not advocate causal theories on kind terms or 
common nouns. If there are no universal properties on which to fix reference, then 
there is no referential continuity, and nor is there referential comparability. What we  
can still compare in this situation are sets of individuals, although that was not 
Kuhn’s cure for incomparability either.   
Ian Hacking has noticed Kuhn’s conceptual anti-realism and suggested a 
nominalistic solution personally to Kuhn. I think he rightly raised the question of 
where Kuhn stands on the dividing line between realism and nominalism. Let us, 
therefore, have a look at their exchange. Hacking’s starting point is the tension in 
Kuhn’s claim that “though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the 
scientists afterward work in a different world … I am convinced that we must learn 
to make sense of statements that at least resemble these” (SSR, 121). Hacking tries to 
interpret positively the idea that after paradigm change scientists are living and 
working in a different world. He constructs a nominalist solution to the new world 
problem. The fundamental idea of nominalism is, according to Hacking, that there 
                                                                                                                                          
84
 Donellan, for example, appears to share the view (see Donellan 1983, 87).  
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are individuals in the world, but over and above the individuals, there are not any 
sets, kinds, universals or classes. His solution is that Kuhn’s world that does not 
change is a world of individuals, and the world that changes is the world of kinds of 
things, which is the world in which scientists work and live. That changes because 
science needs description for its various tasks of interaction, prediction and 
explanation. Description, in turn, requires classification, i.e. the grouping of 
individuals into kinds. (Hacking 1995, 277)  
Hacking urges Kuhn to drop talking of natural kinds. As we have seen, Kuhn  
feels that the notion of natural kind is not well-grounded. Hacking correctly observes 
that ‘natural kind’ is not supposed to mean simply something found in nature, but 
most often it is also associated with a more cosmic sense. Philosophers who argue for 
the existence of natural kinds tend to speak of the “inner constitution of nature”. 
Their conviction appears to be that the world must have cosmic kinds, or as stated in 
Plato’s metaphor, it must have joints. This can be seen, for example, in selection of 
examples of natural kinds. Phosphorous and electricity are thought to be natural 
kinds. More “mundane kinds”, such as water, tiger, lemon and heat are also often 
mentioned, although not mud or dung. Yet even in mundane cases, natural kinds are 
supposed to pick out more cosmical kinds, such H2O, the chromosomical structure of 
tigers, and the motion of molecules. I previously called Putnam’s view of causal 
theory of reference essentialist because Putnam believes that we can fix a reference 
via a sample to a natural kind that is characterised by the essence shared by all 
samples of that kind. Hacking’s recommendation is to use the notion of ‘scientific 
kind’ to mean simply that a scientific term is used chiefly in some branch of science. 
Hacking would mainly include terms from more mature science as scientific kinds, 
but also such terms from common language that have a role in the special field in 
question. Most importantly, a scientific kind is scientific because of human 
aspirations and interests. (Hacking 1995, 290-2) 
Bird (2003b) has recently endorsed Hacking’s interpretation of Kuhn as a 
kind of nominalist. However, Bird differs from Hacking because he makes Kuhn a 
nominalist in an epistemological, not a metaphysical sense. That is, Kuhn, in this 
view, subscribed to the thesis that, although universals exist, we cannot come to 
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know of them (Bird 2003b, 692-3). I do agree with both of them that Kuhn opposed 
conceptual realism. Yet, like Hacking, I take Kuhn’s position to be metaphysical. 
Unlike both of them, I do not think Kuhn ought to be described as a nominalist. In 
order to understand why, let us first see how Kuhn responds to Hacking.   
In his response to Hacking, Kuhn says that he took “immense pleasure” in 
Hacking’s paper. However, he introduces three points of disagreement. One is that he 
still hopes to be talking of meaning with respect to kind terms. We have already 
extensively studied Kuhn’s meaning theorising, and this comment does not cause 
much concern because it may be merely a terminological difference. One wants to 
call something ‘meaning’, the other does not. What is crucial here is whether the 
metaphysical views are compatible or not. More interestingly, Kuhn thinks that 
Hacking’s ‘scientific kind’ is not an appropriate term because what is required is a 
characterisation of kinds and kind-terms in general. Kuhn makes a reference to his 
idea of mental module that would make it possible to recognise physical objects, 
kinds of furniture, of government, of personality and so on. Furthermore, in the book 
he was planning at the time, which never appeared, Kuhn intended to suggest that 
characteristics of kinds are “traces to, and on from, the evolution of neural 
mechanisms for reidentifying what Aristotle called ‘substances’: things that, between 
their origin and demise, trace a lifeline through space over time” (RSS, 229).  
It appears that there is both a point of agreement and disagreement here 
between Kuhn and Hacking. To start with the agreement, Kuhn’s kinds are, to be 
sure, more general than Hacking’s scientific kinds, but I do not think that this is a 
reason to discount the nominalistic solution. Neither of these philosophers is a realist 
in relation to natural kinds in the Putnam-Kripke fashion. For example, Kuhn would 
probably accept Nelson Goodman’s notion of relevant kind that includes both natural 
and artificial kinds and the idea of habituality of kind categories in contrast to 
absolute or psychological priority. And Nelson Goodman is a nominalist, just as 
Hacking is. The only reason that Hacking does adopt the term ‘scientific kind’ is that 
he thinks that Kuhn is interested only in kind terms in science. Now we see that 
Kuhn’s aim is much wider. Yet, we can discern the proper point of disagreement as 
well. Kuhn clearly wants to include something other than individuals in his universe. 
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That is why he writes of ‘substances’ or kinds in general that give continuity. This 
indicates that Kuhn is not a full-blooded, or perhaps extreme nominalist, who thinks 
that objects called by the same name have nothing in common, except that they are 
called by the same name. 
The third point of disagreement brought forward by Kuhn looks even more 
troubling. Given that he has numerous reasons to oppose Hacking’s nominalism, 
Kuhn tells us of only one. Kuhn wonders how the references of terms like ‘force’, 
‘wave front’ or ‘personality’ can be constructed as individuals. Kuhn says that he 
needs a notion of ‘kinds’ that will populate the world as well as divide up the pre-
existing population. Does he want, then, to subscribe to the view that there are 
universal substances after all? Nothing that Kuhn says in this context or elsewhere 
indicates that; quite the contrary, as we have seen. I think it is clear that Kuhn would 
agree with Hacking that kinds do not exist as such, as being independent of our 
minds. He does not approve of the Putnam-Kripke doctrine that the essence of 
samples of kinds defines what kinds they are. But it is also evident that Kuhn is not a 
nominalist in the sense that kinds are just names. 
85
 
It is important to take into account Kuhn’s craving for something abstract that 
exists and underlies the naming of objects. As we recall, Kuhn was committed to the 
existence of concepts as mental beings that were formed by observing similarities 
and dissimilarities between individual objects. This suggests that Kuhn might be 
called a conceptualist; conceptualism says that universals exist but only as concepts 
in the minds of people. Put another way, it may be understood as the doctrine that 
individuals are real, but universal concepts that classify them are creations of the 
mind. They are categories that people make in order to recognise and order things in 
nature. In contrast, I find no justification for the view that Kuhn thought that 
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 In relation to the debate on nominalism, it is interesting to note that J. R. Bambrough thinks that 
Wittgenstein with his notion of family resemblance managed to solve the problem of universals.  
According to Bambrough, a nominalist claims, for instance, that games have nothing else in common 
except that they are called games, while a realist thinks that they have something in common, other 
than that they are games. Wittgenstein said, in turn, that games have nothing in common except that 
they are games. That is, Wittgenstein denied the joint claim of the nominalist and the realist that there 
cannot be an objective justification for the application of the word ‘game’ unless there is an element 
that is common to all games, or a common relation that all games bear to something that is not a 
game. Games are, thus, related by a network of overlapping features; the family resemblance makes 
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universals exist as mind-independent entities but that we are not able to tell which 
they are, i.e. epistemological nominalism. Nowhere do we find speculation on 
difficulties with getting to know real universals. The situation is rather that concepts 
constructed by humans do play the role of universals. Taken strictly, Kuhn was then, 
not an anti-realist in regard of universals as such, because they exist as mental 
entities. Yet he may be said to be one, because universals do not exist as mind 
independent. From that point of view, then, Kuhn's emphasis on the existence of 
conceptual schemes earlier, and mental modules later, starts to make sense. They are 
attempts to characterise those entities that do the organising. It is, though, noteworthy 
that Kuhn’s earlier quotation of Aristotle’s substances and neural mechanism 
indicates that his conceptualism concerns very fundamental neural structure that 
makes concept forming and the ordering of objects possible, akin to cognitive 
science.  
The fact that Kuhn refers to David Wiggins’s book Sameness and Substance 
in the context of the third counter-argument to Hacking is not without significance 
either.
86
 After all, Wiggins is a self-confessed conceptualist, although a realist as 
such. His “conceptual realism” is the claim that “in order to single out these things 
(horses, leaves, sun and stars), we have to deploy upon experience a conceptual 
scheme which has itself fashioned or formed in such a way as to make possible to 
single them out” (Wiggins 1980, 139). However, Kuhn’s reference makes one 
wonder how carefully Kuhn had read Wiggins’s book, and how far he would commit 
himself to Wiggins’s position. That is because Wiggins was also “ an essentialist” 
and his form of conceptualism appears to lean strongly towards realism of an 
essentialist kind. Wiggins thinks that there is physical necessity. Once a thing has 
been conceptualised and determined that it is a member of a natural kind, a thing is 
necessarily of the kind it is. For example, once it is found out that Julius Caser is a 
man, he is necessarily a man, i.e. has necessarily the certain inner constitution that 
                                                                                                                                          
them games. (Bambrough 1970) What makes this suggestion interesting is Kuhn’s commitment to 
Wittgenstein’s family resemblance notion.  
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 After invoking the idea of Aristotle’s substances as things that trace lifelines through space and 
time, Kuhn says in the footnote: “As this sentence suggests, a significant role in the recent 
development of my ideas has been played by David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance.” (RSS, 229; 
footnote 6) 
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men have. Natural kinds are defined by their extension and deictic-nomological 
grounding in the Leibniz-Putnam-Kripke fashion that determines the law-like 
behaviour of things. Wiggins also denies the possibility that the same object could 
have been conceptualised differently (Wiggins 1980, 101). In Wiggins’s 
conceptualism there thus appears to be very little freedom for conceptualisation. 
Conceptualisation is more likely just a tool, a mediating method, for organizing 
things that themselves are necessarily what they are, and therefore, their categories 
are also necessarily what they are.
87
  
There is hardly anything in Kuhn’s writings that indicate that he could accept 
the above view, albeit with the exception of the main idea of conceptualism. Kuhn 
clearly allows more freedom to conceptualise things than Wiggins does. If we think, 
as Kuhn says, that objects are classified by their perceived similarities and 
differences that are not given, then a change in the similarity relations may prompt a 
change in conceptualisation. Consequently, one central feature of scientific 
revolutions is precisely that objects are reclassified. The sun was once conceptualised 
as a planet, but is now seen as a star. Water was categorised as an indecomposable 
element; now it is seen as a combination of two more elementary substances that can 
appear in several forms. Further, Kuhn writes: “the transition from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian mechanics illustrates with particular clarity the scientific revolution as a 
displacement of the conceptual network through which scientists view the world” 
(SSR, 102). Scientific revolutions can be described more generally as changes in 
scientific categorisations:  
 
What characterizes scientific revolutions is, thus, change in several of 
the taxonomic categories prerequisite to scientific descriptions and 
generalizations. That change, furthermore, is an adjustment not only 
of criteria relevant to categorization, but also of the way in which 
given objects and situations are distributed among pre-existing 
categories. (RSS, 30)   
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 Wiggins rewrote his book, which resulted in Sameness and Substance Renewed, published in 2001. 
In that treatise Wiggins intends to “correct all the things in the 1980 version that I know to be plain 
wrong” (ix). Since my interest is in what Kuhn took on board from Wiggins’s earlier book, there is no 
need to consider what were the issues that needed to be corrected.  
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Interestingly, perhaps Hacking manages to capture some of Kuhn’s theoretical 
insight in a paper that was published more than ten years after their original 
exchange of ideas (Hacking 2001). In the article, Hacking seeks for a contact point 
between Aristotle and cognitive science. According to Hacking, although Aristotle’s 
categories were initially meant to be more fundamental and metaphysical than those 
of cognitive scientists, the idea of module in the conceptual realm, and the reference 
to domain specific knowledge about several categories, come very close to the list of 
categories by Aristotle. Naturally, Kuhn’s point was to grasp historically conditioned 
categories that structure our ideas about the world.  
Finally, it can be admitted that Kuhn’s theory - that objects are classified by 
their resemblance and difference - is not so different from the so-called resemblance 
nominalism, according to which certain individuals are called by the same name 
because they resemble each other. The difference is that that process in Kuhn’s 
theory results in abstracted concepts that serve the function of classification. 
Therefore, Kuhn’s conceptualism could also be described as a conglomeration of two 
types of nominalisms, as classified by Armstrong. It has both a feature of concept 
nominalism because concepts do the job of realists’ universals, and of resemblance 
nominalism because similarities are called upon to explain how conceptual 
categories and naming come about (see Armstrong 1978, Ch. 2). Further, if we think 
about Kuhn’s answer to Hacking from this perspective, we may understand it better. 
Kuhn wants a notion that is not merely tied to the existence of individuals. The fact 
that some kind terms are noncountable, such as ‘force’, makes it difficult to conceive 
of them as individuals. Extreme nominalism is limited because of its concern for 
individuals and their names. Many kinds of which existence as individuals is at least 
questionable seem nevertheless to play a role in our thinking. The Kuhnian idea of 
mental module can accommodate such kinds as concepts, whether their extension is 
empty or not, i.e. whether they have any real individuals in their extension or not. 
Thus there is no need for essence or universal substance, even if one thinks that 
universals exists. They are real, but only in minds as concepts; moreover, they are 
liable to change, making it impossible to have them as permanent reference points 
for comparison.  
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Kuhn’s conceptualism defended  
 
The explication of Kuhn’s metaphysical position above is naturally a totally different 
question from the evaluation of viability of his view. Before dealing briefly with the 
question of how feasible Kuhn’s conceptualism is, I need to pre-empt criticism of the 
idea of conceptual scheme from the Davidsonian perspective. Davidson’s argument 
in his “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” is that the idea of conceptual 
scheme is self-defeating. This is because it is supposed to be impossible to provide a 
description of the reality from a perspective of a scheme that is incommensurable 
with another scheme, and yet the advocates of conceptual scheme are able to 
describe incommensurable conceptual schemes in the past.  
 There is potentially much to say about that argument. It is enough here to 
outline a case against it to show adequately enough that Davidson’s argument is 
outdated and does not work at least against Kuhn’s more developed position. The 
first thing to remind a reader is that Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability changed over 
the years. Therefore, when talking about incommensurability, we need to be sensitive 
to the different senses of incommensurability. His later understanding of 
incommensurability as localised translation failure between the terms of two 
taxonomies is clearly different and more limited from his earlier characterisation of 
incommensurability as methodological, observational, and conceptual disparity 
between paradigms. In regard to Kuhn’s later position, Davidson’s construction is a 
straw man. Let us see in what ways this is the case.  
 The answer that Kuhn, and also Feyerabend (e.g. RSS, 203-4; Feyerabend 
1996, 265-273) gave to the critics of conceptual scheme on the above Davidsonian 
ground was that the impossibility of translation that makes theories incommensurable 
does not imply the impossibility of understanding them. One can, metaphorically 
speaking, learn another language and become bilingual. A bilingual person may 
understand two languages and speak them fluently but not be able to give perfect 
translations. Yet it is possible to try to give an approximate description of “the other 
world”. In fact, this must be something that a historian or an anthropologist studying 
a culture distant from ours, either in time or place, is doing. Perhaps a more 
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interesting point to notice is that later Kuhn’s conceptual schemes are not as global 
as Davidson implies
88
. It is not that there is one scheme per culture that forms the 
conception of reality. Kuhn’s later conceptual schemes, or mental modules, are more 
mundane and more local; they are in plural. Nothing that Kuhn says in his later 
writing prevents a person from having several schemes, perhaps not for the same 
field or task, but for different tasks of conceptualisation. A consequence of this is 
that untranslatability is not global and total, but is local and partial, and there may be 
an overlap in many areas, even if somewhere else we are confronted with 
untranslatability. Davidson himself accepts the possibility of partial untranslatability. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the last chapter, Davidson’s and others’ talk of 
conceptual scheme is very abstract and undifferentiated. We have seen that cognitive 
science has more to say on it that removes the mystery from the idea of conceptual 
scheme. In fact, it makes it an empirically supported natural entity. Finally, 
untranslatability, i.e. untranslatability of intension, sense, or so on, may not be as big 
a problem as has been thought. Although not endorsed in this thesis, the main 
message of referential solutions with regard to incommensurability is precisely that 
reference or extension is enough for comparison, even in the absence of an 
intensional translation.   
 Discussion on the feasibility of natural kind concept is important because the 
success of the Putnam-Kripke type of causal theory relies on it. The question whether 
there are natural kinds is, of course, metaphysical. We just do not know whether 
nature has such discoverable joints. A realist of an essentialist persuasion has a belief 
that there are such, and the above mentioned problems are unlikely to persuade 
him/her of a contrary view. Many philosophers keep explaining progress in the 
history of science on the basis of natural kind concepts; they say that scientists in the 
past were referring to and talking of the same kinds as we do, but with less precision. 
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 Note that Davidson’s characterisation fares better with Quine’s understanding of conceptual 
schemes. Quine frequently writes about conceptual schemes in the singular. He talks about “our adult 
conceptual scheme” (Quine 1969, 8), “my sort of conceptual scheme” (Quine 1969, 5), “our current 
conceptual scheme” (Quine 1969, 23; 24), “the conceptual scheme of science” (Quine 1964, 44) etc. 
Quine, thus, supposes that a person, a community, or a culture has only one scheme. He refers, for 
instance, to schemes that individuate abstract objects, and refers to the “object-oriented scheme” 
(Quine 1969, 24). 
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In any case, I think it is evident that we need kinds in science and beyond science. If 
kinds - social, natural, or “relevant” - are simply understood as sets or classes in the 
fashion of Quine, or as concepts, they seem to be indispensable. It is another question 
whether such kinds can and do share an essence. I am not trying to settle the issue of 
the existence of natural kinds, but I am merely suggesting that we let empirical facts 
have more influence on the position we should adopt. That is, we could try an 
inference to the best explanation: if sciences are discovering “the joints of nature”, 
then supposedly scientists in the course of time are able to agree on the 
representations of the world, and as a consequence, the systems stabilise and finally 
become fixed. From the stabilisation of the representations of the world we might 
infer that the best explanation is that there are something like natural kinds.
89
 In other 
words, if theories converge and stabilise with a certain classification, then the idea 
that there are joints that science is discovering is a plausible option. Then, of course, 
we should also decide whether there is one ultimate all-inclusive categorisation in 
science or several separate categorisations in different fields of science. Resolving 
that question depends on whether reduction between sciences is possible, which itself 
is quite a challenging philosophical task. But it is equally important to realise and 
accept that reasoning to the best explanation may produce the contrary result: if 
sciences and their systems of classification become more pluralistic, we have reason 
to become more sceptical of the existence of a privileged system of natural kinds. 
Ultimately I am thus suggesting that we let the history of science have more 
influence on our judgment. This is the theme that will be dealt with more in Chapter 
7. 
 However, I wish to make a stronger claim for Kuhn’s project of kinds: it is 
more warranted than its essentialist rival. There is something that both a realist and a 
conceptualist agree upon. It is arguably unobjectionable that we encounter individual 
objects of which some are more similar to each other than others. On the basis of 
their similarity we conceptualise them in kinds. To say, in addition, that some of 
these resulting classes share an essence, and that there is a universal that explains 
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their classification as kinds, goes much further, however. I think that Kuhn’s 
suggested route is something that we have to start with. After that we may see, in the 
light of the history of science and of other empirical evidence, whether essentialism 
is a feasible position and ‘essences’ needed for explanatory purposes. This is a 
strategy that reminds us of Ockham’s razor: entities should not be multiplied beyond 
necessity. The acceptance of concept to do the job of universals does not inflate our 
universe as we accept mental entities, such as ideas or thoughts, anyway. Moreover, 
in Kuhn’s theory, concepts are something that emerge from the empirical realm. 
More generally, Kuhn can be taken as emphasising the role of empirical 
evidence in deciding what type of philosophical view to take. Now, aside from the 
metaphysical divergence in assumptions between Kuhn and the causal theorists, 
Kuhn allows determination of reference to essences if that kind of view is compatible 
with empirical knowledge. I do not agree with Bird, for example, that Kuhn’s 
rejection of the causal theory is his wrong turning in the sense that he turned away 
from naturalism to a priori reasoning (e.g. Bird 2002, 2004c). The last chapter 
showed that several parts of Kuhn’s philosophy can be seen as receiving an empirical 
endorsement also after Kuhn had made clear that he wanted to reject the causal 
theory
90
. Specifically, in so far as there is evidence that concepts as actually used by 
humans do not allow an unambiguous description of objects they refer to, i.e. a 
description conceived as an essence of the kind, then there is an empirical reason to 
reject the causal theory. Naturally, it could still be right, but what cannot be said is 
that it is supported by empirical research on concept use and that a rejection of the 
causal theory counts as a rejection of naturalism. The case may be, at the end, vice 
versa. That is, because of its poor empirical support, the acceptance of naturalism 
prompts the rejection of the causal theory. 
If the causal theorists wish to be consistent in their naturalism, they should 
also submit the concept of essence for empirical testing. If not, the situation is a bit 
like with logical positivists who wanted to apply the verification principle to every 
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 More on possible roles of Inference to the Best Explanation in an argument for scientific realism, 
see Lipton (1993; 2004).  
90
 He made his attack for the first time in “Metaphor in Science” (RSS), based on a conference 
presentation in 1977.  
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other statement except to the principle of verification itself. Of course, that could not 
be done because it was not known how the principle itself could have been verified, 
and for that reason, it had to be taken for granted. As already seen, Shapere observed 
that the Putnam-Kripke essentialism has a hidden element of apriorism, which seems 
to be absent in Kuhn’s approach. The commitment to the thesis that there are 
essences and that certain substances have certain essences makes it impossible to 
accept an argument to the contrary, and the thesis can always be modified in the face 
of empirical evidence. If cases that are supposed to prove the thesis turn out to be 
incorrect, an advocate of the thesis can always deny that people have really found 
essences or broaden the understanding of ‘essence’ without altering the thesis itself. 
Consider how Putnam admits that we can imagine that water is not H2O, but then say 
that “it is conceivable but it isn’t possible” (Putnam 1975b, 233). Is this not 
indicative of an apriori commitment that we cannot be sure is really correct? (See 
Shapere 1982, especially 8-10; 1991, 667-8) 
 Kuhn’s conceptualism is, of course, incompatible with the idea of Lockean 
real essence. Similarity classes are, therefore, better understood as forming Lockean 
nominal essences. That is, a kind has a nominal essence if a thing must have certain 
properties in order to be called a kind. This view does not imply that the objects of 
kind K need to share essence, just that they are similar in relevant respects that make 
them kinds. This is to say that similarity classes are metaphysically on a par with 
nominal essence in their non-essentialism. Yet, crucially, being an anti-essentialist 
does not imply being an anti-realist ontologically. Kuhn’s conceptualism is 
compatible with minimal ontological realism, i.e. with the belief that there are real 
objects as they are
91
. What is denied is that there is one true way to represent reality. 
This position is similar to Dupré’s pluralism and his “promiscuous realism”. This is 
the view that there are countless legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying 
objects in the world, depending on our needs and aims (e.g. Dupré’s 1993, 18). 
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 Kuhn describes himself on one occasion as an “unregenerate realist”(RSS, 203). He also implies that 
at times nature undermines the security of the professional community (SSR, 169), and that nature has 
a role to play in shaping our conceptions (ET, 72). Because Kuhn does not commit to a view of what 
objects there really are or what the essence of objects is, or in short, of what the structure and form of 
the reality is, this comes close to what stronger ontological realists have mockingly called “fig-leaf 
realism”: Something objectively exists independently of the mental. (Devitt 1984, 23)  
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Dupré argues further that all systems of classification depend on their function and 
there is no functionless classification as such. All classifications are good or bad for 
their purpose. This is to say that the existing classifications in science do not lose any 
legitimacy if we do not declare them as “approximations of real joints of nature”. 
There are good reasons for having them and keeping them as long as they are 
functionally relevant. Neither is there anything that makes categorising easy. Objects 
are real, and although one can have very curious categories
92
, it is very difficult to 
make a functioning one for one’s purpose. All in all, I believe that Dupré’s position 
accords well with Kuhn. Kuhn might be described as a minimal ontological realist 
with regard to individual entities or particulars, but as an anti-realist with regard to 
universals. There are many ways to conceptualise the world but “nature cannot be 
forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes” (RSS, 159). Nature resists because 
entities are real.  
 
Limits of extension 
 
As I have said before in the thesis, I do not think it is correct to maintain that 
empirical studies in cognitive science have proved that the classical account of 
concepts - that concepts are determined by a set of sufficient and necessary 
conditions - cannot work. The advocates of the family resemblance view are right in 
so far as we are concerned with how people use concepts. We cannot find a set of 
conditions that apply equally to all instances of the concept. Still, it is possible that 
                                                 
92
 Both Lakoff and Wiggins bring forward the case of how an ancient Chinese encyclopaedia 
classified animals: a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, 
(d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this 
classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a 
very fine camel’s hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that 
resemble flies from a distance.  
This is apparently Jorge Luis Borges’ invention that Foucault also utilised in his book The 
Order of Things. Interestingly, the writers draw different conclusions from this. According to Lakoff, 
Borges deals with fantasy and these could not be natural human categories. However, Lakoff thinks 
that it nevertheless makes the point by giving the impression that a Western reader gets when reading 
descriptions of non-Western languages and cultures. Wiggins, in turn, says that it is not at all difficult 
to imagine these categories. The problem is to conceive of how they could be the explanation for 
anything. (Lakoff 1987, 92; Wiggins 1984, 144-5)  
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we find conceptual cores, and therefore, explicate or improve our usage of concepts. 
If essentialists are right despite all the scepticism, and if we suppose that we are also 
able to find out what the essential properties of kinds are, then perhaps we can settle 
on a conceptual scheme in which each concept can be defined unambiguously. On 
the other hand, the family resemblance account of concepts offers an alternative 
theory of extension determination, which is more realistic regarding the actual use of 
concepts. And that is how I treated the family resemblance notion: as a suggestion of 
how extension is determined. We need to ask, therefore, whether it can work. 
 Andersen et al. took the view that Kuhn’s account of concept can be 
interpreted along the lines of Rosch’s theory of the graded structure of concepts. That 
is, there is a prototypic exemplar, and instances that fall under the concept can be 
graded in their gradual resemblance to the prototype. If an instance is more similar to 
a specific prototype exemplar than to any other exemplar, it falls under the concept. 
Furthermore, similarity is always a matter of degree. However, it is also possible to 
adopt a different interpretation that accommodates the family resemblance idea. That 
is, we may understand Kuhn’s natural families as sets. A set membership criterion 
can be characterised as an abstracted bundle of properties. An instance is a member 
of a set if it fulfils enough features of the bundle. What is important is not exactly 
how much, but that not all the features have to be fulfilled and, crucially, that 
instances always fall into one or another category. This view can be described as 
loose intensionalism, to use Bird’s terminology, because only a part of extension 
determining criteria needs to be fulfilled. All instances are equal in their 
membership, but some instances can be better, i.e. more typical. I prefer this more 
traditional approach. That way we can avoid, for example, reference to a visual 
characterisation of the exemplars. Furthermore, the determination of the degree of 
similarity by an exemplar that is a concrete object strikes me as problematic. It is 
also easier to deal with the question of comparison via extension and sets than 
through concrete exemplars. 
 The immediate problem that the family resemblance account faces is the 
problem of wide-open texture. That stems from the argument that, since we can 
always find some resemblance between instances of one concept and another, family 
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resemblance does not succeed in limiting the extension of concepts. Thus we need to 
restrict the extension. Otherwise, we can always extend the class to new instances by 
focusing on new kinds of similarities and include practically everything in the same 
class at the end. However, I believe that Andersen’s solution (2000) is able to 
prevent this case from happening. Let us see how.  
 Andersen’s argument is simple. Consider five instances, abcde, of a given 
concept. Concepts possess the features ABCDEFGH according to the following 
diagram.  
 
a  A  B C D 
b  B C D E 
c   C D E F 
d    D E F G 
e     E F G H 
 
This shows how the features of instances extend. Without restrictions there is no 
limit to the application of the concept because we can take new features I, J etc. of 
new instances into account, and the series of sorites continues indefinitely. 
Andersen’s solution in reference to Timothy Williamson (1994) is that such a sorites 
series can be stopped if it collides with a sorites series that goes in the opposite 
direction. This can be seen from the following familiar example of ducks and swans. 
The most common duck, the mallard, in Europe (DuckM) has a short neck (B), a 
rounded beak (C) and is the colour brown (A). The Chinese duck (DuckC) has a short 
neck (B), a rounded beak (C) and is the colour white (D): 
 
DuckM  A B C 
DuckC   B C D 
 
The most common swan has long neck (E), rounded beak (C) and is the colour white 
(D). However, an Australian swan (SwanA) is black (F): 
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SwanC    C D E 
SwanA    C D  F 
 
The duck category cannot be extended in the following way: 
 
DuckX    C D E 
 
That is because the last, DuckX, would be a member of swans rather than ducks. The 
general idea is, thus, that the sorities series stop each other by an excluding property, 
and boundaries of categories can be kept sharp.  
 Andersen asks what we can do with intermediate cases, and she gives an 
answer in reference to Kuhn. Kuhn clearly does not accept that natural families 
merge into one another (see SSR, 45). He writes also that the immediate recognition 
of objects relies partially on the existence of “empty perceptual space between the 
families to be discriminated” (SSR, 197, ft. 14). It is clear from what is said before in 
the thesis that Kuhn does not mean that there would be a structure in the world that 
divides objects naturally into classes. A more appropriate interpretation is that Kuhn 
requires that there cannot be vague boundaries. We remember Kuhn’s words from 
the last chapter:  
 
The experience of generations has to date confirmed that all observed 
objects fall into one or another natural family. It has, that is, shown 
that the entire population of the world can always be divided (though 
not once and for all) into perceptually discontinuous categories. In the 
perceptual spaces between these categories are believed to be no 
objects at all. (ET, 285)  
 
In the case of a new discovery that is seen to bring vagueness, we may understand it 
as a case of the incompleteness of knowledge, which may prompt the construction of 
a new classification. Andersen et al.’s example of the South American “Screamer” is 
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a case in point. However, Kuhn may also accept that there are concepts with vague 
boundaries, but may insist that such cases should not exist in science, or that one 
should aim at getting rid of vagueness. For example, “tall man” is a vague concept, 
but it does not have any significance in science.  
 The emphasis of differentiating features illustrates well Kuhn’s point of 
lexical dependency brought forward also by Sharrock and Read: extensions of terms 
are mutually related and restricted. Without other similarity sets an extension of a 
term would be limitless. It is not enough to take into account an individual contrast 
set (‘swan’ – ‘duck’), but also to consider direct and indirect contrasts in the whole 
taxonomy in order to limit extension in other directions (e.g. ‘Donald Duck’). And a 
change of similarity and difference features of a term may affect the extension of 
other terms. Furthermore, in principle, the family resemblance theory does not have 
an inheritance between the properties of superkind and subkind. Birds might be 
classified as flying animals, and yet an ostrich without its flying ability is still 
counted as a bird because of other similarity features. In this case, the family 
resemblance account differs in an important respect from the classical set theory. It is 
important to notice that a set does not have to share any single property, because the 
limitation of sets can be done by different sets of properties. Naturally, in order to be 
consistent with conceptualism, properties or features ought not to be understood as 
existing independently. They may be understood as abstractions acquired by 
observing similarities between individuals. Alternatively, the talk of properties can 
be taken as a talk of similarities. When we say that a swan is white (X is f), we 
actually say swan A and swan B resemble each other in certain respects (A resembles 
B). The idea is, as the above diagrams show, that an instance of a category cannot be 
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 One should not, however, be under impression that a realist about universals has to necessarily think 
that universals are located in a “Platonic heaven”. As David Armstrong has argued, universals can be 
brought down to earth and think “of a thing’s properties as constituents of the thing and think of the 
properties as universals” (1989, 77). His view is more precisely as follows: “Universals are 
constituents of states of affairs. Space-time is a conjunction of states of affairs. In that sense universals 
are ‘in’ space-time” (1989, 99; see Ch. 5).  
On the other hand, Armstrong has also written about a particularly interesting form of nominalism, 
which (of course) avoids postulating anything like a Platonic heaven but, nevertheless, accepts that 
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 As such, the above family resemblance account is not far removed from more 
traditional descriptive theories of extension. As already mentioned, it is close to the 
so-called cluster theories that were also inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The 
difference to the traditional descriptive theories is its insistence on the flexibility of 
features that instances can have. This also means that it is subject, in principle, to the 
criticism directed against the traditional descriptive theories. Perhaps the most 
worrisome has been the fact that it allows changes in extension, and cannot offer the 
stability of reference sought by the causal theories, and raises, furthermore, the 
problem of incomparability between theories. Our response to this has to start from 
something that is already obvious. From a Kuhnian perspective, we refuse to talk of 
reference to natural kinds because that introduces a metaphysical commitment of 
universals and the idea of a certain structure of the world. We have to talk only of 
extension as a set of individuals. Having said that, things start looking a bit different. 
I defer the full treatment of this problematic to the second last chapter. Yet it is 
enough to say here that I think that changes in extension are natural and recurrent 
phenomena. This is something that we should conclude if we take historical data 
seriously. Furthermore, they do not necessarily cause problems for the comparison of 
theories since theories may be compared via overlapping sets. More importantly, I 
think that the significance of point-by-point comparison via reference or extension is 
hugely overemphasised in the modern philosophy of science, and it is likely to be a 
gross simplification of the historical process.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
there are properties. The so-called trope theory is a version of nominalism that conceives properties as 
particulars, and for that reason does not imply the existence of universals. It postulates ‘tropes’ that 
can be understood as ‘property individuals’ that are qualities located in time and space. The whole 
world can be constructed from these trope particulars. A version of trope theory called ‘bundle theory’ 
appears to be especially interesting. A property of being, for example, white, can be understood as the 
class of similar tropes. Note that tropes are not understood as being identical to universals. The trope 
theory whose tropes have also been called ‘abstract particulars’ and ‘property instances’, among 
others, appears to be a theory that is gaining more strength in metaphysics, to the extent that 
Armstrong said that in his previous work he “underestimated the strength of a tropes + resemblance 
(+substance-attribute) view” (1989, 120) and that “the philosophy of trope is riding high”. Such 
philosophers as Stout, Campbell and D.C. Williams have developed a kind of trope theory. (See 
Armstrong 1989, esp. ch. 6; also 1978; for a recent application of a trope theory in the philosophy of 
science, see Niiniluoto 1999, 29-33.) 




In this chapter I have tried to explain why Kuhn opposed the Putnam-Kripke causal 
solution with regard to meaning change. The crucial difference between these 
opposing views can be found in their attitude to natural kinds. First of all, Kuhn was 
sceptical whether a theory developed for proper names could also be extended to 
general scientific terms. Furthermore, Putnam, Kripke and others working in that 
tradition assume that there are natural kinds with essence and that natural kinds 
together form the structure of the world. This supposition has allowed them to rely 
on a reference to a universal property that is instantiated by members of a natural 
kind, which also explains why they belong to the kind in question. Kuhn denies that 
reference can be fixed to a natural kind because we always need to take into account 
several sorting properties in naming objects. Moreover, in choosing these properties, 
it is not given which property is counted as being essential and which accidental. 
According to Kuhn, the establishment of kind categories is done by us and not given 
by nature. Several ways to classify are possible. Another point of difference is that 
Kuhn does not postulate universals that are indispensable for the causal theory. His 
thinking remains on the more concrete level of individuals, and on their similarities 
and dissimilarities that determine set membership. Kuhn’s example of how the 
extension of ‘planet’ has changed is a good example of his thinking.  
There are, indeed, reasons to be sceptical of how generally applicable the 
notion of natural kind is. Rigid designation may not be as effective in differentiating 
between natural and non-natural kinds as is thought. The analogy between ordinary 
language terms and scientific terms does not hold. Neither is it easy to find privileged 
systems of classification in science. I suggested that Kuhn’s position is more cautious 
and more warranted for that reason. It is reasonable to think that individuals are real. 
The question of whether there is a privileged categorisation that corresponds to the 
real division of individuals in the world ought to be considered by also taking into 
account the history of science and other empirical research. If the history of science 
seems to converge to a certain representation, then it gives support to that view. If 
not, we should be more careful with the essentialist assumptions. However, Kuhn is 
not a nominalist but rather a conceptualist. That is, he thinks that there is something 
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like a conceptual scheme that organises the data of the world. Previous discussion of 
cognitive science has made this suggestion empirically plausible. I also argued that 
Davidson’s influential counter-argument is outdated.   
 I have made clear that I do not think that empirical results from cognitive 
psychology have proven the classical account of concepts wrong. They may have 
shown that the application to human concepts is limited. However, it might be 
possible to find unambiguous definitions of extensions, especially if essentialism 
were right. For that reason I have studied it as a rival suggestion of how to determine 
extension. As such, it is relatively near the traditional descriptive theories, with the 
addition of the flexibility of features that an instance in the extension can have. I also 
argued that Andersen’s solution to the problem of wide-open texture is successful. 
By using a differentiating relation between categories, we can succeed in limiting 
extension.  
There are at least two important questions that I have not answered yet. One 
is the question of our ability to know the extension of our terms and those of the past. 
Can we say, on the basis of our knowledge, that those in the past were wrong about 
extension, and we are right? How much are we tied to our historical standpoint? The 
second unanswered question is focused on the one that initially caused a stir in 
philosophy: how can we compare theories. If we adopt the view above, we can no 
longer rely on stable natural kinds as points of reference. How then is comparing and 
choosing between theories possible? Both these questions are taken up in the 
penultimate chapter. Before that I will engage in a consideration of what meaning 
change is historically. On this issue it may be said that, in addition to focusing on the 
relationship between a term and its extension, there is another sense of meaning 
change that is more appropriate in regard to understanding the thinking of past 
scientists.   
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6. Meaning change historically  
 
Kuhn was involved in three different professional fields during his life. His first 
academic education was in physics. From physics he made an abrupt move to the 
new emerging field in the Anglo-American world, the history of science, prompted 
by a sudden awakening of interest after being given the opportunity by James B. 
Conant to teach some history of science courses. His third career move was more 
gradual. Kuhn’s shift to philosophical theorising occurred in degrees as he became 
acquainted with the philosophical debates of the day. If we exclude what was said of 
Kuhn’s historical rationale in the second chapter, practically all that is said in this 
thesis has dealt with Kuhn’s philosophical aspirations with regard to meaning and 
meaning change, including also a cognitive-philosophical interpretation of them. 
Now I want to go back to his earlier involvement with the history of science. My 
claim here is that at the beginning Kuhn had a rather pure historical interest, not far 
removed from the traditional concerns of the history of ideas or intellectual history. 
Yet he lost this interest after becoming more preoccupied by philosophy and, 
especially, after discovering Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Theorising on the history of 
ideas might have been further developed by the family resemblance notion, but he 
became more interested in the determination of extension than in the determination 
of historical ideas. There are others that have, nevertheless, tried to develop a theory 
of the history of ideas on that basis. Most notably, the representationalist accounts 
that we saw in Chapter 4 have also received an application in the context of the 
history of ideas, especially by Nersessian.  
 In this chapter, I firstly introduce some of Kuhn’s early historical themes of 
interest. They include an examination of Newton’s writing, Robert Boyle’s chemical 
thinking and the emergence of the concept of energy conservation, as well as the 
difference between Aristotle’s and modern concepts of speed. I show that Kuhn was 
deeply interested in the ideas or concepts that the historical figures possessed. 
Secondly, I argue that this interest implies the question of what it means to possess 
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an idea or a concept, and furthermore, what precisely historical ideas or concepts are 
in the first place. These are very traditional concerns in the history of ideas and 
intellectual history, and are separate from Kuhn’s later preoccupation with extension. 
Thirdly, I maintain that, although there have not been satisfactory answers to these 
questions, the questions cannot be ignored. I explore some possible ways to answer 
them, after which I construct my suggestion for an answer. My suggestion stems 
from the tension between two different theories on historical concepts or ideas. 
Lovejoy’s project of unit ideas correctly brings forward the point that all 
exemplifications of historical concepts must share something in common. Otherwise, 
from the point of view of history writing, it would not be meaningful to call two 
representations as representations of the same concept, but it would be more 
appropriate to take them as instantiations of two different historical concepts. The 
problem with the unit idea is, however, that it overemphasises continuity and 
suppresses discontinuity. The capability to describe discontinuity is, in turn, the 
strength of the proposal by the cognitive history and philosophy of science that takes 
historical concepts as the family resemblance type. It succeeds in describing both 
continuity and discontinuity. Yet, the problem is that it allows a situation where two 
historical representations do not have anything in common. My suggestion is to 
adopt the basic strategy and tools of the cognitive history and philosophy of science, 
but to also take Lovejoy’s insight on board. First of all, I take concepts as natural 
beings that are representations in the mind of one or more individuals. We might, if 
we follow cognitive scientists, call them stereotypes or prototypes. Furthermore, my 
conclusion is that in order to call several representations as instantiations of the same 
historical concept, one has to postulate a necessary minimal shared conceptual 
component, but it is not necessary to think that there is a shared set of features out of 
this conceptual core. In other words, there is some shared element that is a 
requirement for conceptual membership, but there is not a full and explicit definition 
of the historical covering concept. Excluding the minimal component that creates 
continuity between instantiations, historical concepts undergo constant changes, 
manifesting simultaneous discontinuity between different exemplifications. 
 I aim to illustrate my view by considering the development of the concept of 
‘element’ in the 18
th
 century. On the basis of the above account, I also give a 
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mundane interpretation of incommensurability. It may be seen as a practical problem. 
The meanings of two expressions differ and are described as incommensurable 
because the implied sets of beliefs under a term differ so significantly that it makes 
communication and translation difficult, but not necessarily impossible, to achieve. 
In the course of the chapter I also draft my answers to the questions that were 
directed against the most famous theoretical project in the history of ideas, i.e. 
Lovejoy’s project - what concepts or ideas are, how they can be identified, and how 
to reconcile conceptual continuity with conceptual discontinuity. This last question 
approaches Kuhn’s interest in meaning change from a different direction than his 
preoccupation with extension. We may say that it gives us a purer historical account 
of what meaning change is. 
 
Kuhn’s early affinity with the history of ideas 
 
At the beginning of his career Kuhn made several, usually short, studies on different 
historical cases
94
. I will next examine some of them in order to illustrate the nature of 
his affinity with the history of ideas. In apparently the first published historical paper, 
published in 1951, Kuhn studies a passage from Newton’s “31
st
 query” of the 
Opticks. This short text is entirely conjectural in suggesting, on the basis of 
interpreting sense of the text, that a misprint occurred in translation of Newton’s 
original text. Kuhn’s proposal is that, unlike the actual printed text of what Newton 
says, Newton in fact considered size as well as attractive force to be relevant to 
determining the power of “menstrua”, i.e. dissolving liquid, in this case, of gold and 
silver.
 
This is an example of a typical textual analysis of a historical work. An article 
that appeared the following year is more interesting. In his article, “Robert Boyle and 
Structural Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century”, Kuhn engages in interpreting the 
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 In fact, the clear majority of Kuhn’s publications until SSR in 1962, and various texts after it, were 
reviews of studies of history. I have ignored reviews as unessential and out of the domain of this 
thesis. I do not either go through all the short historical articles here, but only the relevant ones for the 
purpose of the thesis. See Hoyningen-Huene (1993, 273-78; 302) for an almost full list of 
publications. Only RSS is missing.  
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thinking of Robert Boyle. His target is notably the common conception that Boyle 
suggested a definition of ‘element’ that anticipates the one given by Lavoisier, and is 
thereby a modern one. Kuhn shows how this understanding relies on an omission of a 
crucial piece of text when the putative definition is given. What Boyle, according to 
Kuhn, actually tried to do is to argue against the common “chymical” notion of 
element. That notion stated that there are a small fixed number of unchangeable and 
unmodifiable elements of which all bodies are made and which are responsible for 
perceived qualities of bodies. Much of Boyle’s work was to prove that any candidate 
for such an elementary substance fails. Furthermore, the notion of element was in 
contrast to his chemical thinking based on the mechanical philosophy, according to 
which all chemical qualities can be derived from the manner in which the corpuscles 
of bodies are arranged and moved relative to each other. A consequence of this 
philosophy is that by the sufficient rearrangement of positions and motion one could, 
in principle, obtain anything from anything. In other words, Boyle believed that 
transmutation is possible. The crux of the text is that the “modern” notion of element, 
or any notion of fundamental enduring substance, is in contrast to Boyle’s thinking 
and he, moreover, argued against the existence of such elements. In contrast to what 
was widely believed, at least still in the 1950s, Boyle could not have introduced a 
modern (or almost modern) concept of element.  
 “The Caloric Theory of Adiabatic Compression” appeared in 1958 and brings 
forward two themes that gain a more important role later in SSR. Kuhn studies “the 
discovery” of a phenomenon that rapidly compressed or expanded gas changes its 
temperature. For example, compressed gas increases its temperature, which is later 
said to be due to the work done and was taken subsequently as an example of energy 
conservation. The same experiments that were thought to give evidence for energy 
conservation were also understood as supporting the caloric theory of heat. Although 
this may be paradoxical from a modern perspective, it can be explained, writes Kuhn, 
by realising that the caloric theory was a well-developed theory, and therefore, 
difficult to prove wrong. Another point in the paper is that “the discovery” should be 
understood as a “gradual emergence” rather than a sudden realisation, because 
various scientists over half a century were involved with various outputs in 
formulating the adiabatic compression. The latter concern is common to “Energy 
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Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery” (in ET) published in 1959, 
where Kuhn examines the emergence of the concept of energy conservation. Kuhn 
records that twelve scientists in a remarkably short period came to very similar 
conclusions. For this reason he set out to study the intellectual climate in the two 
decades before 1850 that made the “discovery” possible. He suggests that the 
emergence of the concept is due to three experimental and conceptual elements: the 
“availability of conversion processes”, the “concern with engines”, and “the 
philosophy of nature”. Throughout the paper, Kuhn is concerned by the emergence 
of various scientific concepts, such as the concept of universal convertibility, 
conservation and energy, and work. Yet a further illustration of Kuhn’s earlier 
historical thinking is his “A Function for Thought Experiment” (in ET), which 
appeared just after the first edition of SSR in 1964. There, he compared Aristotle’s 
notion of ‘speed’ to that of modern notions, notably to the one introduced by Galileo 
in his Dialogues Concerning Two Chief World Systems. Kuhn argues that in Aristotle 
the modern concepts of average and instantaneous speed merged into one, and that 
his notion was an integral part of his theory of motion and even of the whole physics.  
 What I want to point out by presenting some of Kuhn’s early historical work 
is that he was interested in textual interpretation, and above all, what scientific 
concepts or ideas are, and how and when they emerged in history. Much of his early 
work is concerned with trying to identify and draft a way to the emergence of 
scientific concepts that scientists came to possess. These concerns I call the 
traditional fundamental preoccupations in the history of ideas and intellectual history. 
That is, one of the fundamental tasks in those fields is to identify and define concepts 
or ideas, explain their birth, trace their influence, and track down their modifications. 
This reading of Kuhn’s early historical works also accords well with Kuhn’s self-
understanding as a historian. In the 1980s he said of himself:  
 
Probably the thing I do best and certainly the one to which I have 
devoted most time is climbing from the writing into the mind of dead 
scientists, figuring out how they thought, why they believed what they 
did, and how they came to change their minds. My principal efforts 
have, that is, been directed to what I have sometimes called “the 
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dynamic interrelationships of pure ideas”. (Kuhn 1983, 27; italics 
mine)  
 
Furthermore, in his last interview Kuhn says that his ex-student Jed Buchwald “does 
the sort of history of analytic ideas that I do” (RSS, 319; italics mine). 
 In Kuhn’s later writings there is a whiff of the same interest. A word of 
caution, though, is necessary here. Kuhn typically moved on to new problems and 
did not proceed to develop full-bloodied theories. The same applies here. Even 
though some words can be seen in the light of the history of ideas, they may have 
pulled Kuhn in developing his theories on family resemblance, taxonomy, and 
lexicon that later became his main focus. Nevertheless, Kuhn’s proclamation in SSR 
that the pre-Einsteinian concept of ‘space’ was necessarily homogenous, isotropic, 
and unaffected by the presence of matter, or that the idea of a moving Earth was an 
nonsensical notion for the pre-Copernicans, seems to communicate the interest in 
“analytic ideas”. (See SSR, 149-50) I return to this interpretation at the end of the 
chapter. Elsewhere Kuhn quite rightly, to my mind, emphasises that the reduction of 
translation of past texts to identifications of reference of terms is not acceptable. In 
addition to reference, historians need to report what scientists of the past believed, 
independent of the truth-values of their beliefs. If we follow, for example, Kitcher’s 
advice and look for a referential equivalent for ‘phlogiston’ in some contexts where it 
can be thought to have referred, for example, to oxygen, we leave the text translated 
in an unintelligible condition. In general, Kuhn spells out clearly that translation 
based on extensional semantics and truth-value preservation is not enough (RSS, 41-
2). What must also be translated is intensionalities or senses (RSS, 49).  
Talk of the definition of historical concepts or intensional meaning is 
different from considerations of extension or reference. In order to find out what kind 
of intensional meaning or concept a person has, whatever that exactly turns out to be, 
does not require knowing whether that meaning or concept refers to anything real in 
the world, or whether the belief or a set of beliefs communicated in this way is true 
or false. Let us think of the tripartite distinction between term/word, intension/ 
concept, and reference/extension. Discussion of meaning change addresses the 
relation between the first two. It is a question of meaning of term when ‘meaning’ is 
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understood in its customary way as sense or concept, and a term is taken to denote 
the sense or the concept.  It can be extended to the consideration of reference but that 
move changes the question from what the intellectual products are that people 
denoted by their terms to what the objects are that they referred to by their terms. 
Naturally, extension and intension, as has been emphasised throughout the thesis, can 
be connected. For example, one can adopt a theory that intension determines the 
former, which I believe Kuhn eventually did. More precisely, I think that Kuhn’s 
interest in similarity relations took the role of the intensional meaning that 
determines the extension of terms.  
 The upshot is that if we are interested in what concepts scientists had or 
possessed, then we are interested by the same token in something that is different 
from the question of what their concepts referred to and how. It is one question to ask 
what the concept of ‘element’ was that a certain scientific group possessed or had in 
their mind in 1750, but quite another question to ask what was in the extension of 
that concept, and yet a different topic to inquire how they determined the extension. 
If the concept possessed was something like an ‘indecomposable fundamental 
substance found in all bodies and responsible for their qualities’, the extension was 
everything that falls into the categories of four or five putative elementary substances 
(because they were thought to be such elements), and the determination of that 
everything was carried out probably in part by observing similarities and in part by 
deducing them from their causes in bodies, i.e. from the qualities that they were 
thought to be responsible for. In other words, the respective concerns are the idea or 
concept in mind or minds, their relation to the world and the way that relation is 
determined.  
 
Nersessian on the foundations of intellectual history  
 
Nersessian (1985) describes with particular clarity the problem under consideration 
here. Nersessian attempts to find an answer to the question ‘When did Faraday have 
his field concept?’. She notes that such a question is customarily seen as an historical 
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issue, but a satisfactory answer requires philosophical consideration as well. That is, 
before we can answer the question of when, we must determine what Faraday’s field 
concept was. According to Nersessian, this is something that both historians and 
philosophers of science have given too little thought to in their analyses of the 
formation and development of scientific concepts.  
The answer to the latter question implies, in turn, three separate questions:  
 
1. What was Faraday’s conception? 
2. What is required for a concept to be a ‘field’ concept? 
3. What does it mean to say that someone ‘has’ a concept, i.e. what general form  
does the representation of a concept take? (Nersessian 1985, 175) 
 
Nersessian correctly argues that answering has to start from the last question. In 
order to say what a certain concept is, we need to be able state the general criteria on 
which that is evaluated. The fundamental question is, thus, a question of concept 
possession: What does it mean to posses a certain concept? Nersessian writes in 
accordance with Kuhn that ‘having’ a concept does not require that we believe that 
concept to be true of anything. For example, saying that Faraday had a field concept 
does not require us to assume that he could substantiate or that Faraday even thought 
he could substantiate the claims implied by that concept. One can have a concept 
without anything corresponding to it in the world. (Nersessian 1985, 177; 182)  
 Furthermore, Nersessian points out the kind of difficult problems that arise if 
we are not clear on the above main question. A general problem is how successive 
scientific conceptualisations are related to each other (Nersessian 1992, 8). Many 
historians attribute a field concept to both Faraday and Einstein. Yet, their thinking 
and theories were very different. Did they then really “say” or “mean” the same thing 
by their field concepts? It is problematic to choose the definition of the field concept. 
If we adopt a modern field concept, then nobody perhaps before Einstein had a field 
concept, which does not seem to be historically fair. One of Nersessian’s main 
requirements is “to do justice” to the historical data (1991, 680). That is, not to 
subordinate the historical subjects to our pre-empirical views of language and 
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meaning. We may, on the other hand, allow that many scientists had a field concept, 
but then end up with the view that there are several field concepts. It is not clear why 
they all are called field concepts, and how they are related to each other. Elsewhere, 
Nersessian writes that it is possible to trace a pattern of descent for the concept of a 
field from Faraday to Einstein. Yet Einstein’s views are so different from the views 
of all his predecessors - Faraday, Maxwell and Lorentz - that his cannot be an 
extension of any of theirs (Nersessian 1998, 160; 1984). And this seems to be a 
typical case in the history of science. We can find descendants for concepts without 
being able to show conceptual cumulation. Another example could be the concept of 
inertia from Galileo to Newton. What this shows, according to Nersessian, is the 
need to account for change in individual concepts in such a way as to accommodate 
continuous, yet uncumulative change (1998, 161). While the traditional philosophical 
approach, writes Nersessian, has viewed conceptual change as static and ahistorical, 
we need a dynamic and historical analysis of it (1992, 8). Yet, furthermore, we do 
not find only the descendance of concepts, but totally new concepts, such as ‘spin’, 
the disappearance of concepts, such as ‘phlogiston’, and cases of the partial 
absorption of concepts, such as ‘ether’ to ‘field’ and ‘space-time’. In other words, we 
need an account of what happens in all these historical cases.   
 Nersessian is concerned about the situation where there is no explicit 
guidance on the theoretical level of how to individuate and locate concepts in the 
history of science. What is missing, according to Nersessian, is an explicit 
metatheoretical notion of what constitutes the meaning of a scientific concept. And 
even more alarmingly, she feels that this metatheoretical question is “at the core of 
historical method”. (Nersessian 1992, 37) It is clear that this consideration has taken 
us into the problem field that is most important for the history of ideas and 
intellectual history: how to describe fairly and accurately the history of human 
thinking and its products. But, as Nersessian pointed out, the concern of 
individuating historical concepts implies important philosophical questions as well. 
This is something that could be adequately described as the philosophy of the history 
of thought. Yet, I am inclined to agree with Nersessian that the existing philosophical 
theories have not been too successful when looked at from the point of view of 
history writing (e.g. Nersessian 1991, 681; 1992, 10). The optimal case would be 
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such that we succeed in giving a satisfactory answer to the philosophical question 
that would then enable us to improve and sharpen our historical understanding. This 
is an ambitious but, nevertheless, a worthy goal to try to reach. And, importantly, 
because the underlying questions are philosophical by their nature, we are also able 
to take advantage of any philosophical theorising on the possession of concepts.   
 
Unit ideas and ahistoric concepts 
 
There are, of course, earlier suggestions on what concepts or ideas are. Arguably, the 
most famous and influential proposal was Arthur Lovejoy’s project of unit ideas
95
. 
Lovejoy famously compared his unit ideas to elements in chemistry. Like a chemist, 
a historian of ideas tries to find and differentiate elementary units from 
heterogeneous aggregates and complexes. They are things that travel throughout 
time, reappearing in different times and contexts. Lovejoy also made clear that the 
number of these unit ideas is limited overall, although he never gave an estimation of 
how many there are. Lovejoy’s further specifications on what unit ideas are do not, 
however, appear to be very useful, for the simple reason that his characterisation 
becomes very general. (Lovejoy 1965, 7-15; 1948, 9) Nevertheless, Lovejoy at times 
describes them as specific propositions or principles. This fits well with the 
description of unit ideas by another classic historian of ideas, George Boas, as 
declarative statements, assertions of belief and statements of fact or policy (Boas 
1953, 4). Thus, Lovejoy’s unit ideas much resemble Platonic ideas in a metaphysical 
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 Another non-analytic-philosophy tradition that might potentially offer a constructive insight with 
regard to the problematic in this chapter is the German Begriffsgeschichte. According to Melvin 
Richter, who wrote a book on Begriffsgeschichte (Richter 1995) in order to introduce the German 
conceptual history to the English audience, the choice of concepts as units of analysis in the history of 
thought distinguishes it from alternative similar methods focusing on other topics (4). 
Begriffsgeschichte makes a reasonable distinction between concepts and words (9). However, it is 
disappointing that it regards any more detailed definition of concepts as being unimportant and takes 
the notion to be useful exactly because of its ambiguity (21). It does not improve the situation that 
sometimes the notions of term and concept appear to be mixed in the usage. For example, Richter 
talks at times of “meanings of concept”, without saying how it differs from meanings of terms, which 
might be taken as a concept. When saying that the German word ‘Bürger’ denoted the citizen of a city 
in 1700, the citizen of a state in 1800, and someone who was not a proletarian in 1900, it seems we are 
talking of the denotation of a term, not that of a concept. (46) 
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sense, or the Fregean propositions (or perhaps components of propositions) in the 
sense that they are atomistic, indestructible entities, independent of time and space in 
a realm of their own, and yet reachable by the inhabitants of the Earth.  
 Today, the problems with Lovejoy’s project are well known. There is no 
reason to dwell long on them. I will rather merely point out some of the major 
problems and indicate references to some scholars who have paid attention to them
96
. 
The first problem has to do with the ontological status of unit ideas. Namely, how 
conceivable it is to suppose that there are such platonic entities that appear and 
reappear in history which themselves do not change at all, and furthermore, use these 
to explain history? The study of history that is tied to a particular time, space, and 
context does not seem to have much use for such ahistorical entities (e.g. Mink 1968, 
1969; Kelley 1990; Richter 1987). Secondly, and not surprisingly, it has not been 
easy to recognise such unit ideas. In fact, it has been argued that even Lovejoy’s 
prototype idea, Principle of Plenitude, fails to be an atom-like unit idea, and therefore 
there are no unit ideas to be found in history (Hintikka 1987; see also Spitzer 1944). 
Thirdly, Lovejoy appears to overemphasise continuity in history. According to 
Lovejoy, most putative novel ideas are, in fact, rather new combinations or 
arrangements of unchangeable unit ideas (see Lovejoy 1965, 3-4; 15). The belief that 
normally there is nothing new in history is an issue that has been difficult to accept. 
Many commentators think that the history of ideas deals rather with something 
changing (e.g. Mink 1968, Spitzer 1944, Mandelbaum 1965). A related danger in 
looking for the same unit ideas is a resulting anachronism projected to historical 
agents (Mandelbaum 1965). Therefore, Lovejoy’s project of unit ideas is thought to 
have such problems that in his study of the discussion on Lovejoy’s The Great Chain 
of Being fifty years after its publication, Daniel Wilson concludes that the atomistic 
notion of unit idea akin to chemical elements “has been almost uniformly rejected” 
(Wilson 1987, 204).  
 Let me be clear on what I think is not under threat here. I think that, unless 
we change our point of view towards history in a drastic way, it is impossible to 
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abandon talking of such notions as concept or idea, and of their individuation, 
changes and influences. In other words, I believe an approach that identifies concepts 
and ideas is fundamental to the study of the history of ideas and intellectual history. 
It is just so embedded in historical practice to write of histories, or to just talk of 
concepts of ‘mass’, ‘evolution’, ‘liberty’, and so on. If we cannot talk of such units, 
we are in danger of making the past unintelligible. If people did not share concepts, 
or some kind of units of information within themselves, and at times with us, how 
can we be able to work out what they thought? Each agent has to be defined as a 
special case without an assumption of conceptual continuity within us or across other 
individuals. It is natural to think that people also had concepts in the past that may 
have sometimes been the same ones as we possess. In order not to exercise this craft 
at all, we need a much more radical change in the fundamental thinking of our 
orientation towards the past
97
. I rather think that the real problem is not to dispense 
with such notions, but to ask how we should understand the talk of concepts and 
ideas in history. Furthermore, we may adopt a more philosophical point of view and 
argue that the postulation of concepts is unavoidable. They may be said to serve at 
least two very essential functions, as Smith and Medin write. We need concepts in 
order to give our world stability which would be rather chaotic without them. We do 
not give a name to each individual and take each object as unique, but treat 
particulars as instances of a concept that we already know. Concepts also allow us to 
go beyond the immediate information given. Once an instance is placed under a 
concept, we can infer what attributes it should have. (Smith and Medin 1981, 1)
98
 To 
reiterate, the problem is to say what it is that we possess.   
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 Naturally, there are alternatives. For example, Quentin Skinner’s theory on intellectual history 
stems at least partially from the rejection of any entities like ideas, concepts or meanings, and rather 
focuses on the uses and intentions of historical authors. Skinner thinks that the search for earlier 
anticipations of later doctrines and the debate on whether a particular doctrine really exists in a 
particular thinker, or at a particular time, are simply absurd. (Skinner 1969, 10-2; 36-7). Also, 
Foucault criticises Lovejoy’s project in a very similar way in his Archaeology of Knowledge (160). 
Yet the question is whether either of these projects is enough to replace the historical accounts that 
rely on concepts or ideas. I tend to agree with Keith Thomas that Skinner’s project is about the uses of 
concept, not the history of concept, and as such, it relies in fact on the notion of concept (Thomas 
2005, 48). 
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 For more on the functions of concepts, see Thagard (1992, 21-24). Thagard lists ten roles that 
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 There are some who have tried to pursue Lovejoy’s project further by re-
formulating the key notion of unit idea. Moltke S Gram and Richard M. Martin 
defend Lovejoy from Hintikka’s (1976) potentially devastating criticism that was 
intended to show that there are no unit ideas. Gram and Martin argue that there are 
indeed unit ideas, such as the law of excluded middle, but that they can have 
numerous formulations. What makes these various formulations instances of a unit 
idea is the fact that “there are always family resemblances sufficient to justify 
bringing them all under a common rubric” (Gram and Martin 1980, 510). Nils B. 
Kvastad writes that a historian of ideas is not “a spiritual chemist breaking up 
compound into irreductible units”, but s/he rather analyses ambiguous terms, being 
sensitive to similarities and differences. He concludes in a similar fashion to Gram 
and Martin that the resemblances “can often be elucidated by means of 
Wittgenstein’s so-called theory of ‘Family Resemblance’”.
99
 However, I fail to see 
how the notions of unit idea and family resemblance could be compatible. The 
former implies that there is a definite unchangeable core, while the latter says that 
instances of a concept do not share a set of common features but are related merely 
by resemblance. We cannot have it both ways.  
Nevertheless, I think that there is something attractive in Lovejoy’s theory of 
ideas as units. Let us think of any putative historical concept - an ‘atom’, for 
example. What is it that makes it the concept that it is? A persuasive answer is that 
there is some conceptual core that makes ‘atom’ the concept it is, and furthermore, 
determines whether a particular instance is an instance of it or not.
100
 Perhaps in this 
case it is a proposition, a ‘minute indivisible portion or thing’. In this way we could 
recognise the existence of such a concept in ancient Greece, 17
th
 century Europe and 
in 20
th
 Century physics. In other words, Lovejoy’s project spells out an intuition that 
in order to be identified as something, there has to be a core meaning that is shared 
by all that are the “same”. We may generalise this conclusion by alleging that if we 
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100
 Gram and Martin also point this out in their defence of Lovejoy’s project against Hintikka’s 
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claim that two or more persons were interested in the same issue or thing - 
‘hybridisation’, for example - it implies that there was something that all these 
people were interested in, in this case, hybridisation. This kind of reasoning leads us 
easily to the conviction that there has to have been an idea or a concept that everyone 
shared or possessed; that there are some kind of unit ideas that different people can 
be interested in and use in different contexts. Perhaps we could think that the 
existence of the same conceptual component is a minimal condition in order to say 
that people are or were concerned, possessed, thought, wrote etc. of the same 
concept. To put it another way, we might contend that the logic of writing the history 
of the “same concept” presupposes something like unit ideas. Taking all this into 
account, therefore, I argue that the case for unit ideas can be made, although it can 
still reasonably be asked whether that case results in satisfactory history writing. 
However, the postulation of such unit ideas can be seen to derive from the logic of 
history writing that requires something akin to a conceptual core, rather than their 
mind independent existence. I come soon to the point regarding in what sense 
concepts can be said to exist.  
Perhaps we could use philosophical theories of possession conditions of 
concepts to substantiate the view of what it means to possess a certain concept. 
While the following theory is not created for the purpose of the history of ideas and 
intellectual history, I do not see why, in principle, it could not offer ingredients for a 
theory of concepts also in a historical context. Christopher Peacocke has advanced a 
theory of concepts that uses possession conditions to individuate concepts. The main 
idea is roughly the following. A concept is determined by an account of the capacity 
of a thinker who masters the concept to have a propositional attitude to contents 
containing that concept. The capacity Peacocke is talking about is that of possessing 
a concept. In other words, to posses a concept a person has to find certain inferences 
“primitively compelling”. Peacocke’s example is the concept of ‘conjunction’ C. A 
person possessing that concept must find the following transitions primitively 
compelling: 
                                                                                                                                          
cannot locate environments that an idea P is supposed to have been asserted, assumed, or repudiated 
(Gram and Martin 1980, 508-9). 




q   pCq   pCq 
----   ----   ---- 
pCq   p   q 
 
 
Peacocke’s theory is quite complex overall, but the main idea of possession 
conditions is enough for our particular interest here. (Peacocke  1992, 6)
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 It is important to point out that Peacocke wants clearly to dissociate his 
concept from mental and prototype theories of concept. His concepts are, just as 
Lovejoy’s ideas are, Platonic entities in a realm of their own, which Peacock finds 
indispensable (see  Peacocke 1992, 13-4; Ch. 4). He and others working in a similar 
fashion do really want to keep any anthropocentric connotations at arms length.
102
 
Another noteworthy issue is that philosophers that have adopted this orientation are 
rather more interested in what stays the same, than in what changes. Peacocke even 
claims that the concept in his sense is a requirement in order to describe a case as one 
of change, rather than as one of replacement, because something has to persist in the 
change. (See Peacocke 1992, 3; see also Diez 2002, 20). Applied to history, this 
expresses Lovejoy’s intuition of the need for conceptual continuity that manifests 
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 Harman has put forward a very similar idea. He also emphasises the role of inferences that are 
“immediate”. According to Harman, the rules of immediate implication and exclusion might be used 
to characterise meanings of logical constants. For example, the logical conjunction ‘and’ would be 
defined as that sentential connective C, such that for any propositions, P and Q,  
P,Q logically imply C(P,Q) 
C(P,Q) logically implies P 
C(P,Q) logically implies Q.  (Harman 1986) 
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 See for instance Peacocke 1992 (3, 13). Jose A. Diez has tried to develop a theory for the 
individuation of scientific concepts that relies on Peacocke’s idea of possession conditions. It does 
become rather complex because he argues that the content of a theoretical concept C of a theory T has 
five different components: lawful-formal, applicative, observational, operational and folk-ancestry. In 
itself interesting theory becomes at times rather suggestive through repeated reminders that it is 
neither “suspicious of socio-psychologism, at least not in any bad sense”, nor “dangerously 
sociologistic” (Diez 2002, 23-4). It gives the feeling that there is some underlying story left untold. 
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itself in unit ideas. This is naturally something that a representative of cognitive 
history and philosophy of science would not agree about, but I believe this basic 
intuition is correct, as we will soon see.   
We might, then, say that while recognising that historical concepts have to 
have some continuing core, Lovejoy’s account of unit ideas, via Peacocke’s theory of 
concept possession, is able to substantiate the intuition and provide a theory of how 
to individuate concepts. Unfortunately, there are still problems that make this project 
an unlikely candidate for a theory of historical concepts or ideas. Firstly, a problem 
with Peacocke’s theory is that it operates at such a high level of abstraction - his 
examples are such concepts as ‘red’ and ‘conjunction’ - that it makes it difficult to 
see whether his theory could actually be used for individuating concepts in the 
history of science that are much more nuanced and complicated. Diez’s (2002) 
attempt does not seem to make the situation much better either. Further, we saw that 
some critics of Lovejoy’s account thought that it overemphasised continuity and also 
that Nersessian’s account took the problem between continuity and discontinuity as 
being central in intellectual history. I think that Lovejoy’s account or any other 
project of unit or other ahistoric ideas or concepts, inevitably hides discontinuities in 
the history of thinking and is, therefore, one-sided. Even though it is important to 
realise that a meaningful study of a historical concept has to show continuity between 
different representations, it is not yet enough to have a meaningful conceptual history 
because discontinuities and changes in thinking are just as interesting and necessary 
to take into account.  
  
Cognitive history and philosophy of science 
 
A point of criticism in Lovejoy’s theory that I did not discuss further in the last 
section is that unit ideas are ahistoric and non-natural beings. It is, of course, not 
possible to give a simple answer to the question of what historical concepts are 
                                                                                                                                          
Perhaps it is just a reflection of deep antipathy, inherited from Frege, Russell, Popper and others, 
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ontologically. However, we ought to take seriously the concern expressed by 
historians that Platonic entities do not come across as being meaningful, although the 
ontological question is surely secondary from a historian’s point of view. 
Furthermore, the supposition of Platonic entities is a problem if one is inclined to 
accept the view, as I do, that everything has to be a natural being explainable by 
sciences. With regard to ontology, my suggestion is to take concepts as mental 
representations, as Nersessian and Kvastad have argued.
103
 For the purposes of 
history writing, it is better to stick to entities that reside in time and place. More 
importantly, I fail to see a compelling philosophical reason that makes the acceptance 
of non-natural entities necessary. Therefore, the preference is to commit only to 
naturalistic ontology and more generally to naturalism. As a consequence, the 
existence of any supernatural entities outside the domain of science is rejected. 
Whatever concepts turn out to be, they have to be subject to natural and scientific 
explanations. 
 A rival account to Lovejoy’s that adopts such a naturalistic point of view is 
what Nersessian calls cognitive history and philosophy of science (cognitive HPS). 
Nersessian offers us an account that does not suffer from the overemphasis of 
continuity. A reader of this thesis is already generally familiar with the orientation in 
question, because it is the same overall tradition that Andersen, Barker, Chen and 
Thagard represent. However, Nersessian adds something more to what has already 
been said. She appears to extend the cognitive perspective, so that in addition to 
applications to concept acquisition and extension determination, her perspective also 
includes theoretical problems in the history of ideas and intellectual history.  
 The cognitive HPS sees the problem of individuating concepts as part of the 
wider representational problem, which leads them to rely extensively on cognitive 
psychology (Nersessian 1992, 37). The cognitive HPS adopts the prototype or 
probabilistic view of concepts. The general claim is that the representation of a 
                                                                                                                                          
towards anything psychological or sociological.  
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 Gram and Martin appear to continue Lovejoy’s tradition in respect of ontology.  At least they do 
not dissociate themselves from Lovejoy’s problematic ontological commitments. Kvastad, in turn, 
says clearly that he does not want to commit to Lovejoy’s Platonic ontology, and therefore, not to 
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concept is some sort of measure of a ‘central tendency’ of the properties of its 
instances. On the probabilistic view, each feature of a concept has an assigned weight 
based on the total number of instances that have it. The weight reflects the 
probability that an instance has that particular feature. Moreover, the more highly 
weighted features an instance has, the more typical and more similar to other 
instances of the concept it is. There is no distinction between essential and accidental 
properties but only a difference in the degree of weight, and the weighting is, 
moreover, liable to change. The upshot of the suggestion of the cognitive HPS with 
regard to a new metatheoretical notion in the history of thought is that “the 
overlapping set of ‘similarities’ or ‘resemblances’ makes a concept into a unit, 
entitles us to call it the ‘Y’, and enables us to write its history”. It is, in other words, a 
family resemblance concept. Furthermore, Nersessian claims that it fits well with 
analyses of the historical or ‘dynamical’ dimension of meaning in scientific theories: 
“It can allow for development, change and continuity in a way the ‘classical’ 
conception cannot”. A consequence is, for example, that we can say that “there are a 
number of different concepts of electrical and magnetic action, each of which is a 
‘field’ concept.” (Nersessian 1985, 180-1) 
 Before proceeding any further, we may ask whether Kuhn’s development of 
the family resemblance theory might after all offer us as much as that of 
Nersessian’s, a theory of what the metatheoretical notion in these fields is. I do not 
think this is so. The reason is that Kuhn’s theorising on family resemblance is 
focused on determining extension, while we are concerned with the possession 
conditions of concepts. Furthermore, that is something that Nersessian, in her 
suggestion regarding the probabilistic account of concept, also overlooks. 
Unfortunately, her suggestion hides the difference between an understanding of 
instances as objects in the world that fall under a concept, and as other (historical) 
representations of a master concept that is a representation itself. The probabilistic or 
prototype account of concept is a summary of features with weight reflecting the 
probability that an instance has that property. A concept is constructed on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                          
understand ideas as “extramental” concepts. (Kvastad 1977, 158.) In other words, Kvastad’s 
interpretation is that unit ideas should be understood as mental concepts. 
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real physico-material instances, and thus, deals with the application of concept to 
individual objects in the external world. The question of what features instances of a 
concept have, and whether there is a unique set of features that characterise all 
instances, are separate from the question of what it is to possess a concept. To 
possess is to have a certain representation whether or not that representation 
instantiates anything in the world. How could we assign a weight, let us say, to those 
features with which ancient scientist characterised the concept of atom? The 
comparison is not to be made to the world by trying to find out how many instances 
fulfil this description, but to other representations of the concept of atom, such as in 
physics in the 20
th
 century. Further, it is not clear how we should understand 
features. As already indicated, it cannot be those features that are born out of 
observing instances. For example, I may possess a concept without knowing 
anything about the actual features of instances of that concept. I may have a concept 
of planet, for example, without having constructed it by observing real planets, nor 
knowing whether features that I attribute to planets are actually possessed by planets. 
What is more, there are a lot of abstract concepts that cannot possibly have been 
constructed by observing their instances, and nor do they have any cognised relation 
to their putative instances. Naturally, it would be possible to understand concept as a 
second-order relation to its instances. That is, the extension of a historical concept is 
all those (historical) representations and not objects that fall under the concept. 
Nevertheless, this does not change the main point that the question here is of concept 
possession and representations, without the concern of their relation to the mind-
independent world. All in all, without some further qualifications, Nersessian’s 
account is not satisfactory for the purposes of history writing. 
Furthermore, Medin and Smith write generally about categorisation that to 
have a concept of X is to know something about the properties of entities that belong 
to the class of X, and further, such properties are used in categorisation (8). In 
relation to the probabilistic account, they say that a representation of a concept, i.e. a 
summary of features of instances, is used whenever a decision is made of the 
membership in that concept (62). This seems to suggest that to possess a concept a 
person has the whole summary description in the mind. But this is implausible. It is 
not likely that people have a long list of features in their minds when they apply a 
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concept. If this is accepted, does it mean that people cannot be said to possess 
concepts properly that they nevertheless use without effort?  
Yet, the most severe problem stems from the logic of history writing. The 
problem with Nersesssian’s theory becomes very apparent if we compare it to the 
one by Lovejoy. One may wonder whether the family resemblance account is in 
accordance with the pre-empirical intuition of meaning in the context of history, 
because it allows, in principle, a situation where the “same” concepts do not share 
any common features. If everything has changed and there is nothing that they share, 
why would we want to call them the same concepts? Wouldn’t it be better just to call 
them different concepts? If the concept of ‘atom’ in Ancient Greece is nothing like 
the one in contemporary physics, is there any reason to regard them as variations of 
the same concept? We should note that we are not interested in the history of terms, 
but in the history of concepts. The same linguistic appearance should not confuse 
two different concepts represented by two tokens of the same term as instances of the 
same concepts. Lovejoy realised this desire for the conceptual core and tried, 
therefore, to find some elementary units that were, in addition, the most fundamental 
in the Western intellectual history. 
Nersessian’s problem is, thus, the opposite of Lovejoy’s. Her theory makes 
the history of concept as history of concept questionable because of its strong 
emphasis on discontinuities. The biggest problem for Lovejoy’s unit ideas from a 
historical point of view is not, to my mind, to find “ideas” like that in history, but 
that it, on all counts, does not seem to be a very fruitful way to study history. If we 
have defined this pre-empirical unitary or analytic meaning and point out different 
contexts where it can be found, we may merely be justifying the view we had in the 
first place, instead of empirically investigating the thinking of historical agents. By 
defining ‘atom’ in such a narrow way as above, we may be able to write a history of 
“unitary” or “analytic idea” but be able to tell very little of what else people thought 
in history. Nersessian, on the other hand, can illuminate very well how different 
thinking was in the past, but she is in danger of putting things together that are 
conceptually totally dissimilar and disconnected.  
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On a more general level, this is the problem of continuity and discontinuity in 
the history of thought. That is, in what circumstances should we talk about 
conceptual change and in what circumstances of conceptual stability? We are faced 
with the following dilemma: we may include too little or too much in the conceptual 
content, and on both accounts we are driven to a problem with the historical 
description. If we include too little, and thus make our definition of a concept very 
general, we may find a lot of continuity in history. The result may be that the same 
concept has appeared and been used in various contexts. But then we run the risk of 
writing rather uninformative history, as argued above. For example, if we define 
‘element’ as a chemically indecomposable body, we find it both in Lavoisier, who is 
thought to have initiated a scientific revolution, and in Stahl, who was one of the 
main architects of the pre-Lavoisier alchemical chemistry. Consider the following 
example. Stahl makes a distinction in his Philosophical Principles of Universal 
Chemistry between physical and chemical principles and says that the former are 
such that “a Mixt is really composed” and the latter are such “into which all Bodies 
are found reducible by the chemical operation hitherto known” (Stahl 1730, 4). The 
latter definition is strikingly similar to Lavoisier’s words in Method of Chymical 
Nomeclature in that “we shall content ourselves here with regarding as simple all the 
substances which we cannot decompose; all such as we obtain in the last result from 
chymical analysis” (Lavoisier 1788, 12) or in Elements of Chemistry in that “if we 
apply the term elements or principles of bodies, to express our idea of the last point 
which analysis is capable of reaching, we must admit, as elements, all the substances 
into which we are able to reduce bodies by decomposition” (Lavoisier 1793, xxii). 
The question is whether it is fair to say that they had the same concept. The other 
option is to make a definition much more precise and detailed so that it will shed 
light into differences in their thinking. For example, Lavoisier, unlike Stahl, did not 
think that the same elements are found in all bodies
104
. If, for instance, that is 
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 Note that Stahl also made a distinction between specifical and generical. “The generical is the 
combination of Principles numerically and essentially different … The Specifical being unknown to 
the understanding, depends upon the different figure, number and situation of the material 
Principles”(Stahl 1730, 10). Only in the former sense are elements or principles the same in all 
bodies: “But as the four Peripatetic Elements, howsoever understood, cannot have place if supposed 
specifically the same in all Subjects; so neither can Chemical Principles: for no-one has hitherto 
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included in the concept of element, we are able to say that Lavoisier brought a 
conceptual change. But the disadvantage here is that we may suppress continuity at 
some level just because there is change at some other level. This is a problem with 
what Nersessian highlighted through the concept of field. If we adopt a modern 
definition, then nobody had a field concept before Einstein. In contrast, if we 
understand ‘field’ as understood by Faraday, his successors may not have possessed 
a field concept, but something else. The moral of this discussion is that if we try to 
give a precise definition of what a concept is, then the recognition of both change 
and continuity are just as problematic. The postulation of change omits continuity, 
and the postulation of continuity omits change. And yet it seems that both conceptual 
continuity and discontinuity are real and important phenomena. The simultaneous 
description of them does not seem to be easily available, given the tools we have. 
 
Conceptual continuity and discontinuity reconciled  
 
Now, it is clear that, unlike for Lovejoy, the description of discontinuity is not a 
problem for Nersessian. She also has an answer to the situation where two 
representations of “the same concept” do not share anything in common. Nersessian 
maintains that concepts have a continuing character by being inherited from one 
group of individuals to another. In the case of several changes that makes two 
concepts rather, or even totally different, we may still regard them as part of the same 
historical succession, if we can prove a historical connection from the first version to 
the last. Nersessian utilises Shapere’s idea of “chains of reasoning”. That is, reason 
connects a successor’s idea or concept to its predecessor. Scientists who develop “the 
same concept” are related by a reasoning that leads them to improve, change and 
modify their predecessors’ representations (see Shapere 1982, 21; see also Shapere 
2001). We should understand this as the case where successive scientists or scholars 
are familiar with the conceptual products of their predecessors, i.e. they use their 
                                                                                                                                          
pretended to shew that these Principles are specifically the same in all bodies. But if consider’d only 
as to their generical qualities, they may be allow’d in Compounds” (Stahl 1730, 4). 
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representations to form new representations. The established connection via the 
minds of scientists is enough to link concepts historically, and thus sameness can be  
reduced to the continuing, but changing character of the conceptual content.  
However, I do not believe Nersessian’s solution is enough for what we need, 
i.e. a historically viable theory for describing conceptual changes. We can accept that 
linking two representations by scientists proves the case for historical continuity 
between them, but it is not enough to say that there are two representations of the 
same concept. A person can study a certain conceptual representation and be inspired 
to develop something radically different, in which case we would surely not say that 
the concept that inspired the person is somehow the same as the one that results out 
of this activity. Again, as Lovejoy’s theory implies, the exemplifications of the same 
concept in history do need to have at least something in common.  
The solution to the problem of how to describe historical concepts so that 
neither continuity nor discontinuity is suppressed can be found by taking the best 
parts of both accounts. Firstly, let us accept that there has to be a minimal common 
component before we can categorise two concepts in history as instantiations of the 
same concept. But let us also take on board Nersessian’s and the idea of other 
cognitive scientists that concept cannot be defined simply by giving it an 
unambiguous set of features that all instances share. Further, the suggestion that 
concept can be taken to have a structure where change in the conceptual content can 
be described as change in the component parts is also worth taking seriously. But 
note that from the latter commitments, the family resemblance account does not yet 
necessarily follow. What we can do is to understand that each instance of a historical 
concept has some minimal, “necessary”, shared conceptual component, but not a set 
beyond the necessary component that would characterise all instances. In other 
words, something has to be shared between concepts that are the “same”, but there is 
no exhaustive or explicit definition of the covering concept.  The minimal component 
thus guarantees membership, but does not function as a definition of the concept. 
Definition in any historically illuminating sense is unattainable, because the out-of-
core elements of any historical covering concept vary, and as a consequence, no 
definition can capture the full conceptual content. As already pointed out, I am not 
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claiming that it is necessarily self-evident what the necessary component of a 
historical concept is, as its determination may involve subjective evaluation and 
depend on a specific historical interest. What I am claiming, however, is that 
postulation of a shared conceptual component between all instantiations of the 
“same” historical concepts is a (logical) requirement for writing an intelligible 
history of concept.  
The fundamental reason for suggesting this is that I believe it is historically 
the most viable. We can view the concept of ‘atom’ as having a conceptual core, 
which is something that people who used any exemplification of it had in their 
minds, but it is impossible to go beyond the minimal definition and draft an 
exhaustive definition due to the fact that all the other components keep changing.
105
 
One may ask: “What about a case, should it happen, where there is simply nothing 
shared between a concept and its distant origin?” I think in such a case we have to 
make it clear that these two representations are not “the same concepts” any more. 
Let us imagine that a certain instance I of a historical concept C can be satisfactorily 
characterised by the following features: A, B, C and D. Further, two other instances 
I1 and I2 can be described respectively as follows: A, B, D, E and A, C, E, F. In this 
example, the feature A represents the necessary component. It also takes into account 
other relevant (changing) features (B, C, D, E, F). The suggestion above is thus able 
to describe both conceptual continuity and discontinuity. A further instance I3 would 
not be a member of C, if it takes the form: B, C, D and F. The reason is that it lacks 
the common necessary component.  Whether such cases of discontinuity arise in the 
historical succession is an issue for historical debate and verification. Nevertheless, 
now we can understand Nersessian’s demand for dynamical concepts that can 
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 Papineau and Bird have advanced a theory which postulates an intensional core that stays the same 
in theory transitions, allowing a descriptive determination of the same reference (see Papineau 1996; 
Bird 2000, 189-191). Although this theory appears to resemble the one offered in the text, there is a 
crucial difference between them. Bird’s and Papineau’s theory is designed to find a minimal 
intensional content that is true in two or more theoretical contexts (thus) guaranteeing  the stability of 
reference. I am interested in an association (between a term and a feature that characterises it) that 
stays invariant between different users of concept, irrespective of its truth-value or reference. In other 
words, Papineau and Bird are not interested in the history of thought per se, and therefore their theory 
is not suitable in the context of this chapter.   
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change, transform, appear and disappear. Nersessian’s requirement makes sense 
because most of our beliefs that characterise concepts are certainly not static.  
There is also an interesting further application that is based on an 
understanding of concepts as being structured. Thagard has offered a theory of how 
new concepts can arise. According to his theory, they do not arise from experience or 
by definition, but by conceptual combination. A new concept is a non-linear and non-
definitional amalgam of existing concepts. That is possible because concepts have 
components that can be combined to form a new concept. Some values or 
components may be overdriven by others. If we think that a ‘feminist’ is politically 
more active than a ‘bank teller’, then in the concept ‘feminist bank teller”
106
 we have 
a contradiction. In that case the political activity of the former takes precedence over 
the inactivity of the latter. As a result we do not have a contradiction but a new 
concept that is an unusual combination of qualities. This theory cannot be studied 
further here but fits well with our discussion of conceptual change and simultaneous 
continuity and discontinuity in a conceptual change. More importantly, it indicates 
the way to proceed in formulating a theory of concept emergence and modification. 
(See Thagard 1984) 
 However, there are two objections to this account that have to be dealt with. 
The first asks whether, taking into account that there are innumerable beliefs that can 
be used to characterise a concept, we are supposed to take all of them as constituting 
the conceptual content. If the answer is yes, we risk accepting the extremely 
problematic doctrine of holism
107
. If not, how do we limit the set? The answer is that 
when talking of a concept or the meaning of a term in this sense, it is meant to 
include the central or most important beliefs associated with a term or in the 
conceptual content. The problem with this answer is that it seems to force us to find 
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 Thagard’s (1984) example.  
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 In the holistic view of content, traditional psychological explanations become problematic. For 
example, if all beliefs are part of the content, it is hard to see how two people could ever share the 
same thought, or how they could ever agree or disagree about the same issue, and how anybody could 
change his/her mind. Arguably, our systems of beliefs are not identical, and hence, our beliefs that are 
dependent on the entire system have different meanings. Reasoning for a change of mind becomes 
hard to understand because a certain belief that I first accept, then later reject, receives a different 
meaning because its rejection brings a change in the system of beliefs. (e.g. Block 1998) 
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some principle that limits the set. It has to be said that the principle that is out of the 
question is analyticity. This is not primarily because it is such a problematic 
principle, as demonstrated convincingly by Quine (see Quine 1964), but because we 
are certainly not talking of anything that is true, whether in virtue of meaning or 
otherwise. Rather, we are talking of idea associations that may be assertible if a 
person knows the concept or the meaning of the term, although they may not be in 
any way true
108
. Further, we may grant that the notion of central belief is vague 
because it is hardly possible to draw a sharp line between central and non-central 
beliefs. Nevertheless, the distinction is meaningful, as much, for example, as that of 
‘bald’. Admittedly, determining what the central beliefs are involves an element of 
subjective evaluation. Often they are decided on pragmatic grounds, i.e. those beliefs 
are highlighted that a person is interested in studying. Yet, it is true that some 
associated beliefs are more significant than others even though it is hard to agree 
which exactly. There is also another way to limit what beliefs are taken into account. 
If the model of frames that stores beliefs to make a prototype is accurate, it gives 
some criteria for selection. Namely, a frame has a hierarchy (see Chapter 4). For 
cognitive reasons an appraisal of the number of beliefs, what the beliefs are and in 
what order they are associated with a term, are obviously limited. It may be an 
important association of ‘dog’ that they are furry but much less important that they 
have a heart, although it may also be possible to deduce the latter indirectly via the 
postulation that dogs are animals. The latter feature is much less important for the 
stereotype of dog in this frame structure.  
 The second problem concerns intersubjectivity. Although not a universally 
accepted view, many philosophers (especially many of those trained in the analytic 
tradition) would argue that beliefs are private, which cannot as such be shared by 
anybody else
109
. How can we guarantee that other people can have the same thoughts 
as we have and that our thoughts can be subjected to public examination? A popular 
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 An interesting theory along these lines is Ned Block’s idea of conceptual role semantics. He writes 
that inferential roles are best understood as narrow contents, i.e. belief contents in a psychological 
sense, which themselves are never true or false. A contrast is wide contents that have to do with the 
relation between a belief and the world, and have, therefore, truth-values. (See Block 1993, 1998) 
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answer is to assume that there are non-psychological propositions that can be shared 
and whose meaning can be defined truth-functionally. A person is thought to be 
related to a proposition by a belief and by other so-called propositional attitudes. If 
we adopt this view, we can begin talking of sets of propositions that terms are related 
with and that equate privately to beliefs. Similarly, we may talk of a change in the set 
of propositions that a term is linked with. The existence of propositions is naturally a 
difficult metaphysical problem although most philosophers appear to accept them in 
some form. For the naturalistic perspective adopted in the thesis, we do not accept 
propositions as Fregean non-natural propositions. Another solution might be to 
postulate some kind of verification procedure that guarantees that people entertain 
the same beliefs. Let us take a term, a public shared linguistic entity, to imply certain 
associated assumptions which can be verified by the public use of language. For 
example, an understanding of the expression ‘bird’ would require an associated 
belief that it is feathered, and for this reason, prompt, if asked, the inference ‘it has 
feathers’. 
110
 I do not want to extend the examination of what possibilities there are 
for guaranteeing intersubjectivity. Both of these approaches are possible in 
                                                                                                                                          
109
 Cf. Wittgenstein’s account of beliefs. He would arguably deny that any sense has been attributed to 
the idea that beliefs are private and probably contend that philosophical questions about beliefs, for 
example, should be studied by examining various uses of the word ‘belief’.   
110
 An example of a theory that uses the intersubjective criteria is Cesare Cozzo’s “epistemic theory 
of meaning”. His theory relies on some primitive inferences that a person has to be capable of 
inducing if s/he can be taken to understand an expression. The crux is that Cozzo’s “primitive 
epistemic property” P, that is at the same time the meaning constitutive property, is such that a person 
attaches it to an expression E. According to Cozzo, there is no need to give a justification of P, and 
deviation with regard to P indicates a lack of understanding of E. For example, in order to understand 
the word ‘room’ (E), Cozzo writes that a person has to be able to associate the primitive property P1 to 
the expression which can be represented as an inferential schema: 
 X is in a room 
P1       ---------------------- 
 There are walls around X.  
In other words, a person has to be able to draw the relevant inferences in order to master the 
expression. In this case, s/he has to be able to infer from the sentence ‘Tom is in a room’ that there are 
walls around Tom. More importantly, a failure to use an expression according to P1 is a sign of an 
inadequate understanding. The sense of a word is roughly, then, the set of all primitive epistemic 
properties one has to attach to that word.  (Cozzo 2002, see also Cozzo 1994). 




 The intersubjectivity of private beliefs is a problem of its own in 




Meaning change of ‘element’ 
 
Kuhn said in his article on Boyle (see above) that Boyle’s work was directed against 
the “chymical” understanding of ‘element’, a substance that would not be 
decomposable and transformable. Let us continue the investigation of ‘element’ and 
examine what kind of change it later undergoes. An important change in the 
conceptual development is thought to occur at the end of 18
th
 century due to 
Lavoisier’s examinations. Yet there is a sense, as we saw above, in which we could 
say that the contemporaries of Stahl and Lavoisier all shared the same concept. That 
is, we may take the concept of ‘element’ as a kind of unit idea expressing merely 
something like ‘an undecomposable and materially homogenous body’. Therefore, 
because there is a minimal conceptual content connecting these representations, we 
may say that in the narrow sense they shared the same concept, and moreover, that it 
is still used in modern chemistry.  
Let us focus our attention, then, on what beliefs changed.  We can see that 
there are many important features that Lavoisier did not attribute to elements that his 
predecessors did. Firstly, elements were thought to be ultimate constituents of 
bodies. Secondly, elements, or principles as they were sometimes called, were 
understood to be responsible for the observable qualities of bodies. An example 
could be the famous ‘phlogiston’ that was supposedly responsible for combustion 
and sometimes also for the firmness of bodies. Thirdly, elements were assumed to be 
found in all bodies. In general, then, this summarises some of the central features of 
the concept ‘element’ before Lavoisier’s chemical revolution. A closer examination, 
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 A third potential possibility is the position that Hacking sees adopted, for example, by cognitive 
scientist Medin. That is, concept is more than a set of ideas in the mind of a single individual, but is 
something less than Platonistic, being something between Frege’s associated ideas and Begriff. 
(Hacking 2001, 478-9) This would naturally need much more elaboration.  
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 Cf. Popper’s view of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of science (Popper 1997, 45-7). 
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however, might naturally bring out some variations in respect of individual 
philosophers or chemists. As a micro study, it would be possible to proceed, as Perrin 
(1988) has done in investigating documented responses in the French chemical 
community over a couple of decades, to Lavoisier’s chemical revolution and try to 
draft an account of the continuous change in the associated beliefs or in the 
conceptual representation of a community. Nevertheless, these three components can 
be taken as expressing those features that a person typically had in mind when s/he 
employed the concept of element at the beginning and mid-18
th
 century. 
We may think of Lavoisier trying to prove that the bodies that were regarded 
as elements were not undecomposable. Lavoisier’s studies with combustion showed 
that the prime example of an element earth - diamond - could actually be reduced to 
air. His further studies with combustion brought him to the famous rejection of 
phlogiston and gave him evidence for the view that air is not an element, but is 
composed of two gaseous substances, oxygen and nitrogen. Furthermore, Lavoisier 
proved, apparently prompted by the experiments of Henry Cavendish, that water is 
not an elementary substance but is also composed of two “airs”. All of these results, 
combined with the generally confused state of chemical knowledge, gave him the 
impetus to renew the whole chemical nomenclature. Lavoisier, thus, demonstrated 
that two elementary substances had turned out to be composable and that they were 
definitely not the ultimate components of bodies. In general, we may say that 
Lavoisier abandoned the feature of ultimate constituent and replaced it with a 
conditional understanding of elements as being so far undecomposable
113
. By the 
same token he did not think that the same elementary substances can be found in all 
bodies. Finally and most controversially, Lavoisier abandoned the view that elements 
are directly responsible for the observable qualities of bodies because, in his view, 
they combine to produce new chemical substances that are not similar by their 
qualities to their components. This is controversial because Lavoisier was obviously 
not free from attributing such powers to some simple substances.
114
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 On this, see, for example, Oldroyd (1973), Gough (1988) or Siegfried (2002). 
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 To see this, it is enough to think of the name ‘oxygen’. Although it was for him an element in the 
sense that it could not be divided into simpler ones, it also had the property that the older elements 
had: it caused directly something to happen in bodies. Lavoisier thought that all acids were combined 
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 With regard to meaning or conceptual change, we need first to note that, in 
addition to the term ‘element’, the main conceptual content stayed invariant, 
although many other beliefs changed. Because of the continuity of the conceptual 
core we can justifiably say that we are talking about instantiations of one concept. 
But then we can also describe the meaning change of ‘element’ in 18
th
 century 
chemistry as a change in the set of beliefs associated with that term or in the concept 
element. What is more, although not essential for conceptual membership, it is not 
difficult to show that the set of beliefs associated with ‘element’ after Lavoisier is a 
successor of the set held by his predecessors. Lavoisier started working with the set 
of associations constructed by his predecessors in mind and proceeded to change 
those belief associations. There is a clear historical link.
115
 In conclusion, we can say 
that Lavoisier’s concept is a variation of the same concept as the one that preceded it.  
There is much discontinuity, as we have seen, but also a crucial continuity in the 
general idea of undecomposability and the focus on the same problematic that his 
predecessors faced, i.e. what are bodies composed of? I think this is an answer to 
Nersessian’s concern about writing the histories of concepts so that they illustrate 
both continuity and discontinuity. 
 
Referential change and incommensurability reconsidered 
 
In light of the above interpretation of meaning and conceptual change, it is 
appropriate to look again at the problematic passage about referential change by 
                                                                                                                                          
by the combination of non-metallic substances with “eminently respirable air”, which he renamed 
“principe acidifiant” or “principe oxygene”. Oxygen was, thus, the substance that acidifies. (Mackie 
1935, 217; see also Lavoisier 1790, 24). The same underlying idea is also implicit in the concept 
‘caloric’ because caloric was taken as the principle of heat and expansibility.  
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 In his early career in the 1760s, two of perhaps the most well-known French chemists were Pierre-
Joseph Macquer and G.-F. Rouelle. The lectures of the latter were popular in the community of 
chemists; according to Siegfried, nearly everyone who later became chemically significant in France 
attended them. Rouelle’s doctrine was built on the framework of Stahlian chemistry, but Rouelle 
himself did not publish. Both Siegfried and a Rouelle-expert, Rhoda Rappaport, think that Macquer 
was the most influential in spreading Roeulle’s view. (Siegfried 2002, 133-4; Rappaport 1960, 77) We 
know that this was Lavoisier’s scientific environment and that, as a young scientist, he also attended 
Rouelle’s lectures. Therefore, we can assume that Lavoisier’s scientific thinking at the beginning of 
his career was Stahlian.   
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Kuhn and also to consider Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability. As we recall, Kuhn 
suggests that references of ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘mass’ change in the transition from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics:  
 
The variables and parameters that in the Einsteinian Ei’s represented 
spatial position, time, mass, etc. still occur in the Ni’s and they still 
represent Einsteinian space, time and, mass. But the physical referents 
of these Einsteinian concepts are by no means identical with those of 
the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian mass is 
conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at low relative 
velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then 
they must not be conceived to be the same.) (SSR, 101-2)  
 
This is probably one of the most problematic passages in all of Kuhn’s texts. We 
should, nevertheless, find an appropriate interpretation of it although practically no 
interpretation is without problems, either in terms of the philosophical position or in 
terms of Kuhn’s intended message or terminology. Sankey (1994) advocates the 
view that Kuhn implicitly accepted wide descriptivism that implies that any theory 
change allows, in principle, a referential change. The underlying idea is that the 
sense of a term changes in theory change because it equals the description implied in 
a theory. This may result in the situation where two senses of the same term are 
incompatible; therefore, they both cannot be true of the same entity. Bird’s (2000, 
2002) interpretation is along the same lines with the specification that Kuhn’s 
intensionalism was “thick” and “strict”, i.e. intension or sense depend on a wide 
range of theoretical assumptions that have to be true in order for a term to refer to a 
property. Both Sankey and Bird appear to think that the idea of two different 
references is incompatible with realism, which takes ‘time’, ‘mass’ and ‘space’ to 
refer to one property or entity in both contexts. Furthermore, Kuhn’s claim of two 
references might be taken as an indication of idealism or constructivism, i.e. that 
there are two separate worlds before and after paradigms. Or if we wish to avoid 
idealism, then it is still implausible that there exist two similar but separate properties 
or substances to which respective terms refer. For that reason, Bird (2002, 458-9) 
concludes that Kuhn must have used “referent” in the above passage in a weak sense 
to mean something like “internal reference”; i.e. reference is not an entity existing 
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independently of the theory, but is the hypothetical entity posited by the theory that 
might not actually exist. Understood this way, its meaning is not much different from 
sense or intension.  
In fact, it might be possible to retain the idea of two separate references 
without falling to idealism or constructivism. For example, Field (1973) has 
suggested that terms may partially denote entities, while in the Einsteinian 
revolution, terms underwent denotational refinement: Newton’s mass partially 
denoted relativistic mass and proper mass, and it went under refinement in the 
Einsteinian revolution to denote only the latter. However, it is questionable whether 
we actually can perceive that such terms as ‘time’, ‘mass’ and ’space’ refer to some 
entities or properties. I agree with Bird that Kuhn did not think that these terms have 
real references in the world. For Kuhn there is no single property of being mass, 
time, and space there that stays constant in theory changes. The terms may be 
understood, rather, as denoting something similar to conceptual categories without 
corresponding references. Interestingly, in the latter part of his career Kuhn defined 
his position as a Kantian with movable categories (e.g. RSS, 104; 207; 264). The 
difference to Kant is naturally that Kuhn’s categories, whether they are called a 
lexicon or mental module, are historical and subject to modification.  Nevertheless, 
from this “neo-Kantian” perspective, Kuhn’s changing ‘mass’, ‘time’, and ‘space’ 
can be taken as categories that organise experience.  
We have above the ingredients for an interpretation of the passage, although 
it is necessary to reformulate and express it a bit differently. The first step is to think 
of meaning change as the change between two representations or sets of ideas. The 
following quotation, already used in Chapter 2, sheds more light on the matter:  
 
The laymen who scoffed at Einstein’s general theory of relativity 
because space could not be “curved” – it was not that sort of thing – 
were not simply wrong or mistaken. Nor were the mathematicians, 
physicists, and philosophers who tried to develop a Euclidian version 
of Einstein’s theory. What had previously been meant by space was 
necessarily flat, homogenous, isotropic, and unaffected by the 
presence of matter. … Consider, for another example, the men who 
called Copernicus mad because he proclaimed that the earth moved. 
They were not either just wrong or quite wrong. Part of what they 
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 190 
meant by ‘earth’ was fixed position. Their earth, at least could not be 
moved. (SSR, 149) 
 
We ought to understand that Kuhn is talking about two different conceptual contents 
here, not of references, and this can be applied also to the quotation above. If Kuhn is 
historically correct, the concept of space that scientists working in the Newtonian 
paradigm possessed can be characterised by the following features: flat, 
homogenous, isotropic, and unaffected by the presence of matter. These beliefs 
changed in the Einsteinian revolution. Yet, it is likely that they also retained some 
core idea of space. I believe something like this is implied in many studies that try to 
study in practice how meaning and thinking have changed over the course of history. 
We find hardly any technical notion of meaning or concept in most historical studies. 
And it was a historical study that Kuhn conducted in SSR. On the other hand, 
‘meaning’ in this sense could be termed stereotype or prototype because it is about 
what people would typically believe is true of entities called by a certain name. 
Notice also that the proposed theory can nominate ‘meaning’ to proper names 
because there are certainly beliefs associated even with proper names. That is why 
we can make sense of the above idea that ‘earth’ had a different meaning in the 
Ptolemaic and Copernican paradigms. Many philosophical theories, the causal theory 
above all, would deny that there is any meaning beyond the individual that a term 
refers to.   
In addition, in order to be consistent with Kuhn’s philosophy, we may take 
these ideas as forming a category that will be used in naming future objects. 
Secondly, because the ideas between two theories appear to be incompatible, just as 
Bird and Sankey write, they cannot be true of the same entities. They have to be true 
of some other entities or not to refer at all.  This is to say that it makes sense, in 
principle, to think that Kuhn had implicitly accepted something like a wide 
descriptive theory of reference, whether or not he thought that the terms in question 
actually refer anywhere. It is however important to understand that, if this 
interpretation is chosen, Kuhn did not consciously postulate or inherit “a descriptive 
theory”. It is rather that it seems to elaborate on something that appears to be implied 
in the passage under consideration. To put it bluntly, it is merely “a theoretical 
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construction” because it is unlikely that Kuhn thought that those terms actually refer: 
if radically different sets of ideas characterise whatever is called by the same names, 
this may be expressed in the form that putative references have to be different 
entities. However, for Kuhn, these entities were nothing other than them being 
putative, i.e. they did not exist. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand 
that the passage deals with a historical interest regarding the change in thinking of 
scientists; for this reason, these putative entities are best taken as mental concepts. 
But this leads one to ask whether it is at all reasonable to talk of references or 
descriptive theory of reference. Perhaps it would be a better interpretation to 
understand that the question is rather of the relationship between a term and a 
concept.  It might be better if we use and Kuhn had used ‘denotation’ here instead of 
‘reference’: i.e. a denotation of the term changed to a different concept, or to the 
same concept that had undergone a change in some part of it.   
 Finally, I wish to proceed still further and now look at the notion of 
incommensurability. My interpretation is something that Kuhn did not explicitly 
suggest, but it fits well with his philosophical and historical rationale. Let us suppose 
that there has been a drastic change in scientific thinking, i.e. there has been some 
kind of scientific revolution. As a consequence, the beliefs of scientists have 
changed, although scientists often keep using the same terms as earlier, as Kuhn 
writes. Now the situation is that the same terms are applied in two different ways. 
Alternatively, the beliefs associated with the same terms are rather different. Let us 
also suppose that the revolution has been wide enough to cover a large area of 
interrelated terms. The result is that scientists from two different paradigms use the 
same vocabulary, even the same sentences, but they imply very different assumptions 
by them. In that situation it is very difficult in a practical sense to find appropriate 
translations, because an incident of incomprehension cannot be straightened easily by 
related vocabulary due to the fact that they imply other different or even 
incompatible beliefs. It is then, as Kuhn writes, that participants have to become 
translators. This implies a recognition of differences in their discourse and in those 
terms and locutions that are used problematically, so that they then can resort to their 
shared vocabulary in order to achieve comprehension. According to Kuhn, that may 
result in the situation where one manages to describe “the world” of the other in his 
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vocabulary. However, the price to pay may be that the sentences translated are very 
long and complex, or that they require a great space for the deliberations of the other. 
Nevertheless, this is something that Kuhn thinks that a historian of science has to do. 
(SSR, 202-3) 
Sharrock and Read appear to emphasise the same point. According to them, 
Kuhn tried to show that translation between two historical theories is so difficult 
because assertions associated with the same term differ and the matched sentences 
would lack the same “feel”. Word-for-word translations are often unable to retain 
“the same detailed set of interconnections”. They also use Kuhn’s example of the 
difference in meaning between Newton’s and Einstein’s ‘masses’ to point out that 
respective terms imply different assertions. In addition, Sharrock and Read give a 
more mundane example that may shed some further light on the issue. They ask us to 
think of the difference between ‘association football’ and ‘rugby football’ or 
‘American football’. In the latter the expression ‘It’s over the bar’ means ‘He scored’ 
but in the former one ‘He missed’. In order to find the differences in meaning of 
these expressions in these contexts we need to discover what kind of assumptions 
there are in the background. Sometimes a faithful translation of even one sentence 
would require a large-scale exercise in history and it might take the length of a book 
to explain what is missed between the two expressions. (Sharrock and Read 2002, 
64; 150; 168) To summarise, this indicates that incommensurability can be 
understood as a practical difficulty (but not as an impossibility) in understanding and 
achieving comprehension, rather than as a logical impossibility of comparison. In 
other words, it is an explanation as to why “the proponents of competing paradigms 
are always at least slightly at cross-purposes” (SSR, 148; italics mine).  
 
Conclusion   
  
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that Kuhn was at first preoccupied by very 
traditional questions regarding the history of ideas. Although we do not find much 
theorising on the history of ideas later in his writings, there is a fundamental 
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theoretical issue at the heart of this inquest. I agreed with Nersessian that an answer 
to the question of what it means to possess a concept is of fundamental importance 
with regard to the history of thought. One of the most influential answers to the 
question of what the basic theoretical entity in the history of ideas is was given by 
Lovejoy. He proposed that there are atomistic unit ideas that travel throughout 
history. Several historians have criticised the theory, but I maintain that Lovejoy’s 
insight is significant. His project implies that, if two concepts are instances of the 
same historical concept, then there has to be some common core between them. More 
generally, this may be taken as an expression of something that the logic of history 
writing requires. One possibility to explicate this notion is to take concepts or ideas 
as concepts in the fashion of Peacocke. Yet it is true that unit ideas tend to 
concentrate merely on continuity in history and can be seen, therefore, as one-sided. 
Nersessian’s approach, in turn, compares similarities between different feature 
combinations and counts different sets as representing the same concept if there is a 
historical connection between them. The problem with this theory is the opposite to 
that of Lovejoy’s, in that Nersessian emphasises discontinuity to the extent that it is 
possible that instances of “the same concept” do not have anything in common.  
My suggestion is, first of all, to take concepts, in contrast to Lovejoy and in 
agreement with the cognitive HPS, as natural beings, as psychological or 
sociopsychological entities. As regards definability, I argued that, historically, the 
instances of the same concept do need to share a necessary minimal conceptual 
component, but that, beyond the conceptual core, there is no set of features that is 
common to all exemplifications of a certain historical covering concept.  The 
minimal component guarantees conceptual membership, but it is not a full and 
exhaustive definition of the covering concept. Continuity and the description of 
different representations as the representations of the same concept is made possible 
via the minimal component, while discontinuity may be described as a change in the 
out-of-core beliefs.  
Furthermore, Nersessian’s idea, and that of other cognitive scientists, is to 
understand concept as a stereotype with a structure, such as a frame, that can be used 
to describe variation in the concept. In this way we can portray simultaneous 
Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy 
 194 
continuity and discontinuity. I illustrated meaning change by a change in the 




 century chemistry. 
Although we may maintain that the core idea of an indecomposable material body 
has remained invariable, many other central beliefs have altered. 
I offered also an interpretation of Kuhn’s idea of referential change and 
incommensurability, illustrated by the transition from Newtonian mechanics to that 
of Einstein. Referential change emerges from the situation where the relationship 
between the terms ‘space’, ‘mass’, and ‘time’ and the associated ideas or conceptual 
representation change. If the ideas that characterise putative entities are 
incompatible, they cannot, in principle, be true of the same entities and have to, as a 
consequence, refer to different objects or fail to refer completely. However, it is 
better to understand that Kuhn was talking about conceptual change and denotation 
to a concept rather than reference to a mind-independent entity. Furthermore, if the 
alteration in the set of associated ideas is drastic and wide-encompassing enough, 
translation becomes hard to achieve because it is difficult to catch all the assumptions 
implied by the same terms and sentences. Incommensurability is, then, taken as the 
practical difficulty of achieving comprehension and translation between two different 
theoretical frameworks.  
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7. Historical perspective 
 
There are still a couple of important questions to raise here in this penultimate 
chapter before concluding. It is fair to say that the question of comparability brought 
Kuhn’s notions of meaning and meaning change into focus in philosophy. For that 
reason, it is an issue that needs to be addressed. The standard solution to concentrate 
on in fixing reference cannot be our Kuhnian solution, because the idea of referring 
to an invariant universal property or kind is in contrast to Kuhn’s thinking. And even 
though it is true that theories may be compared by their extension composed of 
individuals, I believe that even this approach would produce an overly simplified 
image of what actually occurs in science. More importantly, my message is that 
references are not even necessary in order to have comparability. That is to say that 
there are many ways to compare theories. Kuhn himself indicated that there are 
several criteria that may be used in comparison and theory choice. I show that fears 
of the “anything goes” approach can be abandoned even in the absence of a point-by-
point comparison.    
 This takes us to a foundational issue regarding Kuhn’s philosophy. An 
advocate of a referential solution to the problems of meaning change relies on the 
idea that the truth values of two propositions, whose concepts refer to the same 
entity, can be determined, and hence we come to know which proposition is true and 
which false. Presumably s/he does not wish to relativise truth to a theory, language, 
or to anything else for that matter. However, this position faces a serious problem, 
because virtually all propositions in science that have been judged to be true have 
later turned out to be false. Any proposition that has been accepted could not have 
been literally true, if truth means correspondence to the mind independent reality. A 
realist would probably try to salvage the situation by employing the concept of 
verisimilitude. That is to say, propositions do not need to be exactly true; what is 
important is that later propositions are nearer to truth. This implies that at the end 
there is one true description of reality that science is approximating at the moment. In 
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any case, I think that for a scientific realist, proving an argument for increasing 
verisimilitude is indispensable. And importantly, the view that science converges to 
truth could indeed be a correct view, which means that this possibility has to be taken 
seriously.  
 Kuhn’s philosophy is interpreted as naturalistic in this chapter. I begin the 
chapter by showing that ‘truth’ as a non-relativised notion applied in the context of 
the history of science is a non-natural concept. It is something that is not in the reach 
of practising scientists by natural means, and therefore, cannot be a criterion for 
choosing a theory. I will, secondly, take a look at Kuhn’s “developmental 
perspective” on the history of science. This is roughly the following idea: Scientists 
are part of a certain historical niche. They inherit their predecessors’ world view and 
start reforming it from that point on. The history of science is a dynamic changing 
process rather than an accumulation from a static foundation. The focus ought to be 
on the reasons for changes of beliefs rather than on the justification of beliefs as 
such.   
The historical perspective takes us, then, to the issue of comparison. 
According to Kuhn, scientists, like everybody else, are tied to a certain historical 
moment and they can only use for evaluation what is accessible to them. One point is 
that there is clearly not a crucial test, such as falsification. On the contrary, the 
history of science proves that scientists are epistemologically conservative. Further, 
there are elements in Kuhn’s philosophy that makes his epistemology fit well with 
coherentism. Kuhn named five criteria that can be used in evaluation that all 
contribute to achieving greater success in problem-solving: consistency, accuracy, 
scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. Problem-solving can be understood as a part of the 
general aim to improve the coherence of theories. That accommodates Kuhn’s idea 
that theory choice is a comparative process because we can take it as a comparison of 
the degree of coherence between competing theories. Moreover, conservatism in 
history may be explained by the fact that coherence is easier to maximise by 
avoiding drastic changes. Epistemological conservatism also appears intuitive if we 
further assume that there is something like a conceptual scheme or some other 
system for information organisation, because it is psychologically difficult to make 
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comprehensive changes in large systems. However, there also appears to be a 
problem because the five criteria of evaluation used in theory choice cannot all be 
connected unproblematically to the concept of coherence. Yet, this is not a problem 
if they enhance problem-solving and problem-solving can be linked with the concept 
of coherence, which makes them all at least indirectly related to it.  
The fourth major theme in this chapter is progress. Even if scientists could 
not know what propositions are true, given that we are in the right relation to the 
world, increasing coherence might take us to truth, as Charles Sanders Peirce 
indicated, for example. One difficulty of this view is that there are problems in 
formulating the notion of verisimilitude. My argument, as implied in the earlier 
chapters, is that the question of whether the idea of convergence in the history of 
science is viable should be decided ultimately on empirical grounds. I will not study 
here specific arguments for increasing verisimilitude in the history of science, but 
rather take a look at some of the preconditions that need to hold if those arguments 
are going to succeed. That is, if within our chosen parameter theories show stability 
and continuity in the history of science, then it is at least possible to construct an 
argument for increasing verisimilitude. In contrast, if there is no discernible 
stabilisation and continuity over time, we cannot hold such a position. Kuhn argued 
that historically the case is the latter one.  
 
Kuhn’s historical perspective  
 
Sharrock’s and Read’s Kuhn in their Kuhn – Philosopher of Scientific Revolution is a 
Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosopher who tries to get rid of unsolvable 
philosophical problems. Even though this description does not quite fit Kuhn for the 
reason that Kuhn clearly had philosophical ambitions, which Sharrock and Read also 
note (see 223, note 3), they make a plausible and an interesting claim regarding 
Kuhn’s attitude to science along these lines. Sharrock and Read think that Kuhn’s 
message was that the issues of ‘what is really there’ or ‘whether science represents 
reality’ can only be answered in the context of a scientific controversy itself. These 
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questions turn to queries regarding whether this or that paradigm represents reality 
best – questions that can only be answered by further scientific controversy and 
scientific work. The question whether science represents reality is not, according to 
Sharrock and Read, a philosophical question of science, but a “misleadingly 
abstracted version of specific scientific questions”. (Sharrock and Read 2002, 205) If 
we then ask the typical questions that an advocate of a referential solution asks, such 
as ‘What substance remains constant in theory changes?’, then we actually take part 
in scientific controversies. The problem whether something is, and so always was, a 
planet or a star, and whether something else is really a compound and not a mixture 
are questions that science answers. Obviously, the answers to these questions have 
been different at different times. The upshot is that to try to say what is actually 
there, and has always been there, is to take part in scientific arguments. For that 
philosophy does not give any special vantage point. (Sharrock and Read 2002, 57)  
 I do think that Sharrock’s and Read’s view is right. The philosophy of science 
cannot give meaningful answers to such questions independently of science, but is 
forced to replicate the contemporary science and its results. Arguably, contemporary 
science has not said the final word on reality and is open to correction. But in that 
case to judge the history of science from our perspective with some definite 
conviction can historically only lead to Whig-history mentioned earlier and to an 
unhealthy bias in interpreting the activity of the past science in terms of the present 
science. Yet I would not try to force Kuhn into “a conceptual box” of a therapeutic 
philosopher, but rather look for Kuhn’s philosophical argument which nevertheless 
points to a kind of deflationary view in the philosophy of science. If  we take this 
approach, there is much more to say about Kuhn’s specific historical epistemological 
perspective.  
Let us first see what Kuhn said of the notion of truth in the history of science. 
There are two essays, both published in the 1990s that are of special interest here: 
“The Road since Structure” and “The Trouble with Historical Philosophy of Science” 
(in RSS). In these, Kuhn presents a familiar criticism of the correspondence theory of 
truth. According to Kuhn, in “the previous tradition” beliefs were evaluated for their 
truth or for their probability of being true, where being true meant something like 
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correspondence to the real or mind independent world. He notes that seldom or never 
can we carry out such an evaluation directly to reality. (RSS, 114) As a proof of 
impossibility, Kuhn cites what has become known as pessimistic metainduction in 
philosophy: all past beliefs have turned out to be false; therefore, no belief we 
currently hold is likely to be true, no matter how strongly we believe in it. (RSS, 115)   
I think Kuhn’s remarks above make a noteworthy point. How could a 
scientist know whether his belief is true if truth is correspondence to the non-relative 
reality? It is reasonable to think that none of us is in this privileged position that 
allows us to tell absolute truths from falsities. Consequently, a scientist cannot know 
whether his/her beliefs are ultimately true or false in a correspondence sense for the 
reasons that s/he simply does not have access to reality that would tell us what beliefs 
are indefeasibly true or false. Being true, therefore, cannot be a criterion to choose 
between theories in science. And as long as we are concerned with how actual 
scientists function, we cannot refer to truth as an explanatory notion in their decision 
on theory choice. That would make a completely non-natural claim involving the 
access of a privileged being to reality. This may sound as if Kuhn were a sceptic. Yet 
note that Kuhn does not want to abandon the notion of truth; even less does he think 
that it would be impossible rationally to compare theories. At one point Kuhn even 
wants to defend the notions of truth and knowledge from “the excesses of 
postmodernist movements” (RSS, 91).
116
  
The impossibility of having access to truth in Kuhn’s thinking can be 
explained by his “historical perspective” (RSS, 113), “developmental perspective” 
(RSS, 91), or “developmental view” (RSS, 95). Kuhn describes it as follows: The 
historian picks up a process already under way without resort to the beginning. That 
perspective provides an analogy for the evaluation of scientific knowledge. For each 
scientist, beliefs are already in place and provide the basis for an ongoing research, 
which may result in changes in the body of accepted beliefs. There is no ahistorical 
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 It is not, though, clear what Kuhn’s favoured notion of truth is. At one point he is inclined to accept 
“a redundancy theory of truth”, but then he says that “the essential function of the concept of truth is 
to require a choice between acceptance and rejection of a statement” (RSS, 99). The first expression 
hints at a minimalist or deflationary theory, but the latter statement is more compatible with a 
verificationist or pragmatist definition of truth.  
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Archimedean platform, “outside of history, outside of time and space” (RSS, 115), 
available to scientists to be used in evaluations. And so scientific claims are 
evaluated from “a moving, historically situated, Archimedean platform”. No-one is 
free of the vast amount of accepted beliefs which are changed only when needed:  
 
Creatures born into it [the world] must take it as they find it. They can 
… interact with it, altering both it and themselves in the process, and 
the populated world thus altered is the one that will be found in place 
by the generation that follows. (RSS, 101-2)  
 
A consequence is that the focus is not on the evaluation of beliefs themselves, but 
“what’s to be evaluated is the desirability of a particular change-of-belief” (RSS, 95-
6) or “understanding small incremental changes of beliefs” (RSS, 112). On one 
occasion Kuhn compares the traditional investigation of “the rationality of belief” to 
his proposal to focus on “the rationality of incremental change of belief” (RSS, 112). 
The main point in a historical perspective is clear enough. Both scientists and 
historians are part of the historical process that began before them. There is no way 
for the agents to step out of their historical niche and know whether a certain belief 
or a theory is true in any absolute sense and should, therefore, be accepted because of 
that. Everyone is bound up with a certain historical situation involving the relevant 
theoretical body that is used for the evaluation of knowledge, and the evaluation is 
thus carried out against the body of accepted beliefs. If we want to know why 
scientists choose certain beliefs or theories, the answer cannot be that they knew that 
they were true. This means also that any description given by the scientists is tied to 
a particular historical situation and to the language or, perhaps, ‘lexicon’ that they 
use.  
That a neutral description is not available is of course a moral of the post-
empiricist era after the belief in observation as a neutral judge has been abandoned. 
However, it is important to note that it is still possible to maintain that, no matter 
what criteria scientists actually use in choosing theories, and whether they and their 
theories are culturally infected, the criteria used in theory choice function so well 
because they make a difference, unbeknown to scientists, between true, or truer, and 
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false beliefs. For example, “a critical scientific realist” would adopt a position like 
this (e.g. Niiniluoto 1999, 91). I leave discussion on that for later in the chapter.  
It is easy to see that Kuhn’s historical perspective is incompatible with an 
historical explanation that tries to explain changes in history by direct reference to 
reality, or how things “really” are. We remember how Bird thought that it is not 
obvious that there has been a shift in extension since the times of Ptolemy’s 
astronomical system. He argued that what has changed is merely what people 
believed to be the extension. People once called the Sun a planet, but do not do so 
any more because they had the wrong belief that the Sun behaved like Mars, Venus, 
etc. in having a large orbit about the centre of the local system. And so “if the Sun is 
not in the extension of ‘planet’ now, it never was. People can be mistaken about the 
extensions just as they can be about references.” (Bird 2000, 160-1) The problem 
with this idea from Kuhn’s historical perspective is that it implies that we know what 
is really in the extension of planet. That is, we have in some way arrived at true 
beliefs of the world that allow us to form a “natural” category of ‘planet’ and judge 
history from that vantage point. Consequently, the crucial question is whether we 
actually are in a position to know that.
117
 We may ask and not only in the Kuhnian 
framework, in what way could we go beyond our beliefs and beyond “what we think 
is in the extension”? What if future generations think, just as we think of past 
generations, that they had certain false beliefs that led them to the wrong 
categorisation? I think that in the light of the history of science we have to accept 
that that scenario is at least possible. And if this is so, we should refrain from 
explaining the history of science from such a metaphysical point of view. If we do 
not refrain, all that we are doing is creating a Whig-history of our own day that Kuhn 
objected to so much.  
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 Among a number of other distinguished philosophers, Bird advocates externalism in epistemology 
that rejects the so-called “K-K-principle”, i.e. the principle that in order to know I need to know that I 
know. According to externalism, I can have knowledge even if I am not able to consciously justify my 
belief should I, for example, have a reliable method in use. If we now overlook any shortcomings of 
externalism, that position does not help here, if one makes the claim what is “really” in the extension 
that past scientists missed. That implies that we know that we know, and is inconsistent with 
externalism. (e.g. Bird 1998, 216-8) 
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In conclusion, Kuhn’s historical perspective wants to equip those who 
evaluate the history of science only with what is actually available for them. They 
cannot evaluate the past science by assuming that they know what is definitely true 
and false. They, as well as scientists of the time, are tied to the conceptions of their 
time of what is true and false. Truth as correspondence is something that is not 
applicable in explaining why scientists choose how they choose, at least not at any 
conscious level. To use truth as an explanatory notion in this context would 
presuppose an extra-natural access to truth. One way to put this is to say that in 
contrast to many contemporary philosophers, Kuhn wishes to emphasise the 
importance of epistemological questions in comparison to metaphysical ones. We 
cannot fix metaphysics if we do not have some access to reality, and Kuhn argues 
that that is exactly the case. In addition, Kuhn wants to leave judgement of what 
certain entities ultimately are to scientists, who are actually engaged by their 
profession to determine that. It is unlikely that a philosopher or historian could 
improve such an opinion. Finally, we can see that Kuhn’s historical perspective and 
his deflationary attitude towards metaphysics make him a minimalist and a 
naturalist
118
. He wants to leave to science as much as possible; in addition, all 
explanations used are natural. That view is further strengthened if we remember how 
Kuhn’s views on similarity relations, concepts and information organisation can be 
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 I am aware that in two of his last writings Kuhn said that historical philosophers, he included,  
“overemphasised the empirical aspect” (RSS, 95) and the conclusion drawn from the historical record 
“can be derived instead from first principles” (RSS, 112). It appears that here Kuhn is taking steps 
away from naturalism. I think Bird is right in saying that Kuhn desired to argue more philosophically 
and his work became gradually more philosophical (2002, 2004, 2005). However, I do not take his 
rejection of the causal theory as a rejection of naturalism, as is made clear in Chapter 5, although his 
failure to follow research in cognitive science is deplorable. If we look at the context of these 
expressions we can see that Kuhn tells us that historical philosophers attacked the logical empiricist 
view on the basis of history, but that it could also be done merely on philosophical grounds, simply by 
argument. What he sees as important is that we could arrive at a general view of the history of science 
that would be more difficult to refute. I accept that this was a misguided and incoherent step because 
otherwise his philosophy stays well within the bounds of naturalistic philosophy. 
Why Kuhn wanted to point out this is a different question. I believe that there are two factors 
that played a role here. Throughout his career Kuhn wanted recognition as a philosopher and this may 
have been one more attempt to earn it. He probably considered a priori reasoning that is independent 
of the empirical world profoundly philosophical. Furthermore, Kuhn attempted to distance himself 
from certain empirical traditions that he had helped to initiate but did not approve of: Kuhn called the 
Strong Programme of Sociology of Science “an example of deconstruction gone mad” (RSS, 110) and 
an example of “the excesses of postmodernist movement” (RSS, 91). Needless to say, the Strong 
Programme has not always been received favourably among philosophers of science. Attacks on it and 
associating Kuhn with this empiricist genre surely had an effect on Kuhn’s thinking.  
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given a characterisation that can be seen to have received empirical support in 
cognitive science.  
 
Criteria for theory comparison 
 
Now we come to the question of what ways there are for comparison if we adopt the 
historical perspective. It is clear that Kuhn does not advocate a referential solution to 
the problem of comparison
119
. Before drafting a solution that Kuhn brought forward, 
it is worth noting that referential invariance is not necessary for comparison, even if 
one wants to stay in the traditional framework. It is possible to compare theories via 
extension using set theory. Michael Martin argued that even if two terms, ‘B’ and 
‘B*’, in two hypotheses, Ba and B*a, derived from respective theories T1 and T2, 
have different meanings, they can be shown to contradict each other if the extension 
of ‘B’ in T1 is a subset of the extension of ‘B*’ in T2. So comparison is possible, 
even in the absence of the same reference via individuals and their sets. (Martin 
1971; 1972)   
  Nevertheless, comparison via sets is not a solution that Kuhn endorsed. He 
instead suggested something that he saw would fit the history of science better. In the 
background there is a recognition that the idea that we can discern a precise point of 
contact between theories, and have a crucial test to show which theory survives, does 
not fare well historically. I think that the lesson from the Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn 
debate is that there is not an unambiguous falsification or any other crucial test to be 
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 To complicate matters, Kuhn says in “Theory Change as Structure Change”, which is an evaluation 
of Stegmüller’s book on Sneed’s formalism, published in 1976, that “Comparing theories … demands 
only the identification of reference” (RSS, 190). Yet, as we saw in Chapter 5, Kuhn did not think that 
identification of reference and the causal theory of reference can offer us a point of comparison with 
natural kind terms or common nouns. That was because we cannot “trace life-lines of natural 
families”. These statements are not contradictory. It also became clear that Kuhn was initially 
impressed by the Putnam-Kripke theorising on reference determination and held that, regarding proper 
names, Putnam and Kripke had proposed an interesting and valuable theory. The above sentence can 
be thus taken as recognition of the fact that in the case of proper names, comparison is possible via 
reference, although unfortunately this is not often applicable in science. Kuhn says in the passage that 
identification is “very difficult” and one may never be absolutely sure of success in it.  It is also 
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found. Lakatos’ already mentioned case was about how scientists did not abandon 
Newtonian mechanics when their calculations of the motion of Uranus did not match 
the actual movement. Instead they looked for an ad hoc explanation that saved the 
original theory (Lakatos and Feyerabend 1999, 68-9). Another example could be the 
famous abandonment of the phlogiston theory. It was a long and a patchy process 
involving many experiments over a long period by several scientists
120
. Or think of 
Joseph Black and the Edinburgh chemists for whom it took a long time to accept 
Lavoisier’s theory, even when the evidence for it was already strong. They 
nevertheless converted
121
, unlike Joseph Priestley, who held on to the Phlogiston 
theory for the rest of his life. In addition, we can also mention Ignac Semmelweis 
who produced a good case for the existence of something like “cadaverous particles”, 
“morbid matter” or “decomposing animal-organic-matter” that is primarily 
transmitted on hands rather than through air, and he also developed an effective 
means for preventing transmission. However, it took several decades for medical 
scientists to come up with a germ theory of child bed fever. Semmelweis’ method is 
sometimes used as an illustration of Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method at work, 
but it certainly does not prove that scientific communities would use a method like 
that (even if some individuals do), rather the contrary
122
. It would be possible to 
                                                                                                                                          
probable that Kuhn’s opposition to the causal theory was still in 1976 in formation and so he could not 
make a clearer formulation at that point.  
120
 For Kuhn’s account of this process, see SSR, Chapter 6.  
121
 See, for example, Perrin (1982) and Kendall (1952) for analyses of the conversion by Black and 
the chemists in Edinburgh.  
122
 There appear to be differing opinions on why Semmelweis’ theory did not take root despite its 
proved practical success. For example, Loudon blames the man himself. According to Loudon, 
Semmeweis did not publish enough, even though he wrote several letters to eminent obstetricians of 
the time. In addition, he claims that Semmelweis’ difficult temperament had a role to play because he 
could not stand criticism and for that reason made several personal attacks. Finally, he does admit that 
Semmelweis’ theory may have appeared too simple and too radical with regard to the older theories. 
(See Loudon 2000, Ch. 7) György Gortvay and Imre Zoltán shift all the blame from the shoulders of 
Semmelweis in their (probably too) glorifying account of the man and his work. The reason for the 
resistance to his theories was “the scientific ‘conservatism’ of his contemporaries”, and more 
generally the fact that his theories were incompatible with the prevailing views (Gortvay and Zoltán 
1964, 165-7). Yet another view of the resistance is given by Sherwin B. Nuland. What prevented 
Semmelweis’s studies from gaining prominence was that he did not carry out properly substantiated 
experiments, never “availed himself” of microscopic means to validate results and never described his 
results in important medical journals. A further contributing factor was his personality and the 
political climate of the time. (See Nuland 2003, esp. Ch. 6) It remains a fact that Semmelweis’ 
theories were known by a large number of medical experts but, in spite of this, they were rejected by 
the medical community.  
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continue with examples where the problems with a theory, or good evidence against 
it, are brushed aside and retained in the old theory. This already shows that an old 
good theory is not easily abandoned, especially if there is no alternative already 
available. Kuhn’s comment on this is apt:  “if any and every failure to fit were 
ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times” (SSR, 146). 
However, the main point I want to bring up is that the history of science offers us a 
picture of epistemologically more conservative scientists than most traditional 
accounts of theory comparison would allow.  
 We saw that Kuhn wished to concentrate, not on the evaluation of single 
propositions, but on changes of beliefs in the system of beliefs. Kuhn argues that in 
such a change most other beliefs stay untouched, and so the aim is to “incorporate, 
with minimum disruption, the new claim” (RSS, 96). The evaluation of the 
desirability of a change of belief is comparative. Judgement is based on the 
comparison of two theories or “two bodies of knowledge” and each is asked which is 
“better for doing whatever it is that scientists do”. (RSS, 96)
123
 Kuhn’s view since 
SSR was that scientists try to solve puzzles and the choice between two theories 
turns, therefore, to the question of whether the suggested alternative manages to 
solve a puzzle that the old theory could not or whether it can solve more puzzles than 
the old one. Yet he also offers a more specific characterisation of criteria for the 
evaluation of theories. According to Kuhn, there is a whole set of apparently 
intertheoretical, or even interparadigm, criteria used in evaluation: accuracy, 
consistency, breadth of applicability, simplicity and fruitfulness. In the comparative 
evaluation of a change of belief we ask: “which of two bodies of beliefs is more 
accurate, displays fewer inconsistencies, has a wider range of applications, or 
achieves these goals with the simpler machinery” (RSS, 114). Kuhn presents on 
several occasions similar, yet slightly variable lists of criteria that can be used in 
rational comparison
124
. We can see here that the talk of Kuhn as an outright 
                                                 
123
 The idea that comparison is between two or more alternative theories, and is not just an 
abandonment of the one, is naturally already found in SSR. For example: “The decision to reject one 
paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgement leading to that 
decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other” (SSR, 77). 
124
 In SSR, the criteria for comparison are problem-solving success, quantitative precision, novelty 
prediction capability and aesthetic value between the new and the old theory (152-155). In the 
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irrationalist is an exaggeration, because he seems to recognise some common theory 
comparison criteria.
125
 Another issue is that the claim that there is no such thing as 
the scientific method does not raise such hostility and panic as when Feyerabend 
claimed that for the first time. Now when the Kuhn-Popper-debate has cooled, it is 
easier to recognise that, instead of one supreme method of science, there may be 




Kuhn and the coherence theory of justification  
 
We can say that the single most distinguishing feature in Kuhn’s theory of theory 
choice is its conservativeness. That is both a conclusion from his studies of history 
and a natural consequence of his historical perspective. Further, it is reasonable to 
assume that the central concept of paradigm was at least partially born out of an 
observation that scientists commonly tend to stick to their old beliefs and theories 
even when they are faced with contrary evidence to their beliefs and theories. The 
theory is an anti-thesis of Popper’s falsificationism where one negative result is 
reason enough to abandon a theory. As Kuhn said, the maxim in revising an old 
theory is to change it with “minimum disruption”. In addition, we may say that 
falsificationism and other theories of clear-cut rejection have been discredited by the 
history of science. Let us see what other grounds there are, other than historical, for 
conservativeness in theory choice.  
                                                                                                                                          
“Postscript” of SSR the list is: accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness and scope (199). And in an essay at 
the beginning of the 1970s Kuhn gives five criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory: accuracy, 
consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness (ET, 322-4).   
125
 Note that Hoyningen-Huene points out that there is a subjective element in theory choice because 
the values on which theory choice is based may be interpreted or “shaped” differently by different 
individuals. However, it is unclear how differently they can be interpreted, and what the significance 
of their difference is. Importantly, this does not appear to make theory choice arbitrary because the 
shared values, however differently shaped, appear to lead to the same theory choices at the end. (See 
Hoyningen-Huene 1993, sections 4.3c; 7.4b)  
126
 For example, Newton-Smith, who is definitely not an irrationalist, nor an anti-realist, recognises 
eight “good-making features of theories” (1981, 226-2). Bird wishes to add yet two more (Bird 1998, 
263-4).  
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 It seems that, yet again, cognitive science can be used in support of Kuhn’s 
view. Paul Thagard writes that to know an area of physics, for example, is to have 
incorporated a very complicated structure over which one has little or no conscious 
control. This means that, from a cognitive science perspective, scientists have little 
choice in whether they are epistemologically conservative in science or not. The 
system of representation is not easily overthrown. Learning a theory requires 
adoption of the whole network of frames, or a very large and complex conceptual 
structure in order to solve problems and handle the flow of information. There is, 
therefore, a great utility in retaining an old system, which anyway cannot be 
controlled as a whole voluntarily. This explains why scientists do not abandon an old 
good way of thinking in the face of a few anomalies. On this basis Thagard 
formulates his principle of methodological conservatism: “If you have a frame 
system for domain, it is unreasonable to give it up merely because there is an 
available plausible alternative frame system”. We might yet remind ourselves that in 
the absence of such an alternative, giving up is not optional but it is practically 
impossible unless we are prepared to accept that thought “grinds to a halt”. (Thagard 
1984, 248-9)
127
 Note also that we do not need to talk specifically of frame systems. 
The commitment is only to an interrelational conceptual system. Finally, it is not 
unreasonable to take the idea of such restricting conceptual structure as an expression 
of Kuhn’s paradigm concept.    
 The reason for scientists being conservative is, in plain language, that it is just 
very difficult to change one’s thinking in any profound way, even if there were an 
alternative system available. Unless there is overwhelming evidence to reject the 
accepted system and choose an alternative, it is natural to be conservative 
epistemologically. Even in such cases where there is strong evidence in favour of a 
new theory, many scientists have not given up their old theories, such as in the case 
of the above-mentioned Priestley.  Probably personal factors, such as commitment to 
a theory and age, as well as sociological factors, may explain why some change quite 
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 Bird, who also gives an interpretation of Kuhn by using the tools of cognitive science, appears to 
be in agreement (see Bird 2005, 122). Bird interpreted Kuhn’s World-change thesis as psychological. 
Because our set of pattern-recognitional capacities and habits of mind are so entrenched, changing 
them is very difficult, and so World-changes are rather rare.  
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easily while others hang on to the old theory for as long as they live. This comes 
close to Kuhn’s idea, also known as Planck’s principle, that paradigm change 
requires a generational change.
128
 We can discern a grain of truth in that thought, 
although it is an exaggeration
129
.  
Conservatism in theory choice is something that takes us smoothly to 
coherentism in epistemology. Gilbert Harman, who formulated a version of 
coherentism, has advanced “a principle of conservatism” that is similar to that of 
Thagard’s: One is justified in continuing fully to accept something in the absence of 
a special reason not to (Harman 1989, 46). Moreover, Thagard suggests reasonably 
that Priestley, for instance, never accepted the Oxygen theory because he was the one 
who had the most elaborate Phlogiston theory and could appreciate its coherence, 
while he had never studied and used its rival enough to appreciate its coherence. The 
phlogiston theory was far from perfect, but so was the Oxygen theory. For example, 
Priestley pointed out that while the weight of phlogiston was never established, 
neither was the weight of caloric in Lavoisier’s theory. (Thagard 1992, 59-60) 
 All in all, we can say that if we are coherentists in our knowledge 
evaluations, conservatism in theory choice is well-motivated. Coherentism is a 
matter of how coherent a set of beliefs are. Or it is a matter, as Bonjour expresses, of 
how well a body of beliefs “hangs together”: “how well its component beliefs fit 
together, agree or dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organised tightly 
structured system of beliefs, rather than either a helter-skelter collection or a set of 
conflicting subsystems” (Bonjour 1985, 93). Suppose that such a highly coherent 
system is constructed. A person does not have an incentive to change it, should 
coherence decrease as a consequence. On the contrary, s/he has an incentive not to 
change it in such a case. And so, in the absence of strong reasons to change, or in the 
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 In SSR Kuhn quotes approvingly of both Darwin and Planck as they had laid their trust in the 
younger generation in accepting new revolutionary theories (SSR, 151). 
129
 C.E. Perrin showed with his comprehensive study of the French chemical community that the 
majority of scientists converted gradually to Lavoisier’s side, some fifteen years after his views started 
to gain awareness in the community. However, he found support for a weaker version of the Planck 
hypothesis because there was a sharp age difference between “the early enthusiasts” and “the stubborn 
resistors” of Lavoisier’s theories (121). Some of the established prominent scientists never converted. 
(Perrin 1988) 
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absence of an alternative (more coherent) system, or of a change that improves the 
coherence of the old system, a person should not change his/her beliefs.  
This naturally works in the other direction as well: if there is a good reason 
for a change, i.e. coherence can clearly be increased, then the system ought to be 
changed. Bonjour writes that achieving a high degree of coherence may require a 
significant conceptual change. In a case where one or more anomalies appear for 
which there is no satisfactory explanation available, then devising a new conceptual 
system may offer an explanation and thus increase overall coherence. I agree with 
Bonjour when he says that “in this way the progress of theoretical science may be 
plausibly viewed as a result of the search for greater coherence”. (Bonjour 1985, 
100)  
Moreover, coherentism fits in general with Kuhn’s insistence that we should 
concentrate on the justification for changes of belief, rather than on the justification 
of beliefs themselves. If our beliefs are holistically justified, i.e. the beliefs in a set 
mutually justify each other, then we have to understand the whole set as taken and 
try to improve it rather than to try to find a justification for singular beliefs on a one 
by one basis; or even less, to start the construction of a new system from scratch in 
order to look for the justification of beliefs piecemeal. Justification is dependent on 
such a large scale that it is impossible to proceed on a one by one basis while asking 
for a complete justification for each belief. The case is rather that when a belief is 
changed, the rest of the beliefs stay unchanged. For each change one has to ask for a 
specific justification, and improved coherence counts as such.  
 But let us take a step back and see why we are preoccupied by coherentism in 
the first place. The first thing to take note of is that coherentism is a theory of 
justification. Kuhn thought, as we saw above, that it is impossible for scientists to 
have access to truth. On this ground he plunged into the classification of values that 
can be used in theory evaluation by scientists. Kuhn is not alone in this strategy. 
Bonjour’s starting point in his book on coherentism is that because we cannot be 
immediately and unproblematically accessible to truth, as God would be, then all 
what we have in hand is justification. (Bonjour 1985, 7) In other words, we do not 
know whether our beliefs are true or not, but we can know whether they are justified. 
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There are now, thus, clear indications that Kuhn’s historical perspective can be 
accommodated to a coherentist epistemology and theory of justification. 
Furthermore, in light of the history of science it appears that scientists are 
conservative in epistemology and that may indicate, although of course not 
necessitate, that they are also coherentists. From the cognitive-psyhological 
perspective the only reasonable strategy is to change the webs of belief minimally, 
which is a natural conclusion from the coherentist epistemology. But if coherentism 
appears to be our choice in epistemology, we urgently need to clarify further the 
notion of coherence from the mere intuitive level.  
 There are a few philosophers that have developed a coherentist 
epistemological theory. Motivations for developing vary, the most usual probably 
being the well-known problems with foundationalism that Kuhn also mentions as a 
rationale for his developmental or historical perspective (RSS, 95). My motivation, 
independent of the fact that it fits Kuhn’s philosophy, is that it seems to be both the 
most reasonable account of how real people actually operate, and also an intelligible 
normative epistemological theory. I will explicate the notion of coherence with the 
help of Bonjour, who in his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Ch. 5) offers the 
clearest account of the notion that has not in general been adequately explicated in 
philosophy.
130
 Note that I do not underwrite Bonjour ‘s coherentist epistemological 
theory in its totality; the way he connects justification and truth does not appear to be 
reasonable. I will discuss this theme in the last section of the chapter.  
 The customary way to characterise coherence is by one or two conditions: 
consistency or/and explanatory unity. Consistency means that no coherent set can 
contain both beliefs that P and not-P. The latter condition states that each belief P is 
explained by other beliefs in the set. Consistency is also Bonjour’s first condition for 
coherence:  
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 Other versions of coherentism are, for example: Keith Lehrer (2000), Paul Thagard (e.g. 1992, Ch. 
4), Gilbert Harman (1989) and Nicolas Rescher (1973) 
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(1) A system of belief is coherent only if it is logically consistent131  
 
A further factor to be considered is a point of contact between components of 
the set. We need to require that there are some sort of positive connections between 
beliefs. If they are totally unconnected, we cannot say that the set is very coherent. A 
natural idea is that connections are inference relations. This means that there should 
be such relations that a belief or a set of beliefs can serve as the premise(s) of an 
argument for a further belief. Furthermore, if a system has subsystems, coherence is 
higher the more they are connected with each other. It is important to notice that both 
relations between beliefs inside a set and between sets that form a larger system can 
be understood to be a matter of degree. Bonjour formulates two further conditions for 
coherence, as follows: 
 
(2) The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of 
inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in 
proportion to the number and strength of such connections. 
(3) The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it is 
divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to each 
other by inferential relations.  
 
Bonjour argues that we need to highlight one kind of inferential relation. 
Explanatory relations, to which Harman and Thagard would reduce the whole notion 
of coherence, are of special interest. That is because in science and other 
epistemological tasks the goal is to explain a wide scope of area, including 
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 Bonjour points out that coherence should not be equated with logical consistency, i.e. the absence 
of explicit contradiction. It is a condition, but not enough for the whole characterisation. There may be 
cases where a consistent system does have a low degree of coherence. By using the notion of 
probabilistic consistency we may imagine a case where a person holds the belief that P and also the 
belief that it is extremely improbable that P. The set is consistent, although it would be more coherent 
if those two beliefs would be dropped altogether. Bonjour concludes from this that, in addition to 
consistency, probabilistic consistency is another feature to be taken into account: A system of beliefs 
is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic consistency. I ignore here this specification, but 
that does not affect in any way the general point adopted here. (Bonjour 1992, 95-6)  
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phenomena of different kinds by a relatively small number of explanatory principles. 
A coherentist system tries to connect an anomalous event or fact by finding 
inferential connections between it and the rest of the system in the form of looking 
for an explanation for it. Anomalies threaten the status of the explanatory principles 
of the system as general and basic, and thus decrease the coherence of a system. 
Bonjour thinks, therefore, that it is advisable to add one more condition for 
coherence: 
 
(4) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the 
presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system.   
 
This concludes our study of the notion of coherence. There are three criteria to be 
taken into account in determining the coherence of a system: consistency, the degree 
of inferential connections and the number of anomalous instances.  
Now we come to the crucial part. We have to assess how epistemological 
coherentism agrees with Kuhn’s characterisation of science as a whole, and 
specifically, how it agrees with the criteria used in theory choice. The feature of 
science that Kuhn elevated above any other in SSR is problem-solving. The ultimate 
criterion of success of a scientific theory is whether it is successful in problem-
solving. It is true that sometimes Kuhn lists problem- or puzzle-solving next to other 
criteria of evaluation; yet, it is also clear that problem-solving is more important than 
other criteria. It is something that is the distinguishing mark of the whole scientific 
period, normal science. Later Kuhn also reiterates his view that puzzle-solving is 
“what scientists do” (RSS, 96).  
That science is problem-solving is a conclusion one arrives at by taking a 
look at history over a long period of time. It is, thus, a metahistorical view expressing 
what the nature of science is on the whole. If we exclude the problem-solving that 
can be used to characterise science both on the micro and macro levels, the other 
criteria that are supposedly used in theory choice are descriptions on the former level 
only, i.e. they are applicable in the actual situation where scientists choose theories. 
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In Kuhn’s philosophy, the usage of these standards contributes to greater success in 
problem-solving. For example, Kuhn sees that improved quantitative precision, i.e. 
accuracy, makes a theory likely to succeed better in problem solving than its older 
competitors (SSR, 153-4). 
 My suggestion is that problem-solving is a natural component of coherentist 
epistemology. The connection between coherence and problems (or anomalies) is 
obvious.  Problems, i.e. unexplained phenomena by the machinery of the system, 
mean that there are less inferential relations between the components of the system or 
that inferential relations are weak in it, with the consequence that the whole system is 
less coherent than the system without problems or with fewer problems. A potential 
difficulty with this suggestion is that Kuhn’s criteria - consistency, scope, accuracy, 
simplicity and sometimes also fruitfulness - do not all appear to correlate directly and 
unproblematically with a higher degree of coherence. The least problematic is 
consistency because the concept can be directly explicated by it. However, 
remembering Bonjour’s characterisation of coherence above, both scope and 
simplicity can be taken as values that enhance the degree of coherence in a system. 
This is because simpler or more powerful principles are used in explanations and the 
wider the scope they explain then the less subsystems are needed. Less subsystems 
means more and stronger explanatory connections, and thus, more coherence in a 
system. Accuracy might be, then, interpreted as tendency to produce minimally 
anomalies in the system. That is, in an accurate system there would be an agreement 
between predictions made and experimental results. It would be a challenging task to 
link fruitfulness with the concept of coherence. However, it is not a problem if it, or 
any other unfitting criteria, contributes to greater success in problem-solving and 
problem-solving, in turn, makes a contribution to achieving a higher degree of 
coherence. For example, fruitfulness could be interpreted as a promise of future 
problem-solving capability. In this case, all criteria are linked either directly or 
indirectly via problem-solving to coherence, which makes Kuhn’s philosophy 
consistently coherentist. Problem-solving is what science is fundamentally, and it is 
part of the more general search for greater coherence in science.   
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Comparison in the history of science 
 
As already mentioned above, the idea that point-by-point comparison via reference is 
used in the history of science appears oversimplistic. In practice, there are two types 
of problem with regard to this idea. First, even if we thought that there were 
universal substances to which references can be fixed, ontology often changes. In 
that case, there is no prospect of co-referentiality that would offer a point-by-point 
referential comparison. A case in point is the chemical revolution by Lavoisier. 
Entities in the Phlogiston theory are different from those in the Oxygen theory.  If 
these theories are to be rationally compared, there has to be some other way of doing 
it. Another example is the case of Semmelweis’ “cadaveric particles” and the 
contagion theorists’ “miasma” that was transmitted by an air-like infectious disease. 
‘Cadaveric particles’ and ‘miasma’ are very different kinds of (putative) entities, and 
both are thought to be non-existent by modern standards. Yet I think we would say 
that Semmewelweis’ theory was better and should have been accepted. Furthermore, 
‘child bed fever’ was defined by its symptoms (such as shivering, rapid pulse, high 
fever, and abdominal pain of peritonitis) at the time (later, by pathological findings 
and after that, bacteriologically), which almost definitely was often misdescribed and 
confused with other “fevers”. It cannot, therefore, function as a common reference 
either.  
The problem of ontological change applies whenever there are drastic 
changes in the history of science. Therefore, scientific revolutions may introduce 
referential discontinuity. A referentialist would naturally make a difference between 
cases of referential failure and referential success. The situation would often become 
a complex one where we need to construct cases of partial co-referentiality. Philip 
Kitcher (1978) has tried to develop a solution on the basis of such referential 
determination. What is different in his theory compared to many other theories of 
reference is that he makes the theory of reference context-sensitive, which strikes me 
as being an improvement. Different tokens of expressions, such as ‘phlogiston’ and 
‘dephlogistigated air’, may refer in some expressions and uses, and not necessarily 
only to one entity, but not in others. We pick out those expressions where a term 
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refers in one theory, and do the same with another in order to find referential matches 
between these. In that way he thinks we can form a translation, for instance, between 
Priestley’s and Lavoisier’s respective theories of combustion. Kitcher’s theory would 
free us from the rigid theories of reference, which postulate either total referential 
continuity or total referential discontinuity. In this sense it reminds us of the 
previously mentioned Field’s idea of partial reference (see Field 1973). Kuhn objects 
to this theory as a theory of translation saying that we need to meaningfully explain 
the expressions themselves, including all their uses independent of their truth-values. 
According to Kuhn, we should concentrate on describing how the original text 
communicated the beliefs of the author, rather than how terms were related to the 
world. As a concern for the historical interpretation of texts, Kuhn’s comment makes 
sense. Yet I do not think he countered Kitcher on the right issue. Kitcher is 
suggesting his theory because he wanted to prove that communication and the 
comparison of truth-values is possible.  
 No matter whether Kitcher’s theory is possible in principle, it is clear that it is 
historically implausible and implies premises that make it dysfunctional as a theory 
of theory comparison regarding actual scientists. We may also cast doubt on the 
strategy that relies unproblematically on the separation between successful and 
failing references. In describing referring expressions, Kitcher uses metalanguage, 
i.e. the language of modern science. In fact, he signals it clearly. He says, for 
example, that “from our perspective Priestley has misdescribed the new gas” 
(Kitcher 1978, 537). Exactly! But the point is that Priestley did not have “our 
perspective”, nor did Lavoisier. It is not possible to say that Lavoisier knew and 
showed that ‘oxygen’ refers but ‘phlogiston’ does not, or that the latter referred only 
in some contexts. That was one of the central themes in the scientific controversy of 
the time. Lavoisier had to use some other type of persuasion to get support for his 
suggestion. The situation is not any less difficult if it is an open question whether 
there is some unobservable underlying essence that is assumed to be the common 
reference. So Lavoisier and his contemporaries could certainly not compare their 
theories as Kitcher’s referential solution implies - that is, by determining the contexts 
and those terms in the contexts that refer. He seems to be engaged with describing 
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the history of science as modern science now sees it. What he is not offering us is a 
theory of theory comparison that could give a historically valuable explanation.  
There is also another problem with the idea that the comparison of theories is 
based on referential matching. We may suppose that scientists know in one way or 
another that they are referring to the same things or stuff. A simple example would 
be a Copernican revolution. Let us imagine that there are Ptolemaic scientists and 
converted Copernican scientists who have a dispute over the place and movement of 
heavenly bodies. They examine each planet one by one and come to the agreement 
that they are talking about the same individuals: the sun, the earth, the moon, Mars, 
and so on. Now, even if we can say that their references match, can we think that it 
was enough for them to make a choice between theories? I do not think so.  
The idea behind the referential solution is that co-referentiality allows the 
determination of truth-values of claims made of the entities, which enables choosing 
the theory that makes true claims more. The problem is that practising scientists at 
the time could arguably not do that. They could not determine whose claims were 
true and whose false. In fact, the dispute was over that. As proof of how problematic 
the choosing process is, ponder the fact that the Copernican revolution was a very 
slow process. It took one hundred years before Copernicus’ sun-centred system was 
generally accepted among astronomers (Kuhn 1985, 227). Kuhn’s studies on the 
revolution made him appeal to other values: in general, to the higher degree of 
coherence of the Copernican system, and specifically, to its simplicity and potential 
problem-solving capacity (e.g. Kuhn 1985 11-12; 125-6; 172). Scientists had to use, 
therefore, some other ways of evaluation, which can also be seen in other cases of 
scientific change. Moreover, no matter whether it is theoretically possible to 
construct a case of reference determination, it seems that the motivation for theory 
change derives from other sources. Lavoisier was disturbed by the confused state of 
chemical knowledge and nomenclature, as well as by mounting problems with the 
phlogiston theory. Semmelweis was frustrated with the ineffectiveness of traditional 
explanations of child bed fever. I think it is more plausible to think that old theories 
encounter problems, as Kuhn wrote, which leads to the motivation to either revise 
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them, or sometimes, to look for alternatives to them. What happens before revision, 
expressed in Kuhn’s terminology, is an accumulation of anomalies.  
 Kuhn’s understanding of epistemic evaluation highlights a difference 
between his perspective and that of the modern causal theorists. Kuhn was interested 
in how theory change actually occurs in a real historical situation. He paid attention 
to the actual decisions practicing scientists made. He did not write of comparison in 
principle or as a possibility if certain non-actual conditions are fulfilled. Referential 
solution might work in the Copernican revolution if the determination of truth-values 
was possible. But the problem was precisely that that was beyond the reach of those 
who affected it.  
It would be better to say that the level of coherence is what counts in theory 
evaluation. The rule is to try to make a theory as coherent as possible and to choose a 
more coherent one if there is such. Changes in ontology or basic concepts do not 
constitute a problem because the focus is on coherence, which gives us a common 
standard for evaluation. The Copernican system was simpler and it answered, for 
example, the problem of planets’ movement and the need for calendar reform (e.g. 
Kuhn 1985 11-12; 125-6). Lavoisier’s reform of chemical nomenclature was 
certainly an improvement in the search for a more coherent system and his Oxygen 
theory answered some problems that the Phlogiston theory could not, although it did 
not answer all the problems. Naturally, it can take time until a higher degree of 
coherence is fully realised. It may also be the case, for example, that two theories 
solve different problems. But in that case we need to see how they fare otherwise, 
and ask which theory forms a more coherent set in some other sense. The other 
theory may give an explanation but may require acceptance of some non-argued 
principles. Or perhaps the other has many unconnected beliefs or sets of beliefs, 
which is a sign of the low degree of inferential relations, and so on. It is not often 
clear which is better, but the general rule is that a more coherent theory should be 
chosen. The future scientific work usually makes it explicit which is more coherent. 
When we remember the rationality debate a couple of decades ago that involved such 
philosophers as Kuhn, Feyerabend, Popper and Lakatos, the suggestion above leads 
to an interesting and surprising conclusion. That is, if it is accepted that Kuhn’s 
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philosophy can be incorporated to the coherentist epistemology, then it seems that 
Kuhn implicitly accepted that there is something like a rational method of 
comparison: the method of comparing problem-solving capability and the coherence 
of theories. 
 Most theory changes are arguably non-revolutionary that could be described 
as developments by accretion or accumulation. With Kuhn’s terminology this 
corresponds to the phase of normal science where most of the theoretical body stays 
the same. Yet, as said above, theory evaluation is comparative in all cases. It is not 
the case that a belief is just dropped, independent of its role in a theory. In non-
revolutionary changes, what is evaluated is a theory before and after putative belief 
changes. A revolutionary change would be such that a new one replaces most or all 
of the old theory. The case is usually described so that there is not much connection 
between an old and a new theory. However, as Thagard and others with the 
cognition-historical orientation maintain, continuity may be constructed via the 
mind(s) of scientist(s). We saw above reasons for thinking that a revolutionary 
change is not possible without there being an alternative theory available. Taking this 
requirement into account, Thagard describes the process of revolutionary 
replacement in three stages. First, there are relations between an accepted conceptual 
network and a group of other concepts. In the second stage, a new network is 
partially formed in the background that also has links to the connecting set of 
concepts. He mentions as an example a case of Priestley and Lavoisier in 1777 
where, even though they had very different conceptual networks, they shared a lot in 
terms of experimental techniques and observations. In the third phase, the new 
conceptual network is developed further and comes to the fore while the old one 
fades into the background (Thagard 1990, 201-2). Note that the emergence of a new 
network does not make it impossible to use the old one, even though translation may 
not be possible between them. Lavoisier could certainly use, understand and argue 
against the phlogiston theory after his conversion to the oxygen theory. The crucial 
thing to notice is that the choice to adopt a theory is also a matter of comparative 
evaluation between two mature theoretical alternatives, and the choice is made on the 
basis of the overall coherence of the theories.  
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Convergence or not? 
 
Evaluation of the coherence of theories was meant to be something that actual 
scientists have access to. Arguably they do not have access to truth, and therefore, 
truth cannot have an explanatory value in regard to the actual reasons for the choice 
of a theory. What scientists are trying to do, according to the suggestion above, is to 
increase the coherence of their theories. However, we can raise a metaphilosophical 
question over whether there is something more fundamental that explains the 
increases of coherence.  
The scientific realist is likely to hold that the aim of science is the Truth itself 
and may say that coherence is merely a symptom of theories becoming truer. S/he 
might well accept that individual scientists cannot know whether his/her theories and 
hypotheses are true or false in an absolute sense and yet maintain that science is on a 
firm path to truth. That is because the ever-increasing degree of coherence 
unintentionally takes us to truth. We may imagine this as being a kind of invisible 
hand of truth that guides us in our theory choices. Perhaps scientists use such 
methods that guarantee the progress in question, or perhaps it is just science as a self-
correcting process appropriately related to the world that makes it possible. Bonjour, 
for example, thinks that the goal of our cognitive endeavours is truth, and the 
distinguishing character of epistemic justification is its essential or internal 
relationship to this goal. According to Bonjour, an adequate epistemological theory 
should be able to show that coherence in one’s system of beliefs is likely to lead to 
correspondence. Adhering to the coherentist standards is thus “truth-conducive”. 
(Bonjour 1985, 7-9) 
The first question to be asked is how the notion of ‘truth’ itself is understood. 
An easy answer would be to advocate not only a coherence theory of justification but 
also a coherence theory of truth. Truth would mean something like an ideal fit or 
ideal coherence. This would link justification to truth inherently: if a theory increases 
its coherence, it will also be truer by the same token, because truth is identical to 
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justification-in-the-long-run. However, the realist naturally understands truth as 
correspondence to reality, and commitment to a coherence theory of truth is 
definitely not their choice. It may also be asked whether a coherence theory of truth 
is really a theory of truth, or merely a restatement of a theory of justification. But that 
is not an issue for further investigation in this thesis. 
Historically, there may not be many philosophers who have tried to connect 
the coherence theory of justification to the correspondence theory of truth.
132
 
Nevertheless, an important historical figure that sought to find (at least in some 
interpretations) a connection between a coherentist justification and a 
correspondence theory of truth is C. S. Peirce. Peirce understood truth as the limit of 
inquiry, or as the opinion that a scientific community arrives at in the long run. Ilkka 
Niiniluoto argues that the limit of inquiry represents, or corresponds to, real things 
that causally influence the belief formation in a scientific community, and thus, 
Peirce’s characterisation of truth is coextensive with that of the correspondence 
theory. If that is true, then Peirce did accept the basic idea of the correspondence 
theory. (See Niiniluoto 2000, 101; 1980) Richard Rorty also thinks that Peirce tried 
to “bridge the gap” between coherence and correspondence by reducing coherence to 
correspondence by reanalysing the term ‘reality’ (Rorty 1994, 447). Richard L. 
Kirkham, in turn, highlights Peirce’s words that “the conception of truth gradually 
develops …, reaching the idea of truth as overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in 
experience as the effect of an independent reality” (Peirce 1934, 394). Kirkham 
expresses his disappointment that Peirce did not commit to the correspondence 
theory more strongly because “Peirce’s theory of truth is plausible only because it is 
parasitic on another, hidden theory of truth: truth as correspondence with reality” 
(Kirkham 2001, 83). All in all, the essential claim to be considered is the scientific 
realist’s contention, which Peirce seemed to accept in some form, that the coherence 
theory of justification should be connected to the concept of truth as correspondence 
or/and that an increase of coherence implies progress towards truth. In other words, 
is the explanation given by the coherence theory of justification just “parasitic” on 
the correspondence theory of truth? 
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 For some suggestions, see Rorty (1994, 447) and Bonjour (1985, 158; note 1). 
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Let us begin with the normative side. Whether truth as correspondence should 
be the goal of scientific inquiry is dependent on one’s philosophical commitment. 
Many think that it should, but there are a number of philosophers who do not regard 
it as necessary, Kuhn among them. And if scientists do not need truth as 
correspondence, or are not able to use it in actual situations of theory choice, I do not 
see how it necessarily should be the goal of scientific inquiry, except perhaps for 
motivational reasons. A normative question is, thus, dependent on the values that one 
accepts in the first place. For that reason, I do not deal with it here any further. I will 
ask rather whether increasing coherence is compatible with a rising degree of 
truthlikeness, and further, whether the notion of increasing coherence implies 
convergence to truth.   
I believe that no scientific realist argues that an increase of coherence is an 
infallible sign of a higher degree of verisimilitude. The case does not change even if 
we accept Bonjour’s “observation requirement”, i.e. that any non-a priori belief 
should be in principle subjected to observational test (Bonjour 1985, 141-4). Even if 
we suppose that there is a mind independent reality with a determinable structure, it 
is not impossible that we systematically obtain merely false beliefs. There could be 
many reasons for this. Perhaps there is a sceptic’s demon or an evil scientist who 
feeds false information into our heads, making our system of beliefs internally 
coherent but fundamentally wrong. Or perhaps part of the reality is inaccessible, or 
“unobservable”, in principle, and cannot be described accurately. Secondly, it may 
not be discounted that there are several coherent systems that are either equally true 
or equally far from the truth. Perhaps we are not in a position to describe reality 
neutrally, and any description always involves something like Kuhn’s historical 
perspective. My message here so far is only that it is presumptuous to think that 
coherence implies or is an automatic sign of correspondence.  
If one wants to connect coherence to correspondence, s/he has to offer an 
argument for it. Bonjour correctly recognises that if the only rationale for the chosen 
concept of truth (read: correspondence concept of truth) is an appeal to the related 
standard of justification, then the argument loses it force. It would be circular to say 
that a certain standard or epistemic justification is correct because it is truth-
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conducive and that the conception of truth in question is correct because it can 
connect this way with the suggested standard of justification (Bonjour 1985, 109-10). 
In other words, an argument for progress towards truth as correspondence has to be 
motivated independently. However, Bonjour’s argument is, disappointingly, reduced 
to the conviction that a system of beliefs that “(a) remains coherent (and stable) over 
the long run and (b) continues to satisfy the Observation Requirement is likely, to a 
degree which is proportional to the degree of coherence (and stability) and the 
longness of the run, to correspond closely to independent reality” (Bonjour 1985, 
171; italics mine). I do not think this is quite enough to convince that the account is 
correct. The account may be reasonable, but he begs the crucial question as to why it 
is likely that that would be the case. If our descriptions are contingent in the way that 
Kuhn claims, and there is thus more than one possible highly coherent, and for that 
reason also relatively stable description of the world, then stability and coherence do 
not give any guarantee whatsoever that we are closer to truth.   
It is clear from practically all that Kuhn wrote that he was against both the 
correspondence theory of truth and the idea that there is progress towards truth. In 
SSR, Kuhn urges people to abandon the idea that scientific progress has to be defined 
as a movement towards some goal, and hints that this is a relict as much as the pre-
Darwinian evolutionary theories that took evolution to be a goal-directed process 
planned by God. Instead he proposed to extend the metaphor of evolution to 
scientific development. (SSR, 170-3) In the “Postscript” Kuhn says that there is “no 
theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a 
match between the ontology of a theory and its ‘real’ counterpart in nature now 
seems to me illusive in principle” (SSR, 206). This clearly amounts to a rejection of 
the correspondence theory of truth. There is not much change either in Kuhn’s mind 
in this sense later, except that he becomes more explicit in philosophical terms. Kuhn 
writes in 1990
133
 that “what is fundamentally at stake is … the correspondence 
theory of truth” (RSS, 95). And he continues,  
 
                                                 
133
 “The Road Since Structure” (RSS), published in 1991.  
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Nothing about the rationality of the outcome of the current evaluation 
depends on their, in fact, being true or false. They are simply in place, 
part of the historical situation with which evaluation is made. … 
Justification does not aim at a goal external to the historical situation 
but simply, in that situation, at improving the tools available for the 
job at hand. … Scientific development must be seen as a process 
driven from behind, not pulled from ahead – as evolution from, rather 
than evolution toward. (RSS, 96; similarly RSS, 115)  
 
Note that, as far as problem-solving is concerned, Kuhn motivated it 
independently; namely, through studies of history
134
. And it is the sole 
epistemological goal of science that he put forward. Furthermore, he was convinced 
of the implausibility of the teleological view because of the historical record. Such 
sheer conviction is not enough to discount the realist’s view, but the idea of using 
historical records as arguments for metahistorical views of science is a laudable one. 
In order to show that science is converging towards truth, an advocate of that view 
should, firstly, define the notion of verisimilitude or truthlikeness that is used in 
those arguments. Secondly, s/he should verify empirically that science is converging.  
On the first task, it is clear that early attempts, such as Popper’s, failed to 
make sense of the notion of truthlikeness
135
. Since then, there has been an admirable 
amount of work carried out around the notion by Ilkka Niiniluoto, Graham Oddie 
and others. The focus has been on the concept of similarity. The suggested view is 
that truthlikeness equates to truth plus similarity, and similarity is used for measuring 
distances from truth. Evaluation of these latter attempts is still ongoing. 
Unfortunately, to give a verdict on the viability of these complicated arguments goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, one sceptical remark is in place at this 
stage. Measuring the distance from a goal requires knowledge of the goal and the 
point at where the distance is measured from. If we want to know the distance from 
                                                 
134
 It is naturally an interesting question whether Kuhn’s view of the history of science as problem-
solving is actually empirically valid. The most important thing is that his view is open to refutation. 
Yet, the question of empirical validity is not a concern of this thesis, but it could be a subject for a 
further study.   
135
 This is largely due to the Tichý-Miller refutation of Popper’s definition. They showed that 
Popper’s notion is not applicable to the comparison of false theories. In order to use it, the other 
theory has to be true, which is an absurd assumption with regard to the history of science. (Niiniluoto 
2000, 65-8; see also Miller 1974). 
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truth, should we then know the truth? I take it as self-evident that that is something 
that is beyond our reach, at least for the moment. If it were not, then the notion of 
truthlikeness would lose practically all of its interest. Niiniluoto anticipates this and 
says that distance is relativised to a certain target, and not to “the whole truth of the 
whole world” (Niiniluoto 2000, 77). However, it is not clear in what relation such 
cognitive targets stand with regard to reality itself, which leaves the support for 
convergent realism as being questionable.  
At the moment I would be ready to give the benefit of doubt to those who try 
to explicate the notion of verisimilitude. But even so, it is not enough if we manage 
to make sense of the concept. We also need to show that it applies to the history of 
science. Bonjour sensibly expresses the condition for the case of convergence in the 
history of science. He writes that the coherentist standards may produce two different 
types of results in the long run. The system of beliefs might involve constant and 
relatively wholesale changes over time and thus not approach any stable conception 
of the world. The other alternative is that the system of beliefs gradually converge on 
some definite view of the world and thereafter remain relatively stable. The point is 
that only in the latter case it is reasonable to think that the beliefs that stand at the 
end are true in the sense of correspondence. In the absence of continuity and stability 
of any kind, i.e. in the case of progress through revolutions and total discontinuity, 
hitting the truth at some point would be a sudden lucky shot of which we might be 
wholly unaware. And this scenario is implausible anyway, and so I think we can 
discount this possibility. In other words, either the history of science settles on a 
certain conception of the world and remains stable, or it keeps constantly changing. 
If it converges to a certain view, then it may be the case that it corresponds to the 
reality. This is not of course necessarily so, as expressed above. If we now forget any 
challenges offered by the sceptic, one should still be able to say something of the 
relation between different scientific fields. A certain object can be studied by several 
scientific fields, which yield rather different results and theories. If there is a reality 
that can have a unified description, then the sciences that describe it should also be 
unified. One should tell, therefore, which of sciences is most fundamental, and what 
kind of relations of reduction there are, because otherwise we are left with several 
incompatible true descriptions. So, if there is convergence and stability, that would 
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clearly be a step forward from a realist point of view, but it would then open a 
problem field on a secondary level (unless convergence had already solved it in some 
way). Of course there are those, such as Dupré, who think that the project of unified 
science is doomed to fail (see Dupré, 1993). Then again, if there is constant change 
in the history of science, it is totally unreasonable to say that there is any empirical-
historical evidence for convergence and the increasing correspondence to reality, 
which makes the whole argument for truth convergence hollow. Thus, the crucial 
question is whether there is convergence and stability to be detected in the history of 
science or not.  
So is there? One can, of course, focus on many aspects in the search for 
convergence. If there is no convergence in basic ontology or concepts, then there still 
might be on a structural level, if appropriately defined. Or if not on the structural 
level, then perhaps one might try to find it via reference or truth content, and so on. 
Each case requires both an explication of the notion that convergence is supposed to 
rely on, and an empirical vindication of the view. On the other hand, if we are 
arguing for convergence as a kind of ideal final description, i.e. as a view or picture 
of the world, then there should also be convergence in the basic concepts and 
ontology. Unsurprisingly, Kuhn argues against that. In The Copernican Revolution 
(1985) Kuhn had already expressed his conviction as follows: 
 
But though achievements of Copernicus and Newton are permanent, 
the concepts that made those achievements possible are not. Only the 
list of explicable phenomena grows; there is no similar cumulative 
process for the explanations themselves. As science progresses, its 
concepts are repeatedly destroyed and replaced (Kuhn 1985, 264-5) 
 
 In addition, beside his overall argument that the history of science comprises 
scientific revolutions, he is “as a historian … impressed with the implausibility of the 
view” that looks for a match between the ontology of a theory and nature. Kuhn says 
further that:  
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I can see in their [Newton’s and Einstein’s mechanics] succession no 
coherent direction of ontological development. On the contrary, in 
some important respects … Einstein’s general theory of relativity is 
closer to Aristotle’s than either of them is to Newton’s. (SSR, 206-7).  
 
Later he talks of vain attempts at “zeroing in on nature’s real joints”, and of the need 
to replace the goal-directed approach with an evolutionary one. The greater closeness 
of relativistic physics to Aristotelian than to Newtonian is a case that “stand[s] for 
many” (RSS, 206). Kuhn is thus saying in effect that, in general, there is no 
convergence in basic ontology or in concepts in the history of science.  
It is true that Kuhn did not, at the end, offer enough historical argument for 
his view, which Sharrock and Read (2002) much emphasise. He simply did not study 
the history of science enough to strongly corroborate his views, which may probably 
be explained by the fact that he moved ever closer to the non-empirical philosophical 
argumentation. There are naturally others who have argued against convergent 
realism on empirical grounds, such as Larry Laudan (1981) and Dupré. Laudan tries 
to show that “epistemic realism … is neither supported by, nor has it made sense of, 
much of the available historical evidence” (Laudan 1981, 20).  For example, he 
comes to the conclusion that there is support for the view that many historically 
successful theories (he names more than ten of them) are nonreferential in respect of 
many of their central concepts.  He says that anyone who had come to the opposing 
conclusion “has studied only the more whiggish versions of the history of science”. 
(Laudan 1981, 33-4) Furthermore, Laudan suggests that the idea that the laws and 
mechanisms of earlier theories are preserved in theory changes in a “mature” 
discipline does not withstand historical scrutiny (1981, 47). According to Dupré, the 
situation is “messy” in biological classification. For example, it is not clear whether 
the biological basic unit of classification - species - is a kind. The post-Darwinian 
debate has tipped the balance to the opinion that due to the omnipresence of variation 
it is questionable whether species share any common internal property. As a 
consequence of this, many philosophers and biologists treat species as spatially 
discontinuous individuals. However, there are several competing principles in 
deciding on the membership of an individual in a particular species. The main 
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categories are morphological, evolutionary and pluralistic. Most crucially, there is no 
way to prove that one of several classifications is privileged. They just work 
differently for different purposes. That is to say, there is no convergence on the level 
of basic kinds in biology.  
My most important point here is that the question of whether there is 
convergence in the history of science has to be settled both by the conceptual 
clarification of such concepts as truth-likeness or verisimilitude and by empirical 
studies of the history of science. I disagree with Bonjour’s idea that the question 
should be decided by a priori argumentation (Bonjour 1985, 158). Kuhn argues 
against convergence in respect of basic ontology in science, but I think his empirical 
data is too thin to corroborate the view. At this point I am ready to leave the case 
open and wait for the verdict on whether we can find stability and gradual movement 
to some determinable direction in the history of science. Perhaps we may need to 
wait on this verdict for a long time. Meanwhile, more empirical research and a bit 
less historical cherry-picking in support of an intuitively appealing view is needed on 
both sides.  
 
Finale: Historical-pragmatical view 
 
An alternative view to scientific realism of the convergence type that does not imply 
irrationality or that does not make science non-objective can be constructed on the 
basis of Kuhn’s philosophy as it is interpreted in this thesis. Let us start by accepting 
the historical perspective of science. We are “born into” our systems of beliefs. The 
evaluation of beliefs is conducted in a historical situation with the means available. 
What is not possible is to assume, as Cartesians did, that we could search for a secure 
foundation or start building a system of beliefs from scratch. Instead, the focus is on 
how we change the beliefs of the existing system. Since the existing conceptual 
system(s) is the only one there is at each moment, and it serves rather essential 
functions in our mental life, the default option is to keep it as it is if there is no 
special reason to change it. Each change has to be motivated by the achieved gain 
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that follows. Individual beliefs are changed, and occasionally even whole systems, in 
order to increase coherence.  
 The historical perspective comes close to what pragmatists or pragmatically- 
inclined philosophers have aptly described a replacement of a spectator account of 
knowledge by an account that makes us “actors in a drama”
136
.  We do not evaluate 
our systems of beliefs outside from a neutral point of view, as if being spectators at 
some play; rather, we are the ones who are in the situation playing, interfering and 
constructing knowledge. Richard J. Bernstein writes that the conception of man has 
been distorted by Cartesianism, “not only by the preoccupation with man as knower, 
but by a certain view of what knowledge is or ought to be – one that is ‘incorrigbly 
contemplative’ ”. In order to correct this distortion, we need to understand man as an 
agent that is actively being engaged in various forms of practice. (Bernstein 1971, 
7)
137
 We are, of course, in relation to “the world” or “nature”, not in any neutral one, 
but in the relation conditioned by each historical moment. The long-term collective 
activity of a scientific or any other community in fixing our beliefs is given a crucial 
role in this view. As a consequence, each construction of knowledge is culturally 
infected or involves a perspective, because that is our starting point as human beings 
born into the ready-constructed/conceptualised world.  
If there is one True description of the world, it can be found only by getting 
rid of any cultural and contingent elements in our worldview because only in that 
way it is possible to reach correspondence to mind and human independent reality. 
This is possible, in principle, if, for example, by increasing coherence we gradually 
arrive at a certain conception of the world, which would be something like a God’s-
eye point of view. As stated above, that question needs to be settled by studying what 
kind of evidence the history of science gives to this possibility. It may also be that 
there is no such convergence and thus we are unable to arrive at “a view from 
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 Bohr reportedly made such a comment (see Niiniluoto 2000, 147-52).  
137
 Three classic papers offering a critique of the Cartesian framework from the pragmatist point of 
view are Peirce’s “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man”, “Some Consequences 
of Four Incapacities”, and “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four 
Incapacities”. The articles are reprinted in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce 1934). 
Note that, as Bernstein says, “Cartesianism” or the “Cartesian framework” is in this context better 
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nowhere”, even in the long run. This leaves us with the doctrine in which each 
description of the world inherently has a perspective and is constructed for a specific 
purpose. There may be, as Dupré argues, plurality of theories that are just as true 
without any obvious relations of reduction.  
This view, therefore, leaves open the possibility that the final description of 
the world is achievable, but it does not proclaim it. It rather locates us in history as 
active constructors of knowledge systems with our own limitations of knowing what 
is “really” true and false. But it implies that we are necessarily in relation to the 
external world, not in an unmediated way, but via our action-formed concepts. It also 
offers us a theory of theory comparison. Scientists should choose a more coherent 
theory. It may happen that two theories seem as coherent with each other. In that 
case, we should ask, in addition to their coherence, what are we looking for a theory 
for? With the Kuhnian terms, we would ask what theory is better for doing what 
scientist do, and focus on their respective ability to solve problems in the desired 
area. 
Kuhn talked in the latter part of his career of being a Kantian with historical 
moving categories, implying that the world itself, an sich, is unreachable for us, and 
that conceptual categories form the experience for us (e.g. RSS, 104). I think the idea 
of changing mental categories that shape and organise our knowledge of the world is 
a sensible one, as has been made clear throughout the thesis. However, it would have 
been better if Kuhn had not said anything of the world an sich. There is no need for 
such a postulation; the idea of conceptual scheme does not imply the distinction 
between the world an sich and the world for us. The latter is the only one we have at 
the moment. It would have been more consistent with his historical perspective had 
he stayed silent in respect of the world in itself. As a matter of fact, Kuhn sensibly 
signals in one of the Kant-references that we might be able to do without the world 
an sich (RSS, 207). His historical perspective refrains from metaphysical speculation 
or taking a standpoint that implies an external point of view. The only meta-view is a 
historical one that is the result of observing the history of science over a long period 
                                                                                                                                          
understood as an interpretation of Descartes, rather than as a view held by Descartes himself. (see 
Bernstein 1971, 5) 
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of time. We do not really know whether there is a fixed permanent world. If there is 
and we are in a position to reach it, then the future science presumably takes us there. 
From our historically situated perspective we cannot tell this. All that we can do is to 
concentrate on improving our theories of the world, which is a task that needs to be 




In this chapter I have studied Kuhn’s metahistorical view of science. One of the 
fundamental claims is that scientist do not have a privileged access to truth. To 
suppose that they have would be to make a non-naturalistic claim, unwarranted by 
the history of science. Kuhn suggested that we adopt a historical perspective 
according to which we are tied to a particular historical situation. We always inherit a 
ready-made system of beliefs and a ready-made conceptualisation of the world. The 
whole system cannot be evaluated, and so the evaluation is concentrated on changes 
to the prevailing system. The maxim is that if there is no particular reason to change 
any belief, one should retain the old system. Kuhn is, thus, suggesting that 
conservativeness is a virtue in epistemology. That is also supported by the history of 
science. There is not something akin to a crucial experiment but scientists tend to 
stick to the old. Epistemological conservativeness receives further strength from 
studies in cognitive science. Scientific knowledge is stored in holistically organised 
systems. All radical changes in the system are practically ruled out if there is no 
alternative available, and are discouraged even if there is, unless there is a promise of 
clear epistemological gain.   
The consequence of the conclusion that there is no access to truth is, in other 
words, that we are left with justification. I suggested that Kuhn’s philosophy is 
compatible with coherentism in epistemology. That is, scientists try to increase the 
coherence of their theories. That fits well with Kuhn’s view of science as a problem-
solving activity. Unsolved problems make a system less coherent, and solved 
problems, in turn, increase explanatory power, and, therefore, the overall coherence 
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of theories. Many other of Kuhn’s criteria may also be linked to coherence. And in 
any case, we may connect the criteria that may not be linked directly to the concept 
of coherence indirectly by their contribution to success in problem-solving. A further 
issue is that the coherentist tends to be conservative in epistemology because changes 
do often decrease coherence. Coherentism also provides a point for comparison 
between theories in a way that does not require an agreement between theories in 
their basic ontology. Scientists should adopt a more coherent theory for the task they 
are doing. In relation to this, I argued that comparison via references is too simple an 
account to be a historically realistic theory of theory choice. Reliance on coherentism 
is historically on firmer ground and gives a rational criterion for theory choice.   
I also examined the question of whether increased coherence might lead us to 
truth. This is the question of whether increasing coherence correlates positively with 
increasing verisimilitude, or alternatively, whether coherence is explained by a more 
fundamental notion of truth as correspondence. While this is possible, it does raise 
further questions. One is to define what truth-likeness or progress towards truth is. 
Another problem is to prove that such convergence actually occurs in history. Kuhn 
objected to the idea of convergence saying, for example, that Einsteinian physics is 
in some respects closer to Aristotelian than to Newtonian physics.  
I briefly drafted an alternative view based on Kuhn’s historical perspective. 
This accepts that scientists are historically situated and can only try to increase the 
coherence of their theories. We are more doers than spectators in the world. That is, 
we naturally interact with the world and actively construct knowledge from our 
perspective. This is akin to the pragmatist philosophy. There is no need to assume 
that the process of science takes us to truth, although it is possible. All that we need 
are standards for evaluation. If the end result is that there are multiple irreducible as 
true theories constructed for different purposes and not one True theory of the world, 
this does not establish a threat to the objectivity and reliability of scientific 
knowledge. In that situation, we still have scientific knowledge as objective and 
functioning as science actually takes it anyway.  





Perhaps we can divide philosophers into two kinds. There are those who are very 
systematic and rigorous but who do not seem to open that many new paths for others 
to follow. Then there are those who are creative opening new unexpected routes but 
may lack rigour and be somewhat unsystematic in their work. If this distinction is 
meaningful, Kuhn undoubtedly falls into the latter category. He chose not to defend 
default positions in the philosophy of his time but to suggest new ways to proceed. 
Kuhn is arguably one of the most influential philosophers in the latter part of 20
th
 
century, both inside and outside professional philosophy, and yet he never succeeded 
in giving precise formulation on the standards of analytic philosophy to practically 
any aspect of his theorising. He wrote and developed many issues but always moved 
on without offering the required explications.  
For the above reason he has been an easy target in philosophy, even to the 
point where he has become one of the apparently necessary bugbears in  
contemporary analytic philosophy. Michael Devitt, for example, motivated his 
vigorous defence of scientific realism in Truth and Realism - a conference in St. 
Andrews in June 2004 - with the fact that there really are some anti-realists, such as 
Kuhn, Feyerabend and Bas Van Fraassen. Their existence is enough to trigger a 
counteroffensive. Kuhn is undeniably an anti-realist of sorts. I indicated in the thesis 
that he might be classified as an ontological realist, but also as an epistemological 
and conceptual anti-realist. The problem is that he has become an unpleasantly 
convenient figure for the realists’ imagination. At times, he appears to serve the role 
of a straw man just to be destroyed in arguments by many who argue for realism and 
convergence to truth in science, which appears to be a kind of default position of the 
philosophy of the day.  
Bird, who fortunately does not reduce Kuhn to a straw man, but instead 
conducts a nuanced and sophisticated study of his philosophy, admits sincerely that 
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his defence of the Putnam-Kripke position is conducted from a realist perspective 
(2004a, 90-1). He goes on to say that a criticism that assumes an anti-realist 
perspective is question-begging because referentialism is a component of scientific 
realism. This also explains why Bird did not decide to develop Kuhn’s own point and  
try to find an alternative - something that would have produced an inherently anti-
realist viewpoint. Furthermore, Bird writes that it is very hard see the relevance of 
Kuhn’s critique of Putnam, even though the causal theory and essentialism have been 
put under close and critical scrutiny by analytic philosophers. On the whole, he 
thinks that Kuhn had “a tin ear” for the analytical philosophical arguments (Bird 
2004a, 74-5). Perhaps he had, but a part of the explanation as to why it is so difficult 
to see the relevance may also come from the perspectives themselves in this debate. 
My feeling is that the causal theory, or referentialism more generally, has become so 
popular that practically no-one before Sharrock and Read had tried to understand 
Kuhn’s anti-realistic perspective in this respect. While it is naturally reasonable to 
defend scientific realism, I think the decision to do so becomes unfortunate if it hides 
many of the valuable points that Kuhn made. Furthermore, arguments are often in 
danger of becoming self-serving if one’s mind is already made up before the 
analysis.  
Even though Kuhn contributed to the ingredients for misunderstandings so 
that others often saw him as a kind of philosophical extremist, I do not think he 
should be reduced merely to the role of a counter pole of scientific realism. One of 
the aims of this thesis has been to show that Kuhn’s philosophy implies elements of 
interesting theory construction and seeds of thought for serious and relevant criticism 
with regard to some of the raging philosophical debates of the day. What was just 
said above applies also to the question of meaning change. To treat meaning change 
merely as something threatening and something to be opposed is one-sided and 
conceals many interesting aspects of it. In this thesis I separated three such aspects: 
philosophical, cognitive-philosophical, and historical. In what follows, I wish to 
introduce and discuss briefly some possible themes for future research.  
In recent research, Kuhn has been seen as a therapeutic philosopher who 
wants to get rid of philosophical pseudo-problems (Sharrock and Read); as the last 
logical empiricist (Bird); and as the precursor of cognitive science theorising 
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(Andersen, Barker and Chen, and Bird). I rejected both the first and the second 
interpretations, but endorsed the last one. In addition, the Kuhn of this thesis is a 
post-empiricist but also a naturalist because of his reliance on historical and 
cognitive-psychological empirical research. Furthermore, I see him as an anti-realist 
and as someone to be taken seriously. His conceptual anti-realism or conceptualism 
and his theory of extension determination via similarity relations form an 
interpretation that makes him relevant in modern philosophy, most notably in respect 
of the causal theory and epistemology.  
The question of Kuhn’s proper context and genesis is one of the themes to 
which future research may shed more light. As shown at the beginning, there has 
been a recent move from the earlier emphasis on discontinuity in relation to logical 
empiricism to descriptions that stress continuity with that tradition. I argued here for 
discontinuity, but for different reasons than the early views by tracing the origin of 
Kuhn’s meaning theorising to the study of history. I think there is room for an 
examination of the influences on Kuhn’s early thinking from other sources as well, 
such as Gestalt psychology and Ludvig Fleck’s philosophy, which have, admittedly, 
not been entirely ignored either (e.g. Bird 2000, Ch. 1). My view is that Kuhn moved 
gradually and thematically towards the main-stream discussion in philosophy (and to 
the philosophical debates in the first place!), rather than the other way round. If 
comparison is made to logical empiricism, one needs to make clear whether that is 
meant purely as an illustration of parallels, or also as a proof that Kuhn was 
somehow a partaker of the empiricist tradition. In the latter situation, one has to point 
out what exactly was shared between Kuhn and logical empiricism, and how it 
separates them from other traditions. For example, it makes sense up to a point to say 
that Kuhn had (implicitly) adopted a descriptive theory of reference. But this 
immediately prompts the question of how widely this characterisation applies in 
philosophy, when we remember that the causal theory and externalism in semantics 
are rather recent suggestions and hardly successful theories in any pure form. 
Moreover, one should not ignore that Kuhn’s “descriptive theory” was quite a 
peculiar sort, because objects are picked and classified by similarity relations. To me, 
this counts as an important unparallel to logical empiricism, establishing a historical 
connection to later Wittgenstein.   
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A fresh approach that I have studied with keen interest in this thesis is an 
application of the cognitive science perspective with regard to Kuhn’s philosophy. 
By highlighting Kuhn’s theoretical innovations in the middle and at the end of his 
career, the advocators of this orientation have managed to point out and develop new 
aspects in his thinking, such as the idea of knowledge representation, concept 
definition and concept acquisition. There are also interesting applications to the 
history of science. I expect that this approach may be able to give us a yet more 
detailed rational account of what occurs cognitively or psychologically in scientific 
change. In Kuhn’s work, this was left somewhat mysterious because of the emphasis 
of the Gestalt-type-switch of sudden conversions. It may also be able to give us more 
historically informative accounts of specific theory changes in the history of science.   
Then, of course, Kuhn’s ideas themselves may be interpreted in unexpected 
new ways. I hope to have shown that his stand against the causal theory of reference 
reveals a proper philosophical disagreement by having argued that Kuhn assumed 
that similarity relations determine extension and that he was a conceptualist who 
does not approve of universals as mind-independent entities. Moreover, I also 
attempted to locate Kuhn in a non-customary way in the epistemological field by 
connecting his idea of science as problem-solving to the coherentist epistemology. 
Even if Kuhn was not the most eloquent constructor of philosophical arguments, 
there are truly interesting issues that are more or less implied in his philosophy. I 
would not be surprised if further angles and interpretations appear in the near future.  
I think that there is (potentially) an entire field of study where activity has 
lately been minimal. This is something that I call the philosophy of the history of 
thought, which asks what historical concepts or ideas are, how and why they change, 
and how to describe the dynamics of concepts and ideas. It seems that historians in 
the history of ideas, intellectual history, and the history of science are not interested 
in such questions of a philosophical nature that, nevertheless, can be seen to underlie 
their work. For example, the question of what ‘concept’ or ‘idea’ is often appears to 
be too abstract in comparison to the practice of history writing. Philosophers, in turn, 
have various theories of concepts to offer, but it is difficult to apply them to history 
with any relevance. And neither are philosophers very interested in the philosophy of 
the history of thought. One reason may be that one of the central theoretical notions 
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looks very confusing to an analytic philosopher. From a certain perspective, for 
example, the notion of historical concept or idea is a conglomeration of what might 
be called meaning (in the analytic sense) and belief.  
I believe that the notion of concept or idea is an important one.  Just as Smith 
and Medin wrote, we need concepts to give stability to our world and to be able to go 
beyond immediate information. Furthermore, I think we need to also have an account 
of historically existing and changing concepts. If one caught the insight from the 
very first page of the thesis that concepts or meanings form the basic ontology of our 
world, an interest in the dynamics and causes for their appearance and transformation 
becomes understandable. The question of what makes the entities that structures our 
world (view) to emerge has a straight epistemological significance: How do we 
explain the emergence of basic components of our knowledge? What are the reasons 
and the mechanisms for that process? This concern may also open a fruitful 
connection to the sociology of knowledge. It is worth elaborating further on this 
relationship.  
If we ask for a reason for meaning change as it was understood in Chapter 6, 
we are, in effect, asking why certain beliefs have changed. It may be argued that this 
interest resembles the main object of study in the sociology of knowledge, even 
though Kuhn himself did not approve of such a field. David Bloor, one of the main 
theoreticians on the sociology of knowledge, writes that the variation of our ideas of 
the world is a starting point in the field. The fundamental question is: what are the 
causes of this variation, and how and why do the ideas change? Furthermore, Bloor 
says that this study would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or 
irrationality, and success or failure. (Bloor 1991, 5-7) The starting point of the study 
on meaning change is also concerned with the variation of beliefs. We also want to 
know why members of a scientific community changed their minds; for example, 
why did scientists stop believing that elements are found in all bodies? There has to 
be a mechanism and some causes that explain this change.  
A referral to the truth of a belief does not appear to be an explanation because 
it presupposes that we have already been able to establish that the belief is true. 
Remembering the pessimistic meta-induction, that would be a daring postulation. 
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Further, it is not reasonable to give metaphysical explanations to singular events in 
the history of science. But even if a certain belief were true, we should still explain 
why people came to accept this belief and abandon another. What was the chain of 
events that led to that decision? Did somebody have an epistemic access to reality so 
that s/he could verify that a belief is true? If so, in what way? If not, how did it 
happen? This also establishes a difference to the sociology of knowledge. The 
agreement is that the mere supposition of the truth of a belief is not an adequate 
explanation. But if at some point it turns out to be the case, i.e. if it can be 
established that a certain scientific belief is true, then it may have explanatory value. 
This could be the situation that externalists in epistemology and semantics talk about: 
that the true beliefs about objects are causally effected by the objects themselves. 
The problem is to establish that such is the case. In this sense, we can use the same 
type of mechanical explanations in both cases but the truth of a belief would bring a 
further relevant factor to be taken into account in the explanation. On the whole, the 
study of meaning change shares with the sociology of knowledge both the starting 
point and a fundamental premise: the former is the task of explaining belief changes 
and the latter a conviction that the explanations used have to be natural. 
I think it is important to realise that the study of meaning change is not 
necessarily in contrast to scientific realism. It is, in principle, possible to accept that 
there are certain causal explanations as to how scientists came to accept certain 
beliefs and maintain that their beliefs are true or truer than those of their 
predecessors. Judging whether that is the case is another matter. At a more general 
level, I agree with Paul Thagard that logical, sociological and cognitive explanations 
can be compatible or even complementary. For example, we may give a sociological 
account of how Lavoisier’s oxygen theory or his revolutionary beliefs spread by 
various means and reasons to his colleges, which prompted new beliefs and mental 
representations of them, which in turn led them to appreciate the greater coherence of 
Lavoisier’s theory and thus accept it (Thagard 1994, 637-8). This type of explanation 
takes all these aspects into account.  
It may be said that the step from the era of logical empiricism to the post-
empiricist dominance of realism brought a change in how ontological questions 
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relate to epistemological ones. That is, logical empiricism conjoined the question of 
what exists with the question of how we can know that by making observation the 
corner stone of all knowing, while the realist philosophy wants to address the 
questions concerning existence in separation from the questions concerning our 
capability of knowing. However, looking at this from a historical perspective, such a 
separation looks puzzling. Arguably, the distinction can be made intellectually, but 
how about in practice? How can we try to answer what there is without taking into 
account the position we are in when answering that question? If the history of 
science can be used as any indicator, then it looks that our answers to ontological 
questions are distorted by all kind of historical products, such as the web of beliefs, 
language, and sociological factors. The fact that no answer to ontological question 
has appeared to be lasting seems to convey the message that epistemology stands in 
the way of ontology. We are historically situated and, thus, impaired in knowing. In 
other words, our (in)ability to answer the most fundamental questions has to be taken 
into account. Kuhn did not go back to the view of logical empiricism that conjoined 
the two questions, but he may be said to have prioritised the epistemological over the 
metaphysical. 
The problematic whether we are situated inside a frame, language or 
something else that disqualifies us from answering external questions, or whether 
there is some direct and unmediated way to get knowledge of reality is an age-old 
problem and reflects the tension between the historical and the externalist 
philosophical points of view. I do feel that that the scepticism of the historical 
perspective in regard to the possibility of our knowing answers (at the moment) to 
ontological questions is well-grounded. In any case, it is interesting to continue the 
debate on this basis, and critical realism is at least prepared to engage in such a 
debate (see Niiniluoto 1999, 91). Such a historical orientation does not need to lead 
to any subjectivist, idealist, or irrationalist exaggerations, but can offer, in contrast, a 
reasoned standpoint in philosophy that I tried tentatively and briefly to draft at the 
end of the penultimate chapter. Of the major philosophical traditions, perhaps 
pragmatism offers one such reasoned standpoint. What I wish especially to see today, 
more than forty years from the birth of the historical philosophy of science and the 
emergence of many departments of the history and philosophy of science, is yet 
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better integration of historical and philosophical studies. My belief is that in 
answering the question of whether science really is approximating reality, the history 
of science has to play a central role. In other words, I wish to see more applications 
and attempts that try to assess what kind of philosophical view the history of science 
can accommodate without distortion of the historical data. This has to start with 
respect to both philosophical argumentation and historical research, and with the 
decision not to aim to merely vindicate one’s view, no matter what the cost.  
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